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Spring 1978

Staffing the Carter Presidency:
Richard E. Neustadt — Premature Notes on the New Administration
Harrison Wellford — An Insider's Comments
Richard E. Neustadt — A January 1978 Postscript

Nelson W. Polsby — Presidential Cabinet Making

Lewis J. Edinger — West Germany: Problems and Prospects

Greg A. Caldeira
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Gary W. Reichard — Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952–1956

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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT reviews President Carter's reorganization of the Executive Office of the president, announced last July. Staff arrangements in and near the White House show both the stamp of inheritance and the impact of President Carter's own special outlook on staffing and organization. HARRISON WELLFORD, a member of Carter's reorganization team, comments on Neustadt's observations from an "insider's" point of view. In a short postscript, NEUSTADT reflects on developments in the Carter Executive Office since last September.

NELSON W. POLSBY suggests that the pattern of appointments in the Carter cabinet shows the persistence of a type of presidential leadership that the Nixon presidency did not put out of style. The causes of President Carter's brand of leadership are traced to the Democratic nomination process, however, rather than to attitudes about presidential authority that Carter evidently does not share with former president Nixon.

LEWIS J. EDINGER takes a long-range look at West German domestic and foreign policy developments. He holds that the present political system appears firmly established, but that it may be severely tested by conflicts over military, economic, and internal security issues.

GREG A. CALDEIRA and FRED I. GREENSTEIN present evidence on trends in adults' party attachments and on children's orientations to political parties in Britain, France, and the United States. Their findings cast doubt on recent assertions that Fifth Republic France has become a nation of party identifiers and strongly suggest that there are wide variations in the qualitative content of the partisan orientations that citizens in each of the nations acquire in the course of political socialization.

GARY W. REICHARD traces the evolution of Democratic party thought and action on significant foreign policy issues during the first Eisenhower administration. Refuting the idea that bipartisanship prevailed in foreign policy during the 1950s, he describes how Democratic leaders differed with Eisenhower's policies from 1952 to 1956 and why they developed a coherent alternative policy of their own after 1956.

JACK P. GREENE argues that Thomas Paine's larger significance can only be understood in terms of his contributions to the modernization of political consciousness that occurred during the last decades of the eighteenth century. More specifically, Greene contends that Paine played a key role in bringing about two crucial political developments: the mobilization of large segments of society that had previously been politically inert and the desacralization of the traditional political order.

RAYMOND COHEN compares six examples of threat perception in international crisis that occurred over the past 100 years. He concludes that a common factor which influenced the relevant decision makers' selection and interpretation of evidence was the appraisal that there had been a breach of "rules of the game" among the states involved.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Staffing the Presidency: Premature Notes on the New Administration

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT

In December 1976, with an August 1977 deadline, I was asked to do something very hard—to give fellow president-watchers useful information that would "up-date our lecture notes" on the institutional presidency, carrying forward from Ford to Carter, from Republicans to Democrats, an outline of Executive Office organization, White House included.

What made this task hard was the qualification *useful*. The ostensible staffing pattern of a new regime in its seventh month (when this analysis was due) is an uncertain guide for the years to follow, especially when viewed from the outside. The Truman pattern of late 1945—more crazy-quilt than pattern—gave no hint to outsiders (or insiders for that matter) of the stabilized relationships to come, built up by personalities not yet in place, among others, Clark Clifford and James Webb. The Nixon pattern of mid-1969 had seeming "openness," even competitiveness in domestic policy. Daniel Patrick Moynihan balanced Arthur Burns, while Henry Kissinger struggled for acceptance by the Nixon loyalists, a struggle then in doubt. At that point Bryce Harlow, the congressional liaison man from Eisenhower's time, had far higher status in the new regime than, say, John Ehrlichman. But six months later Haldeman and Ehrlichman were "in," Kissinger entrenched, the others gone or going. Therefore in August 1977 one cannot write with confidence of Hamilton Jordan and company, to say nothing of Bertram Lance!

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, author of *Presidential Power* and *Alliance Politics*, is professor of government at Harvard University and was an advisor to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. He has also served as a consultant to Carter's Reorganization Project. This article is adapted from comments prepared for the September 1977 Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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However, 1977 yields one special feature which may lend current arrangements rather more weight than usual: Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, and more importantly the study that preceded it. The study gave President Carter and his chief aides more instruction on and understanding of Executive Office institutions generally, and of their own performances to date—buttressed by quite dispassionate case studies—than previous presidents have ever had so early in the game. Carter made conscious choices, after study, only last July. We can assume, therefore, that for some time to come he will stick with those choices to the maximum extent allowed by unexpected losses of key people or by unforeseen defects in key procedures. No doubt there will be some of both. Barring a flood of them, however, I think we can anticipate, this year and probably next as well, that Carter's Executive Office, White House included, will resemble what we see in his first Reorganization Plan and its accompanying statements.[1]

Personalities along with strains that history can put upon procedures—especially in economics and in national security—may wreck this prediction. I accept that. But at least we start now, seven months into Carter's term, with relatively stabilized relationships and conscious choices made by light of some experience. Thus Nixon's case *may* not apply. A lot depends on personalities, of course, and how they grow, or don't.

Let me introduce those Carter choices by asking where the Executive Office now stands in relation to what went before: How has the Carter administration dealt with its inheritance of structures and procedures from previous presidents?

In the institutional development of the Executive Office since 1939, innovative structures and procedures that survive a change of administration from one party to the other seem firmly rooted thereafter, altering their inner character perhaps, with the passage of time, but not their external form or ostensible functions: for example, legislative clearance in the then Budget Bureau after 1952; or congressional liaison à la Harlow after 1960; or a special staff for trade negotiations, like the Kennedy Round, after 1968; or a substantive staff for the president in foreign policy à la Bundy (nominally under NSC), expanded after 1968 with Kissinger as super-Bundy. Or take the Council of Economic Advisers launched in 1946, which very nearly did *not* survive Truman. Eisenhower left it up to Arthur Burns, and Burns's CEA was carried on by Kennedy, then Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and so to Carter.

What seem to be the counterparts today? What innovations from the Nixon years and Ford's now seem built in, part of the long-term presidency because—so far—they have survived under Carter? Let me list ten at random.

[1] For a full statement of Executive Office reorganization as envisaged in July 1977 see Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, with a "Statement by the President," July 15, 1977, a "Fact Sheet" dated the same day, and the transcript of an OMB press conference. These are available from OMB in a document entitled "Reorganization Plan No. 1, July 1977."

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Office of Management and Budget

The Rooseveltian Budget Bureau keeps the awful title Nixon's people fastened on it in 1970, "Office of Management and Budget" (OMB), with all its historic functions intact, except for those of Roosevelt's Central Statistical Board (never effectively integrated, increasingly downgraded, and now transferred with some hope of upgrading to Commerce). Internally, OMB keeps the administrative layer of so-called PADs (Program Associate Directors) inserted in Nixon's time between front office and career staff. PADs are political executives presumably attuned both to the White House and to Capitol Hill. Their presence testifies to doubts in Carter's time, no less than in Ford's or Nixon's, about leaving careerists on their own while budget directors may be otherwise engaged (for example, George Shultz, Bert Lance) and while congressional dealings multiply along with congressional staffs. OMB also continues to stress the M in its title, encountering as always a dilemma: how to avoid being swallowed by the B, or being swamped by services for second-string officials whose needs are remote from the president's. The answer of the moment is to focus in the main upon a temporary task, the President's Reorganization Project, and secondarily on intergovernmental issues, so as to backstop the White House. One thing OMB will not keep is the statutory Federal Property Council and staff, mostly devolved to GSA, while OMB retains, as it should, a watching brief.[2]

Two Lesser Agencies: COWPS and CEQ

COWPS, the Council on Wage and Price Stability, a cabinet committee with staff, is a statutory relic of Nixonian controls.[3] It survives for much the reason it came into being on the heels of decontrol: there has to be some symbol of the government's concern and some staff capability to monitor key sectors. The new regime, indeed, is buttressing that staff while subordinating it at the same time to the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Charles Schultze now wears two hats. Thereby the CEA retains the character that it assumed in Burns's time, a largely academic staff on short-term leaves, a link between the profession and the president, a source of personal advice to him on matters mainly *macro*-economic. Sectoral issues seem to be a sphere for COWPS staff under Schultze's other hat. Perhaps this makes a nice division of

[2] The Federal Property Council, with a staff of about forty, is being transferred for the most part to the General Services Administration, but the OMB retains residual responsibility for review and coordination in the sphere of property management (as in most other spheres of executive operation).

[3] The Nixon administration, using discretionary authority, established mandatory price and wage controls in 1971 and gradually removed them during 1972 and 1973, following which the United States experienced the sharpest inflation ever. In the process the discretionary authority lapsed and was not renewed by Congress. COWPS was then established (1974).

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labor; it is too soon to say. At any rate the new institution, like the old, survives, and they are joined as not before.

CEQ, the Council on Environmental Quality, is another Nixon creation and like CEA a staff group, not a cabinet council.[4] It passes the test of survival, although now reduced in size, after pressure tactics previous presidents would have resented fiercely. How Carter feels I do not know. Probably there are more reorganizations coming of environmental functions generally, including this one.

Office of Science and Technology Policy

OSTP, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, is a revival of OST, the Science Adviser's office, started under Eisenhower, institutionalized under Kennedy, abolished under Nixon.[5] OST had let itself become spokesman *to* the president for the second-string concerns of half-a-dozen federal scientific agencies: not his concerns, theirs. And its advisory bodies had included outspoken opponents of the Vietnam War. Abolition under Nixon seemed natural. Revived in 1976 by act of Congess, OSTP was only just beginning to organize when Ford left office. The new administration drew on an almost clean slate with Frank Press as Director. Press reportedly was quick to distinguish between helping the White House frame policy options and helping all others press claims on the White House. Reorganization Plan No. 1 envisages devolving from OSTP all statutory duties which would make it prone, like OST, to serve as routine spokesman for those others. Press is said to be enthusiastic about devolution, a good augury for OSTP's usefulness. The survival test, however, cannot be applied full-scale until the next Republican administration.

Domestic Policy Staff

Nixon's most ambitious institutional innovation was the Domestic Council, a statutory cabinet committee with staff created in 1970 on the model, it was said, of NSC. The "council" feature never became real: intended for a small number of superdepartments, it failed to function when they failed to come into existence, having been blocked by Congress. A council of existing departments, being no improvement on the cabinet, was not used. The staff, however, had reality from the start, although a checquered career thereafter. It began as John Ehrlichman's instrument for policy planning and ad hoc coordination, and it dominated many agencies. After Ehrlichman's fall, and partly because of it, the Domestic Council staff sank almost out of sight and under Ford had

[4] The CEQ, a statutory agency, modelled roughly on CEA, was established in 1970, predating the EPA which came into existence by Reorganization Plan at the end of that year.

[5] The OST (now replaced by OSTP) was created by Congress in 1962 at Kennedy's instance, formalizing the science advisory bodies established at the White House under Eisenhower after "Sputnik" in 1957.

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an uncertain evolution, often kept at arm's length from the day to day flow of presidential business. But Carter's aides, who needed slots for Stuart Eizenstat's campaign issues coordinators, emptied the Domestic Council of Ford's people and installed their own, although in lesser numbers. Since January 1977 a Domestic Council staff of eighteen or twenty professionals has worked for Eizenstat, the president's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy, in very much the way that Joseph Califano and his staff of five or six served Lyndon Johnson: as substantive assistants in development of legislative programs for a new administration, while helping to track presidential interests or frame presidential options, day by day. The staff thus plays as key a role as it ever did under Ehrlichman, although it is decidedly a Democratic variant which lacks Ehrlichman's reach for control, and is mindful of Carter's professed interest in "cabinet government."

Reorganization Plan No. 1 acknowledges this evolution by relabelling the Council a "Domestic Policy Staff," with Eizenstat wearing two hats, one inside the White House, one out, precisely paralleling Carter's NSC Assistant, Zbigniew Brzezinski.[6] Like the National Security Council staff (there "Council" remains in the title), this Domestic Policy Staff is only a very small step "outside" the White House. The step is small but perhaps consequential: White House aides are automatically presumed to be on Carter's business; aides from NSC or DPS are merely on Brzezinski's or Eizenstat's business, until they show otherwise. The main thing to note is that both staffs not only survive but flourish, smaller in numbers but larger, by all accounts, in effect on policy than they were under Ford.

Three White House Offices

In the White House itself many traces of Ford's arrangements remain. These in turn owed much to Nixon's, something even to Eisenhower's. Most important, the traditional post of Appointments Secretary, known to every Democrat from FDR through LBJ as a key place for politics, now has the grander title of Assistant to the President and is buttressed by associates, effectively subordinate, each one of whom does part of what old-style Appointments Secretaries were supposed to do. There are special assistants for scheduling, for personnel, for White House management, and a Staff Secretary for the paper flow, each with a deputy or two and help from White House careerists who were once almost the sole recourse for an Appointments Secretary. That officer, retitled now and freed from total immersion in minute detail, can put his mind on whatever the president wants.

Nixon, who pioneered this arrangement, came to want a choke-point, in effect a deputy, sometimes a coconspirator: H.R. Haldeman. Ford wanted not a

[6] Brzezinski's formal title is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and as such he directs the staff of the National Security Council. Eizenstat is Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, and Director of the Domestic Policy Staff.

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deputy but a priority-setter and strong facilitator: Donald Rumsfeld, later Richard Cheney. Carter evidently wants political strategy and perspective: Hamilton Jordan—who, wisely refusing to be called a "chief of staff," sits where those others sat while doing his own thing.

Another trace of Ford, and through him of Nixon, can be found in Carter's White House aides for public liaison, under Midge Costanza, also an Assistant to the President. Her staff is somewhat smaller but addresses the same purposes as it did under the Republicans (shaded for differences in party style and emphasis): it affords status symbols and a set of open doors to groups not otherwise well connected, at least in their own estimation (for example, ethnic minorities). "Public liaison" seems here to stay. This is a sobering thought for those of us who favor a lean White House, but it is justified, perhaps, by history, demography, and the collapse of parties.

Still another trace of Ford—which improves on Nixon—is found in Carter's Special Counsel to the President, Robert Lipshutz. He is *not*, as in the old days of a Rosenman, a Clifford, or a Sorensen, domestic policy adviser and speechwriter combined. Nor is he the one but not so much the other as in Johnson's time, when Califano and Harry McPherson divided those functions (or as Eizenstat now divides them with a Special Assistant for speechwriting, James Fallows). Lipshutz, rather, is the direct heir of Ford's Counsel, Philip Buchan, a legal adviser per se on propriety, conduct, and conflict of interest in a president's staff *after* Watergate.

Economic Policy Group

A further trace of Ford, or anyway a glimmering, attaches to the Steering Committee of Carter's Economic Policy Group, an adaptation of the Executive Committee in Ford's Economic Policy Board. The EPB was Ford's foremost institutional innovation. Its executive committee was chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury but with a secretariat consisting of a senior White House aide—William Siedman—and an able junior, Roger Porter. Those two coordinated, processed, and scheduled preparatory efforts and follow-up on virtually every economic issue, micro as well as macro, legislative as well as operational, or informational, which Ford personally dealt with in 1975 and 1976.[7] EPB's committee thus combined the reach (though not the authority) of Nixon's economic czar, George Shultz—who was both Treasury Secretary and White House Assistant—with the ostensible terrain of the Council on International Economic Policy, and the macro role of Kennedy's "troika": Treasury, Budget, CEA.

The EPG Steering Committee now starting to function for Carter as an outgrowth of reorganization, may or may not turn into an equivalent or an improvement. There is reason for hope, but it is much too soon to tell. The

[7] A major study of the Economic Policy Board as it functioned in Ford's time is now underway at Harvard, directed by Roger Porter, Special Assistant to President Ford (1974-76).

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Committee is Kennedy's threesome expanded to four: Messrs. Blumenthal, Lance, and Charles Schultze, plus the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Richard Cooper. (Commerce and Labor, there in Ford's time, are now gone.) Treasury chairs and also furnishes the executive secretary—a striking shift from EPB—but a fifth and a sixth member, both *"ex officio,"* are the president's two policy assistants, Brzezinski and Eizenstat. How they and their functions relate to this Steering Committee and vice versa, and what Blumenthal makes of his chairmanship, and where his able aid, the Committee's Secretary, Curt Hessler, comes to rest, we perhaps will know in six months time, after budget season and the annual messages of 1978. This may turn out in retrospect a legacy from Ford, a Carter innovation, or a passing phase.

White House Titles

A final legacy from Ford and Nixon is the five-way spread of current White House titles (up from four in LBJ's time, three in Truman's). Nixon put "Assistants to the President" in senior places previously held by "Special Assistants." It followed as night from day—and still does—that there then would be "Deputy Assistants to the President," "Special Assistants to the President," and "Deputy Special Assistants to the President" (maybe even some 'Administrative Assistants to the President," the old Rooseveltian title), as well as a still lower, fifth level of assistantships without those magic last three words.

Carter, to be sure, has cut the White House staff. Professional-level personnel (distinct from clerical and service staffs) employed in the White House proper drops from some 250 to about 180, as I understand the new reorganization. No one will be surprised that I applaud it and am heartened by it. Combined with Rumsfeld's cuts in 1975, these reverse Nixon's indiscriminate expansion of the White House Office—when the comparable figure rose above 300—and go far to restore its status as a personal staff (not far enough to suit *me*, but as far as I suppose we are likely to get from now on).

But that five-way spread of titles has wreaked havoc with one Democratic precedent, namely, that those three words "to the President" were meant to signify a close, continuing relationship with *him*, and serious engagement on *his* work from day to day. Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and even Johnson gave out those words sparingly. Nixon, and only less so Ford, now Carter, cast them wide. By way of compensation, Carter's people draw a sharp distinction—as did Ford—between "senior staff" and all others. Seven Assistants to the President, together with the presidential Counsel (all equal but some more equal than others) rank everybody else in the White House Office save the Vice President, a special case. This now becomes familiar to the Washington community and nobody but me seems bothered in the least by more than thirty aides entitled something-to-the-President.

So much for innovations since the Johnson years adapted now and carried on by Carter. There are also some things that he now chooses to discard. Four units first established under Nixon have *not* passed the survival test. The Energy

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Resources Council goes to the new department. The Council on International Economic Policy, long moribund, is abolished. So is the Office of Telecommunications Policy, its functions split between the president's Domestic Policy Staff and a new Assistant Secretary of Commerce. The Office of Drug Abuse Policy is being replaced by a White House Special Assistant. An Eisenhower innovation modified by Kennedy and later Ford has also been abolished (made redundant by new oversight committees on the Hill): the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. A Nixon unit abandoned by Ford remains dead: the so-called Director of Communications. Carter's press secretary, Jody Powell, still another "Assistant to the President," does all that this regime intends to do by way of White House-media relations, with half the staff of Nixon's although four times that of Truman's—a tribute to the size of the accredited press corps, *and* to TV.

At the same time, Carter has made innovations of his own, especially inside the White House. One of these is embodied in Jack Watson's double role as Cabinet Secretary and Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Relations: an interesting conception, hard to bring to life. Another—just now being installed—is a set of interdepartmental procedures for policy development meant to make Eizenstat a process manager on the lines of Brzezinski, or the early Henry Kissinger, in NSC. Still another innovation, yet to be completed, is a Central Administrative Unit which consolidates some services for the Executive Office as a whole.

But these and other changes of the same sort are dwarfed by Carter's quite unprecedented use of the Vice Presidency and this, combined with what he seems to want from Jordan, has enormous influence on his general staffing pattern, especially the fostering of separate staffs for foreign and domestic policy.

In 1977, after all we should have learned since World War II about the risks of separating foreign from domestic staff-work for a president—shades of Korean War aims, or the Bay of Pigs, or soybeans for that matter, let alone Vietnam—it may appear extraordinary at first glance that DPS and NSC staff are in wholly separate boxes on the Carter chart. The fine print discloses that Eizenstat is a nonstatutory member of the NSC, which helps some. It also shows, I understand at second-hand, that Jordan has access at will to any papers moving through those boxes, either one. And so does the Vice President who is supposed to actively participate in everything, and evidently does, and has his own staff to backstop him. By all accounts the president treats Mondale as a "working partner," and—remarkably—their staffs respect the relationship.[8] If so, with these arrangements, Carter has more chance for integrative staff-work linking foreign with domestic policy and politics than we have known before. Those

[8] "Working partner" is a term coined by the *New York Times*. A circumstantial account of the Carter-Mondale relationship can be found in that newspaper, signed by Marjorie Hunter, July 20, 1977. Her account squares with what I have been told by OMB and White House aides.

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boxes we can hope are far less separate than they seem. Carter's use of Jordan is in part the reason. And so is Mondale, the man with separate staff.

The reorganization study contemplates formalizing Mondale's role, in this respect and others, by making him the chairman of a staff group at the White House, tentatively titled an "Executive Committee." They and their chairman would watch and adjust substance in the president's agenda, set and review priorities among the issues headed toward him (or those needing staff attention but not getting it) throughout the Executive Office, NSC, DPS, OMB, and the cabinet besides—and EPG presumably, although that remains to be seen. The president's seven Assistants, Jordan, Powell, Eizenstat, Brzezinski, Watson, Costanza, and Moore (the Congressional Liaison), the president's Counsel, Lipshutz, the Budget Director, Lance, and perhaps one or two others, thus become collectively, under Mondale's chairmanship, a sort of super-Rumsfeld. If this is implemented as intended it will crown the procedures now envisaged by the new regime for staffing out substantive issues, foreign and domestic, presumably including economic, at presidential level—a remarkable development.

But do not count on it yet! Whether a committee of ten or more crowns anything, except *pro forma*, is open to doubt. Or more precisely, everything depends then on its chairman's standing with the rest—and with the president.

Procedures are no substitute for judgment, of course, nor are they meaningful apart from operating styles, and styles fuel judgment in the sense that they determine when and how and with what coloration issues get presented to a president. What matters is the *interlock* of operating styles between him and his aides and among them. In early months when he and his associates are still adjusting to the new conditions of their lives, both work methods and human interactions are uncertain and are subject to considerable change. Later, sometimes much later, stabilized relationships emerge, which outsiders can discern and characterize with some precision. So far as I can tell, Carter's White House has not reached that stage. Nor is it likely to for quite a while, especially if Lance should step aside, leaving the others to adjust afresh.

Presidential transitions are not short-term affairs. This one is far from over. Carter, I am told, still exhibits some of Truman's early tendencies to grab and make decisions out of hand. Brzezinski's "process" may now be the envy of domestic aides, but his command of it and management are said to leave a lot to be desired. The early Frank Moore plainly had his troubles. So it goes. These details will alter. Others not now visible are certain to emerge. The likelihood is that a year from now the staffing pattern set so consciously last summer will remain in outline although changed in some particulars. But in the cycle of a presidential term, the seventh month is too soon to be altogether sure of anything: these notes are premature. They may suffice for lectures in the fall of 1977; the word a year hence should be, "check before using."

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Staffing the Presidency: An Insider's Comments

HARRISON WELLFORD

Dick Neustadt asked me to think about what the reorganization of the Executive Office meant to the president in terms of an insider's understanding of his style and preferences. The first guideline we received from the president was that he wanted the units of the Executive Office to serve his major decision processes. He wanted the Executive Office staff to look to the president and to provide information and options for his major decisions from his point of view, and not represent outside interests to the president. As we talked about the pros and cons of abolishing a particular unit, the president would frequently look back on the first six months of his presidency and ask how many times had he met with the people in the unit, how aware was he of the things they were doing. He was testing their usefulness by his own experience. That principle of trying to mold the Executive Office staff to serve the president from his perspective guided our study throughout, but there are exceptions. Though we felt on the whole that the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) could perform its functions adequately outside the Executive Office, it was nevertheless decided, after a lot of discussion and some political negotiations, to continue CEQ in the Executive Office.

A second point was the president's concern that the Executive Office staff and the White House personal staff be organized so as to make cabinet government a reality. Virtually every modern president has come into office in January saying that he wanted cabinet government. We all know that six months later that ideal goes aglimmering. In this administration I think cabinet government has, in fact, characterized our process, mainly because the president insists on governing the process to make it work. In the reorganization work that my staff does we are often in potential conflict with cabinet members because we are in the uneasy role of telling a department head that he may lose part of his

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domain or that he may have to reorganize the units within his department. It could easily develop into a situation in which we became a kind of super-staff making a great many decisions for the cabinet in areas that they would feel were peculiarly their own. But because of the president's concern for cabinet government, we have taken great pains to develop a cooperative arrangement with the major agencies and departments that we're reorganizing and we are acting with them to a significant extent as partners in a common effort. Sometimes we give a little bit, sometimes the cabinet member gives a little bit. But the reason we take such pains is that the president really does want the primary initiation of policy including reorganization to come from his major cabinet officers.

A third point I would make is that the president stated all along that he had a preference for "ad hocery" over formal institutions. And as a result, we made a number of recommendations which tried to get away from creating permanent institutionalized staffs in the Executive Office. In the Executive Office, particularly, we need flexible institutions to respond to the shifting needs of the presidency. The Economic Policy Group is probably the best example of that. It was tending to become a formal institution with an independent staff in the early part of this administration. But the reorganization plan turned that around and the EPG at least for now is much more flexible in the way it's working. It does not have an independent staff but draws staff from principals as problems arise. Mr. Eizenstat's staff, the Domestic Policy Staff, by the way, is much more involved in economic issues than its predecessors were.

Contrary to press reports, we did not recommend that the president designate a chief of staff. A.D. Frazier and I did go to Hamilton Jordan to discuss problems in the White House policy process but did not suggest that Ham assume the mantle of chief of staff. We pointed out a number of coordination problems that beset the present White House policy system and suggested that we needed to develop a remedy for these problems. We did not recommend a chief of staff because the president had made it clear in all of our meetings with him that he did not want a chief of staff—that is, somebody at the top of the pyramid through whom everything else was channeled. Hamilton is in many respects first among equals and gets involved in both domestic and foreign policy when he thinks it's of importance to the president to do so. But he is not sitting at the top with all papers and decisions flowing through him.

The president acts as his own chief of staff. He is a prodigious reader. The memos we send in sometimes come back with more comments than original text. I don't know how long he can keep this up but he has a passion for getting involved in the details of a lot of these decisions—even decisions that less hard-working presidents probably felt could have been handled below the Oval Office.

One remedy we proposed is a central planning and tasking mechanism for both domestic and national security policy. Pursuant to our recommendation, the Vice President is now chairing an executive committee of senior staff which has responsibility for planning the president's agenda for 1978 and

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beyond. We're in the process now of trying to develop the guidelines for this system.

Finally, we have reduced the professional staff at the White House quite substantially, thus reversing the long-term trend toward steady increases.

A January 1978 Postscript

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT

A few weeks after my original words were written Lance did step aside, leaving all relationships, all human interactions, operating styles to adjust afresh. As presidential confidant, authentic Georgian, and Budget Director, with commensurate weight in the EPG, Lance was a key member of the inmost inner circle. Those in outer circles were fast stabilizing their relationships with one another—and indeed with the president—around and through Lance. His departure slammed the White House entourage back almost to square one, and forced them to relive the uncertainties of February in October.

The Lance affair, moreover, with its slow-motion dénouement and Carter's evident dislike for what he had to do, gave the Washington press corps a field day, fleshing out an otherwise lean season.[1]

The president's honeymoon with the press ended then and there. With it went a share of his professional reputation. And when, immediately after, Senate moves against his energy proposals prompted no effective countermeasures from the White House, criticism in the press and in Washington generally reached quite remarkable proportions: remarkable because so fre-

[1] The acute phase of the Lance affair ran from August 18, 1977, with Carter's reaffirmation of faith in Lance after the Comptroller of the Currency Report, to September 21, 1977, with Carter's reluctant announcement of Lance's resignation despite vigor in his own defense at Senate hearings. For the Pesident's statements and accompanying news accounts see the *New York Times*, August 19, p. A19, and September 22, p. 33.

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quently addressed to managerial detail—like Jordan's failure to assume the staff coordinative tasks assigned Ford's "chief of staff."[2]

That the absence of a White House "chief of staff" should cause complaint in Washington within months of a Democrat's inauguration is in itself remarkable, worth notice, and deserving of thought. Since presidential staffing in a serious sense started under FDR, no Democratic president has tolerated in the White House anyone with Rumsfeld's relative authority over most other aides, to say nothing of Haldeman's in Nixon's time or Sherman Adams's under Eisenhower: authority, that is to say (always in all regimes with some exceptions), to superintend the flow of people and of papers into the Oval Office, while simultaneously chairing staff meetings, handing out assignments, vetting performance, vetoing initiatives, all in the president's name, and generally policing his priorities (if not, indeed, contriving them). Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson all preferred and usually tried to do such things themselves. Yet in the fall of 1977, journalists with Democratic leanings, Congressmen of liberal persuasion, Washingtonians-at-large had at Carter for weeks, belaboring him for his failure to turn Jordan into Rumsfeld or to replace him.

There may be diverse reasons for this phenomenon. Perhaps because Rumsfeld and Cheney worked for Ford, a president who liked to deal with detail and to hear from all and sundry, their retrospective reputations are benign, contrasting well with Haldeman's whose image now has faded. Perhaps because Republican administrations, relative to Democratic ones, have pressed less controversial social legislation on reluctant Congresses, White House "coordination" seems a relatively simple thing, a matter more of process than of substance. A Rumsfeld would not square well with an Eizenstat—or with a Clifford, a Califano, or a Sorensen—but under the Republicans there was less need for one (unless like Ehrlichman he was the staff-chief's chum and deputy). Perhaps because the Johnson White House, pre-Vietnam, is a decade or more behind us, too long for most journalistic memories, unknown to most Congressmen and Senators elected since (a larger group than usual), what startles and seems novel is reversion to a "prewar" pattern, while the Cheney-Rumsfeld-even-Haldeman precedents are taken for "modern times."

Besides, if Carter is to be considered his own chief of staff, he seems to lack an attribute of his Democratic predecessors: wide accessibility. Truman chaired daily staff meetings; Kennedy had functional equivalents; Johnson *noticed*; all reached out. And all presided over White House groups far smaller than Carter's: no counsel (in the current sense), little "public liaison," few deputies, no staff or cabinet secretaries, an embryonic domestic policy staff, a modest National Security staff, and no fifth layer (in Truman's case no fourth). Carter is the first Democrat to work in a Republican-sized White House. Republicans who tried it quickly got themselves staff-chiefs. Carter so far has not. Yet he regularly visits face-to-face with relatively few of his aides; reading what

[2] For one example of many see Charles Mohr, "Carter's First Nine Months: Charges of Ineptitude Rise," *New York Times*, October 22, Sec. 1, p. 36.

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they write does not have a commensurate effect upon the loyalty and cohesion of the rest. This, rather than lack of memory, may account for some of the concern expressed in Washington last fall.

On the other hand Carter has at least two things the Republicans lacked. For one he has the old Domestic Council harnessed to a policy aide in the best Democratic tradition. Eizenstat by all accounts is turning out to be a proper heir to Clifford and the like. He even seems to be achieving the degree of "process management" envisaged by last summer's reorganization. Carter also has Mondale, the first vice president to disappear from sight not because he is cold-shouldered at the White House but because he is so busy there. I write in December 1977. Thus far, Mondale has shown no signs of taking on himself, or on his nominal committee, operational coordination of his colleagues day by day. But what he seems to be engaged in is coordination of their views about priorities and timing for initiatives ahead, the stuff of Carter's own agenda. This too is in the spirit of July's Reorganization Plan.

Every new administration, in the fall of its first year, discovers afresh that preparation for its January messages to Congress is the nearest thing it can expect (however far from perfect) by way of opportunity for comprehensive program planning. Thereupon each new regime works up procedures whereby it can take advantage of the opportunity. To play a part in those procedures is to get at the heart of the president's key peacetime role in government, the clerkship from which, in my view, all leadership must emanate: the taking of initiatives for other parts of government—and interest-groups—to chew on. As of December, Mondale by all accounts plays such a part. That does not make him chief-of-staff. But along with yeoman work by Eizenstat it helps explain why, at this time of year, Carter can carry on without either a Rumsfeld or a long-term replacement for Lance.

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Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons for the Political System

NELSON W. POLSBY

When a new president picks his cabinet, he gives observers the first set of solid clues about the kind of president he intends to be. Like the campaign rhetoric that preceded the election, a cabinet can be read in a variety of ways. And it affords only fragmentary evidence about how the president plans to run the government. But fragmentary though it is, it is hard to ignore, for unlike campaign promises, cabinet members do not disappear into thin air. Rather they take office, and, to a greater or lesser extent, actually administer the affairs of the nation. President Eisenhower's appointment of "nine millionaires and a plumber" gave quite a good forecast of the sort of presidency General Eisenhower wanted to have. When John Kennedy became president he struck a dominant theme of self-consciously moving beyond his own range of personal acquaintance to form a governing coalition. Likewise, his appointment of his brother as attorney general telegraphed a strong desire to keep close control of the civil rights issue.

It is possible to see in Richard Nixon's cabinet appointments a mirror of his emerging view of the role of the president vis-à-vis the rest of the government (Table 1).[1]

After beginning with a politically diverse and reasonably visible group of

[1] For much of my discussion of President Nixon I draw on Nelson W. Polsby, *Congress and the Presidency*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), pp. 48–61. An account of President Nixon's administrative goals and activities early in his presidency is contained in Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power* (New York: Random House, 1971). It is useful to contrast Richard Nathan's *The Plot That Failed: Nixon and The Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), written from the perspective of later events.

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TABLE 1

Decline in Prior Political Experience of Nixon Cabinet

	President Nixon's First Cabinet	*President Nixon's Last Cabinet*
Prior political experience extensive (includes office-holding)	William Rogers, State Melvin Laird, Defense Walter Hickel, Interior Maurice Stans, Commerce Robert Finch, HEW George Romney, HUD John Volpe, DOT	Rogers C.B. Morton, Interior Earl Butz, Agriculture
Prior political experience moderate (active in state party, etc.)	Winton Blount, Post Office	Frederick Dent, Commerce Peter Brennan, Labor Caspar Weinberger, HEW
Prior political experience slight	David Kennedy, Treasury John Mitchell, Attorney General Clifford Hardin, Agriculture George Shultz, Labor	Henry Kissinger, State William Simon, Treasury James Schlesinger, Defense Robert Bork, Acting Attorney General James Lynn, HUD Claude Brinegar, DOT

cabinet appointees, Nixon increasingly appointed people of no independent public standing, and with no constituencies of their own. In this shift we can read a distinctive change in the fundamental political goals and strategies of the Nixon administration, from early concerns with constituency-building to a later preoccupation, once Mr. Nixon's reelection was assured, with centralizing power in the White House.

His first Secretary of Labor, George Shultz, though unknown to begin with, became an early star of the Nixon cabinet owing to his intelligence and quick grasp of problems. The first major reorganization of the Nixon presidency shuffled Mr. Shultz into the White House. He was replaced by an efficient but unprepossessing figure, who in turn gave way to a maverick union official who was not even on speaking terms with the head of the AFL-CIO. This was not the only example of a movement away from clientele concerns in cabinet-building, and toward the accretion of managerial capacity within the White House. Seemingly by design the access of large and significant interest groups to the president was greatly hampered. Labor, education, the scientific community, conservationists, and others felt not merely that Richard Nixon was a president whose goals differed from their own, but also that their voices were being choked off, that they were shut out from the White House, and that their case was being rejected before it was heard.

If Mr. Nixon's administrative appointments were designed to be increasingly weak in their capacity to carry messages from interest groups to policy makers, they were far stronger in executing orders, in providing a conduit from the

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various arms of the White House executive apparatus—the Domestic Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Advisor—to the levels of policy execution.

Centralization of policy making was only half of the latter-day Nixon administrative program. The other half consisted in systematic attempts to place functionaries who can only be described as political commissars in the bureaus and departments, agents whose job it was to report to the White House on the political fidelity of the executive branch.[2]

Presidents and their political appointees have frequently puzzled over the problem of making the enormous apparatus of the executive branch responsive to their will. The legitimacy of this claim is based upon the results of the last election; presumably a president is elected and makes appointments, at least in part, to carry out his promises with respect to the future conduct of public policy, and the necessary instruments of that conduct reside in the unelected agencies of the executive branch.

Executive agencies, however, are seldom merely passive receptacles awaiting the expression of a president's preferences. Rather, they embody a number of persistent characteristics that from time to time may serve as bases for conflict with presidential directives. Expertise, for example, a body of doctrine about the right way to do things, may well thwart responsiveness to presidential demands. So may alliances between agency executives and the congressional committees that have program and budgetary oversight over them. So may strong ties between agencies and the client groups they serve.

The case of a conservative president facing an executive agency doing what he believes is liberal work is especially poignant. The very existence of a bureaucratic apparatus attests to the mobilization, at some time in the past, of a majority of sufficient strength to pass a law and put an agency to work. So long as the law is on the books, and Congress appropriates funds for it, the agency presumably has some sort of legitimate standing. Yet it was precisely the existence of all too many of these federal activities, all staffed with people devoted to the execution of their programs, that Mr. Nixon wished to question. In one famous instance—the case of the Office of Economic Opportunity—President Nixon attempted prematurely to put an agency out of business altogether.

In each of Mr. Nixon's attempts to organize and reorganize the executive branch an observer can note efforts to cope with a hostile administrative environment. Revenue sharing, of course, had the effect of removing responsibilities altogether from federal agencies. Nixon vastly strengthened the White House National Security Office and invented a domestic counterpart in the Domestic Council, politicized and reincarnated the Bureau of the Budget as the

[2] Additional discussion of the Nixon administration's public administration problems, together with documentation, is contained in Subcommittee on Manpower and Civil Service, *Final Report on Violations and Abuses of Merit Principles in Federal Employment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, December 30, 1976).

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Office of Management and Budget, and drastically increased the number of employees in the Executive Office of the President. Just as the storm of Watergate was breaking over his head he proposed a reorganization plan that would have officially denied cabinet officers direct access to the president by shifting supervisory power to four "supercabinet" officers who were supposed to act as special presidential assistants.

It would be wrong to suggest that these devices for limiting the power of government departments, agencies, and bureaus were in some sense illicit. For the most part they were not, yet they reflect a distinctive view of executive branch legitimacy, and its monopoly in the presidential office. Mr. Nixon's view, it became clear, was that his reelection by a landslide not only provided him with a special entitlement to pursue his vision of public policy, but it had, in addition, delegitimized all other possible actors in the system.[3]

The last pre-Watergate months of the Nixon presidency saw neither the first, nor necessarily the last manifestation of the view that the president is the source of all the legitimacy on which the entire government runs. Indeed, even today the theory is widely held that because the president is the only elected official in the executive branch, political choice by the executive branch is legitimized only insofar as it can be plausibly seen to have been radiated down from a presidential choice or order or preference.

Sustenance for this view comes from a conception of the American political system in which legitimacy arises chiefly, if not exclusively, from the electoral process. If the direct results of elections are the only source of political legitimacy, then it follows that the legitimacy of the entire executive branch rests, like a gigantic inverted pyramid, on the quadrennial election of the single member of that branch who is elected, the president. Given this view of the situation, there can be no grounds upon which hierarchical subordinates of the president might legitimately act to thwart, undermine, modify or attenuate the will of the president in public policy, once it is expressed.

This is not, to be sure, the only view of political legitimacy in the executive branch. Another view is that while the electoral process does provide a very significant measure of legitimacy for the acts of government, this process by itself is neither adequate to the task of providing accountability, nor the only process actually provided for in the constitutional design and in the pattern of American politics that has since evolved in harmony with the spirit of the constitution. In contrast with this hierarchical, pyramidal, or plebiscitary view of legitimacy there is the check-and-balance, or multiprocess view favored, for example, by the authors of *The Federalist*, in which the rightful power to govern is spread about in the government, and even, in a more modern version, extended to interest groups and other mobilizers and organizers of popular desires, needs, and sentiments.

[3] This evidently included even the Congress that had been elected at the same time, as contemporary accounts suggest. See, e.g., Elizabeth Drew, *Washington Journal* (New York: Random House, 1975). A more thorough elaboration of this theme is contained in Nelson W. Polsby, *Political Promises* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 6–14.

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Patterns of Cabinet Building

It is interesting to contemplate the extent to which a presidency-centered view of the proper relations between the presidency and the bureaucracy has survived intact through Watergate, and indeed through the fashionable disparagement of the Imperial Presidency. This is reflected in President Carter's address to the problem of cabinet building and what appears, consequently, to be his initial perspective on the permanent government.

There are at least three alternative ways to build a cabinet. First alternative: Each of the great departments of government serves clientele in the population at large. Each has custody over a range of policies that tend to affect some Americans more sharply than others. Thus one strategy for building a cabinet is to enter into a coalition with the client groups of departments by finding appointees who already have extensive relationships or political alliances with relevant client groups. A cabinet in which this alternative is dominant is one heavy with former political office holders. Characteristic pathologies of this mode of cabinet building are those associated with complaints from interest groups whose competitors have succeeded where they have not. So, for example, conservationist groups may feel exceedingly well served by the appointment of one sort of secretary of interior. Grazers, miners, and loggers may feel quite differently about the matter. The impossibility of accommodating all the groups into which Americans may legally divide themselves for the purpose of pursuing a common interest is, no doubt, one of the facts of life that give vitality to a competitive two-party system at the presidential level. The fact that ungratified client groups can form alliances with the out-party helps to legitimize the inevitable choices that presidents must make among contending interests, since a mechanism is thereby provided for limiting the extent to which any incumbent may ignore the strongly held preferences of large numbers of citizens, without suffering electoral defeat.

Second alternative: A president may choose a cabinet of substantive specialists. Specialists possess technical mastery, knowledge of programmatic alternatives, and understanding of particular governmental agencies and their impact on the world. Where the client-oriented cabinet member seeks to do his job to the satisfaction of the customers, the specialist cabinet member's internal definition of success depends on satisfying the norms of performance that the agency itself (and its associated professions) generate. The characteristic pathology of this sort of leadership is given constant publicity in the folklore of government: domination by arbitrary, insensitive, "faceless" bureaucrats, the proliferation of meaningless paperwork, the manufacture of red tape, the triumph of custodial convenience over sensitivity to clientele or to political realities.

The basis for the political legitimacy of specialist leadership is far less thoroughly understood. It is, I think, fundamentally historical. At some point in the past, after all, someone had to pass a valid law for a bureaucracy to exist at all. Presumably, government agencies are administering programs because once upon a time a law-making majority, a winning coalition of president and Con-

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gress, produced a mandate for them to do so. In the absence of some equally valid set of more recent instructions, government agencies have a right to presume that what they are doing is proper and legitimate. Specialist leadership rests its legitimacy heavily upon the notion that effective, knowledgeable pursuit of an agency's mission constitutes a continuing renewal of its historic mandate.

Those cabinet members who are connected neither to clientele nor to agencies suggest a third alternative: the generalist executive. The generalist may be responsive primarily to the siren song of his own career and thus be connected to, and ultimately reachable by, nothing at all. Or he may respond with particular alertness to presidential priorities, plans and orders, to be, in fact, the president's ambassador both to the agency and to its client groups. I have already given the familiar rationale for a cabinet dominated by executives of this stripe. In such executives the presumption is strongest that the president, being the most recently elected chief executive, is entitled by his electoral mandate to command the resources of the executive branch, and to shape its programs according to his desires. The careers of generalist executives are tied not to interest groups or to agencies but to the president personally or, alternatively, to law firms, public relations firms, universities, or other organizations that provide technical skills and services to a variety of clients not closely clustered around some narrow set of policies.

Until the beginnings of President Nixon's second term, I think it is fair to say that observers were not excessively attentive to the possibility of pathology in the execution of this alternative. Yet presidents, it now appears, can ask members of the executive branch to do illegal and immoral acts, acts not contemplated and in some cases prohibited by the charters of the agencies involved. A president or his agent can seek to close down activities provided for by law, or can repudiate political alliances with devastating future effects for himself, his party and/or his successors. Generalist executives, without expertise or independent standing with interest groups, are presumably best situated to further, and least well situated to resist, these tendencies when they appear.

The Carter Strategy

No president, to my knowledge, has in modern times pursued a pure strategy of cabinet building. In all cases of which I am aware the strategy has been mixed. Yet the character of the mixture at any given time has been instructive about the claims to legitimacy made by each incumbent administration. So it is, also, with President Carter, as a consideration of the seventeen cabinet-level appointments of his administration will illustrate (Table 2).

In matters of foreign and defense policy, with the very important exception of Ambassador Andrew Young, Mr. Carter has sought subject-matter experts. Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Michael Blumenthal, and Harold Brown have all put in substantial time working for the government on problems associated with the departments they now head.

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TABLE 2

President Carter's Cabinet, 1977

	Specialists	*Client-Oriented*	*Generalists*
State	Vance[a]		
Treasury	Blumenthal[b]		
Defense	Brown[b]		
Justice			Bell[a]
Interior		Andrus	
Argiculture		Bergland	
Commerce			Kreps[b]
Labor	Marshall?	Marshall (?)[b]	
Hew			Califano[a]
HUD			Harris[a]
Transportation			Adams[a]
Energy			Schlesinger[b]?
CIA			Turner
Natl. Sec. Council	Brzezinski[b]		
OMB			Lance
Council Econ. Ad.	Schultze[b]		
UN Ambassador			Young

[a] Lawyers
[b] Ph.D.'s

In two, arguably three, instances, Mr. Carter has picked cabinet members who can be considered ambassadors from interest group constituencies. One, Bob Bergland, supervises the interest group constituency closest to Mr. Carter's own in private life, agriculture. The second is Cecil Andrus, who brings to the Interior Department close ties with environmentalist groups. I am less certain that Ray Marshall of the Labor Department belongs to this category, rather than to that of the specialists.

Nine of the remaining ten appointees are, I believe, best understood as generalists. An academic labor economist serves as the chief link between the business community and the administration. Three lawyers—all Washington D.C. careerists in one way or another who might well have been interchanged—head the main urban departments. There are, as many people have observed, three Georgians, presumably presidential ambassadors par excellence, among the top seventeen, seven Ph.D.'s, five in economics, one each in physics and political science, and five lawyers.

It is not their high level of education, however, that observers have fastened upon in noting the odd resemblance between this Democratic cabinet and the Republican cabinets that immediately preceded it. Rather it is the curious neutrality of the Carter cabinet toward the vast stew of interest groups, both within and outside the government, that make up the traditional Democratic coalition.

Of Carter's top seventeen appointees, how many reach into the constituencies

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suggested by the old New Deal voting coalition? Where are the representatives of the Irish, the Polish, the Jews, the Italians? The cities? The labor unions? Where, indeed, are the long-time active members of the Democratic party? Not wholly absent, to be sure. But hard to find.

Causes of the Carter Strategy

I have observed that in his second term Richard Nixon chose generalists for his cabinet because of his abiding hostility to the central purposes of the permanent government, as he saw them. Although he ran as an outsider to Washington politics, there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Carter shares Mr. Nixon's deep and clear-cut doctrinal disagreement with so many of the routine purposes of government. And so rather than seek the key to Mr. Carter's leadership of the government in programmatic antagonism, I believe we must look elsewhere for clues.

A first, and extremely interesting, examination of the problem has been made by Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky in a close analysis of President Carter as a theorist of public administration.[4] They observe, quite correctly, that President Carter has repeatedly expressed strong views about the proper procedures for making public policy. Very much in a tradition of political engineering that stretches back through Herbert Hoover to Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Carter has emphasized the importance of design considerations in the making and the presentation of public policy, and has deemphasized the content of those policies.

The goals President Carter has stressed are essentially administrative in character: simplification, reduction of duplication, and the establishment of uniformity, predictability and long-range goals. He is a believer in comprehensive reform, in finding once-and-for-all solutions to problems.

Theoretical commitment on the part of President Carter to general and far-reaching purposes, and a desire to separate himself from the piecemeal accommodations of bureaucrats and the narrowly focused desires of interest groups is thus surely part of the answer. But this answer poses a still more fundamental problem: how is it that President Carter finds it possible to gratify this theoretical preference in the harsh arena of national politics?

The answer to this, I believe, can be found in the political conditions which made Jimmy Carter's nomination and election possible. Mr. Carter is the latest in a lengthening line of political leaders—of which Mr. Nixon was also an example—who have made the claim that their electoral victories conferred on them a legitimacy direct from the people, unmediated by special interest groups, or by parochial considerations.

For a Democratic politician, the basis of this claim must rest in large measure on the transformation of the rules for nominating presidents that has occurred

[4] Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of Governing" *The Wilson Quarterly* I (Winter, 1977): 49-67.

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over the past decade.[5] Finance through mass mailings and through the public purse has replaced the mobilization of well-heeled backers and the seeking of alliances with interest groups. The stimulation of coverage by the mass media and the building of a state-by-state personal organization have replaced the cultivation of party regulars and state and local leaders. Primary elections, not party wheelhorses, select the vast preponderance of convention delegates.

So the idea of a party as a coalition of interests bound together by the hope of electing a president is becoming an anachronism. Party is increasingly a label for masses of individual voters who pick among alternate candidates as they would among any alternatives marketed by the mass media.

The mass news media in America, though highly professional and in many respects unideological, are nevertheless far from random in their behavior. Thus while interest groups that are mobilized in traditional ways, around the economic interests or the communal ties of their members, have diminished in their political influence, the fortunes of other interest groups have been greatly enhanced because the managers of the mass media have decided to smile upon them. Prominent among these are groups embodying what the media recognize as disinterested rectitude, such as Common Cause and the Ralph Nader organizations, and those speaking for interests widely perceived as disadvantaged, such as black, Hispanic-American, and militant women's groups.

This is not the place to argue about the realities behind the palpable gains and losses that have befallen these groups in national politics. Black leaders, like labor leaders, surely mobilize large numbers of Democratic voters, and so might have fared equally as well under the old dispensation as under the new, whereas militant women are far less successful in demonstrating that they deliver the votes even of most voting women. What is significant for our purposes is the fact that in a straight fight between leaders of militant women's groups and black groups on the one hand and, on the other, the leadership of the dominant faction of the U.S. labor movement over who was to become secretary of labor, as we all know it was labor that lost.[6] This, it seems to me, is an emblematic as anything could possibly be of the disestablishment of one sort of interest group in the Democratic party and the establishment of another.

Consequences for Public Administration

The consequences of this change in the actual workings of government are difficult to fathom. Two, at least, are worth considering, and both suggest an increase in certain sorts of stress in the political system.

[5] A review of some of these in the context of electoral strategies rather than, as here, in relation to their consequences for public administration, can be found in Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* 4th ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1976).

[6] See, e.g. Robert G. Kaiser, "Women Lobby for Role in Carter Camp," *Washington Post*, December 5, 1976; "Dunlop Backers Call him Victim of Unfair Action," *New York Times*, January 26, 1977.

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The forces that have revolutionized the presidential nominating process have been far slower to affect the thousand-odd nominating processes that supply us with candidates for Congress and the Senate. Congress is a greatly changed place from the way it was even a decade ago. The previously moribund Democratic caucus is now available as an instrument of majority will, when that will exists. But the mobilization of that will is by no means the unchallenged prerogative of the president. If anything, Congress is today better equipped than ever to find its own way into the intricacies of policy and to arrive at its own balancing of forces and priorities.

So long as elections in America are of the staggered, prescheduled, non-referendum type, and so long as nominations to Congress are decentralized, it will be difficult if not impossible for presidents to attempt to persuade Congress by going over its head to the people. This is no substitute for the hard, frustrating, and frequently unavailing work of doing business directly with Congress. Because of the divergence that currently exists in the ways in which presidents and Congress mobilize their electorates and arrive in office, we may be entering an era in which tensions and misunderstandings between president and Congress increase—even when both are controlled by what is labeled the same party.

Another possible consequence of the modern trend in cabinet building is a decrease in the reliance of political executives on the accumulated expertise of the permanent government. When the top of the government was dominated by client-oriented political executives, bureaucrats supplied technical information, policy analysis, know-how and knowledge of programs. Some specialist cabinet officers are going to ignore the agencies they head altogether; others, specialist and generalist alike, will undertake policy evaluation and analysis in competition with their own agencies. Much of this activity, no doubt, will result in vastly improved understanding of policy alternatives at the top of government. Moreover, it can create over the long term a corps of people outside the government who can contribute to the analysis and understanding of policy.

But as the comparative advantage of being inside a bureaucracy begins to diminish, the caliber of the agency begins to slip. As agencies begin to view their nominal superiors as competitors in the supply of what they supply best, expertise, the incentives to firm up other sorts of alliances—with clientele, with Congress—increase. Thus over the long run, without strenuous effort and much good will on both sides, the cure can aggravate symptoms of the disease.

Two Models of Legitimacy

I have suggested that there are currently two models available through which the claims of the executive branch to be properly vested with power can be validated. One model, the presidential model, sees the conferring of legitimacy in our political system as having the following four features. It is episodic, in that it relies heavily upon the results of the last presidential election, which for

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present purposes is treated as conferring a sweeping mandate. It is concentrated, in that only the winner of the last election receives the endorsement that is claimed to be at the root of the government's entitlement to act. It is direct, in that it is claimed that permission to act is conferred by voters not on the basis of their interest group or other affiliations but through their individual, atomized responses to a particular candidate and his presentation of self during the campaign. Finally, it reflects the present or the recent past, in that only the results of the most recent presidential election are taken into account in determining the right of an official to claim the acquiescence of citizens in public policy.

A view of legitimacy in our political system alternative to the presidential model is contained in what readers will recognize as a Federalist model since it draws upon the thoughts of the earliest expositors of the logic underlying the original design of the U.S. Constitution. In this view, legitimacy is conferred not episodically, as in elections, but continuously. It is conferred both through elections and through continuous interaction among decision makers. Legitimacy is not concentrated, but dispersed, to elected officials, to appointed officials, to career bureaucrats. It is based not on election alone, but on organizational norms such as seniority, or selection by congressional caucus, or neutral competence or expertise. In the Federalist view, legitimacy is conferred not just directly, but also indirectly; for example, by the workings of the congressional committee system. Finally, not the present alone, but the more distant past as well is invoked by the Federalist model, which explicitly recognizes the legitimacy of law-making majorities of the earlier eras that produced programs that persist to this day and are embodied in the agencies of government.

The ascendancy of the presidential model has evidently survived the discredited presidency of Richard Nixon, who militantly espoused it. This has come about because of sweeping changes in the politics of presidential nomination that have fundamentally affected the ways in which interest groups must be mobilized and attended to by a Democratic presidential nominee, although it is less certain that the same vector of forces applies to a Democratic president. Nevertheless, the record of this new approach can be read in President Carter's cabinet choices.

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West Germany: Problems and Prospects

LEWIS J. EDINGER

West Germany's rise to eminence in international affairs brings to mind a little known variation on the familiar story of the ugly duckling that grew into a majestic swan. The tale concerns a Great Dane that thought itself a little dachshund—and an ugly one to boot—because people refused to take it into their laps and pet it. Then came the day when the creature came across a mirror, realized its true identity, and henceforth played the big dog, looking down its nose on smaller ones.

The sudden recognition that the Federal Republic is not what it used to be has in recent times startled both West Germans and foreign observers. West Germany is no longer merely an object of power politics, but a leading actor in European and world affairs. Its regime no longer appears to be tenuous and fragile, but well-established and stable. The once troublesome "German problem" no longer bedevils East-West relations. Though West German leaders remain concerned about the image of the "ugly German" in other countries, they have nevertheless become more assertive in promoting the Federal Republic's international interests.

The new-found status of the Federal Republic is directly related to the reduction of tensions in Central Europe and to West Germany's increasingly important position among economically interdependent states. It matters today not so much that the Federal Republic is not a military superpower as that it stands in the front rank of the richest industrial and commercial countries. This fact alone gives ruling elites in other Western, Communist, and Third World nations strong reasons to watch West German politics closely.

The politics of the 1950s were those of reconstruction. Economic recovery

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was underway, but had not yet led to general affluence. A "provisional" new state and regime had been imposed on West Germany by the former occupation powers and had still to take root in the political culture. The persistence of traditional authoritarian patterns was reflected in the autocratic style of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and other leading policy makers, as well as in deferential popular attitudes toward authorities in state and society.

The politics of the 1960s were the politics of transition, marking the end of a beginning. National prosperity was no longer in doubt and came to include most West Germans. The constitutional order was more firmly established, and authoritarian traditions were on the wane. However, vivid memories of past conflicts continued to impinge on domestic and foreign politics. The Nazi legacy kept cropping up, and relations with the Communist countries were troubled both by West German fears of Communist aggression and by West German demands for the reunification of the former Reich and the return of "lost" territories.

The politics of the 1970s bear the imprint of a different political climate and new policy concerns. The specters of yesteryear are fading away as a new political generation comes to the fore. The accent is on preservation—of prosperity and political tranquility at home, of diplomatic, economic, and military stability abroad. Policy conflicts are more subdued than in the United States and Britain and less ideologically divisive than in France and Italy. Reunification, in particular, is no longer an emotionally charged issue. All told, the policy course is essentially conservative.

West German politics of course have distinctive features and may be shaped by unique environmental factors. But we should not exaggerate their significance. In the final analysis we have to realize that the German accent is now decidedly less pronounced than in years past and that it may well become even less distinct in years to come. The notion that politics in the Federal Republic are largely formed by factors attributable to the cultural peculiarities of a singularly German national character is anachronistic. Political modernization spells adaptation to new conditions for policy making, and public affairs have become less "Teutonic" as they have become more closely enmeshed with those of other countries in Europe and elsewhere.

Problems and Prospects

Political forecasts are not prophecies; they are at best educated guesses based on imperfect information. Developments, especially long-range ones, are usually not as evident to contemporary observers as to later historians. Too close a focus on dramatic current events can therefore all too easily obscure our view of the road ahead for West German politics. At the same time, the further we seek to peer into the future, the more we are limited to broad speculations about conceivable, but by no means certain, developments.

It is safe to say that the politics of tomorrow in the Federal Republic will be different from those of today. But exactly how different we cannot really tell.

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The clues we have are too few and too ambiguous to let us predict the nature, direction, and magnitude of coming changes. Some signs point to an unspectacular evolution of policy-relevant attitudes and processes and others suggest that we should not rule out major transformations. In any event, the dynamics of the international policy environment are bound to introduce new elements whose effect cannot be readily anticipated when we project present domestic patterns. In short, when we contemplate what may happen over the next decade or so we can do no more than consider possible developments.

MILITARY SECURITY AND PEACE

We can expect defense problems to remain leading policy concerns as long as key West German decision makers consider the threat, if not the use of force by other states a distinct possibility. Under these circumstances, further rapid advances in weapons technology will require increasing military expenditures. If most West Germans continue to view the Soviet Union as a potential menace to world peace and stability, they will probably approve higher defense outlays. And the more they fear for their military security, the more likely they are to accept a resulting tax bill with little protest.

Public opinion will most certainly continue to demand and support policies that promise to keep the Federal Republic out of military encounters, not only between the superpowers, but between any other countries. If more countries should acquire atomic weapons, such policies may eventually call for a West German nuclear deterrent force. What seems more likely is that West German leaders will seek, and perhaps achieve, greater control over the deployment and use of British and French atomic weapons through tighter political integration of the European Community. But even if they should obtain it, they are unlikely to rely much more on the collective military power of the European Community's members than they do now and less on American security guarantees. And if political developments in other European NATO countries—say, Communist participation in French or Italian governments—should threaten to undermine the Western alliance, West German policy makers would probably strive for even closer defense arrangements with the United States.

However, these speculations assume that a combination of basic factors in the external security environment of the Federal Republic will remain essentially constant. This means, first of all, that there will be no significant shift in the Soviet-American military standoff; a marked destabilization favoring either side would undoubtedly have a great, but unpredictable effect on West German politics. Second, we presuppose that the Soviet Union will continue to play a predominant role in Eastern Europe in general and in East Germany in particular; a change in this condition would create an entirely new situation for West German defense policies. Third, we take it for granted that American policy makers will stand convincingly by present United States commitments to protect West Berlin and defend the Federal Republic; if they do not, adroit Soviet moves might well promote a massive upsurge of neutralist sentiments in West

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Germany that would shatter consensual support for the alliance with the United States.

In any event, external security developments are bound to have a major effect on socioeconomic policy issues. West Germans have not yet had to choose between more guns and more butter thanks to an almost uninterrupted expansion of their national income. Whether this will continue to be the case depends, therefore, not just on the scope of military security demands, but on economic developments.

ECONOMIC SECURITY AND GROWTH

We may count on it that West German governments will be hard pressed to safeguard domestic prosperity and prevent economic stagnation or decline. What is less certain is that they can ensure substantial productive growth over the long run and that they will continue to adhere to fairly restrained measures for steering the private sector of the economy.

The public in the Federal Republic can be expected to push for steady growth as long as most citizens define "the good life" in terms of economic security and abundant goods and services. Perhaps such "materialistic" values will in time give way to more "idealistic" standards for the general welfare and personal self-fulfillment, but such change will come only very slowly.

Today's young adults were raised in an age of increasing national affluence and may not be quite as much preoccupied with bread-and-butter issues as older groups. But the incoming generation does not seem to be appreciably less attached to comfortable living standards, less interested in secure, well-paying jobs and welfare state benefits, or less committed to sustained prosperity. Some left-wingers may discount or ignore any contingent need to choose between guns and butter and question the desirability of much further economic growth. Their programs for a more equitable distribution and "beneficial" public utilization of the national income assume nevertheless that the gross national product will continue to expand rather than diminish.

Growth issues enter into most aspects of West German domestic and foreign policy. Compared with the economic problems of less prosperous countries, the West German concern may strike an outsider as no more serious than that of a fat man who must watch his weight to stay healthy. But to observers in the Federal Republic the potential social and political consequences of economic development at home and abroad provide little reason for complacency and a good deal for alarm.

To be sure, the West German economy appears to be strong enough to withstand considerable buffeting. But it is highly doubtful that the fortuitous combination of circumstances that have furthered its growth will persist. The era of spectacular economic expansion, ensured full employment, and rapidly rising affluence is evidently over. And as in other rich, non-Communist states, rulers and ruled now confront unavoidable public policy decisions on just how much and what sort of further growth is necessary, desirable, and feasible.

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These issues may contain the seeds of bitter domestic and international disputes over the mobilization and allocation of scarce economic resources. At home they involve, for instance, such controversial policy questions as what constitutes the "best" tradeoff between technological progress and consequent unemployment, between the costs and the benefits of mandatory pollution controls, between the use and the conservation of natural resources, and between the consumption and the reinvestment of economic products. In foreign affairs policy makers differ largely on what is the most advantageous policy mix between economic competition and cooperation with other industrially advanced countries, on how much and what kind of aid should be given to less developed nations, and on the problems raised by the increasingly important role of multinational corporations and transnational, intergovernmental agencies in promoting or inhibiting domestic growth.

Growth policies are also likely to be complicated by the fact that an increasing number of West Germans object to what they take to be qualitative social shortcomings of quantitative economic gains. For example, many employees are no longer reconciled to the "human costs" of high-speed assembly line processes and monotonous working conditions, but major improvements on this score might require policy measures that would reduce productive output. Fears of atomic contamination are feeding an emerging protest movement against the construction of nuclear power plants, but without such energy resources the West German economy will be all the more dependent on increasingly costly and uncertain foreign oil and gas supplies.

Although these problems are not unique to West Germany, a number of closely related factors underscore their significance for political developments in the Federal Republic. One is the particularly pronounced association in its political culture between a generally high level of prosperity and democratic processes in state and society. Elites as well as nonelites have come to view steady economic growth as a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the smooth operation of the complex system of checks and balances embodied in the prevailing constitutional order. By all accounts, if there should be less to go around, currently muted party and interest group controversies over economic policies will become more virulent, and demands for decisive conflict resolution by executive agents of the state will increase correspondingly.

A second key factor is that West Germans are not united by strong bonds of national community that transcend socioeconomic and political cleavages in the United States and other countries. Public officials therefore find it harder to invoke overarching patriotic sentiments to obtain voluntary compliance with unpopular austerity measures "in the national interest."

A third factor is that the heavily trade-dependent West German economy is highly vulnerable to protectionist policies of other countries and to unfavorable international conditions of demand and supply. The most promising growth sectors are especially dependent on low-cost imports at stable world prices and ready access to foreign export markets. Here we should take note of two developments affecting future growth. One is the increasing pressure from

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allied, but economically competing countries for a slowdown of the West German export drive. The other is the increasing insistence by less prosperous countries for more generous financial assistance from the Federal Republic and for measures that will allow those countries to sell their products in West Germany more easily and more profitably. In both cases the West German policy makers face a dilemma: they risk strong internal opposition if they accede to these external demands at the expense of powerful domestic interest groups. However, future international conditions inside and outside the European Community may leave them no other choice.

Whether and how all of these matters can be resolved by future policy makers remains to be seen. It now seems that persistent demands for more West German industrial and commercial expansion and mounting obstacles to further productive growth at home will have two major political consequences.

West German foreign policies are likely to feature intense diplomatic efforts for closer trade relations with Communist and wealthier Third World countries and more hard-nosed endeavors to make the European Community yield maximum benefits for the Federal Republic. In domestic affairs the signs point to much more overt and covert state intervention in what is now essentially a capitalist economy. Here present indications suggest three developments: more extensive and intensive regulatory efforts by the Federal Government to structure the domestic consumer and labor markets and to restructure private enterprise production and capital investments; more far-reaching and centralized policy planning by executive authorities; and more emphasis on policy-implementing understandings among collaborating government, business, and trade union leaders, bypassing legislative bodies.

INTERNAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

The possibility that conflicts on military or economic security issues might seriously strain, if not tear the established political fabric accentuates a crucial problem for the present regime. In a fairly open, pluralist polity, disputes over internal security curbs on personal freedom are bound to arise even under the best of conditions. A decisive question for future West German political developments is whether the prevailing libertarian conception of a Rechtsstaat—a liberal democratic state under law—can be reconciled with persistent demands for domestic peace, stability, and order.

Constitutional principles call for as much personal freedom as possible and for as much collective internal security as necessary. The "Basic Law" of the Federal Republic contains an extensive catalogue of fundamental civil rights, including general guarantees for freedom of speech, association, personal privacy, and equality of opportunity under law. However, it also requires executive, legislative, and judicial authorities to take all necessary steps for safeguarding both the constitutional order and the public welfare.

What sort of balance should be struck between the two sets of provisions has long been a sticky political issue. There was thus the intense controversy in the

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late 1960s over emergency regulations for contingent crisis situations. By current indications difference over the "legitimate" scope of internal security regulations will prove no less problematical in the future and may prove more so.

The scope of the state's internal security tasks can be broadly defined to include practically all aspects of West German political, economic, and social relations. Authoritative constraints on individual freedoms in the name of the collective interest may therefore take in not only regulations for the protection of life, property, public health, and safety, but for the preservation of esteemed cultural values as well. In a narrower and currently more immediate sense, internal security measures focus on the permissible limits of political opposition and dissent.

By some accounts there is a clear and present danger that aspiring Communist and militant socialist "counterelites" will abuse their civil liberties to undermine the constitutional order from below—ostensibly to achieve more participatory democracy, but in fact to create a leftist dictatorship. According to other accounts West German democracy is threatened by the gradual erosion of civil liberties through autocratic measures from above—ostensibly for the good of all, but in fact to maintain the power of the ruling few. The former view stresses the pressing need for effective internal security controls *by* public officials, the latter the urgent necessity for more adequate popular control *over* public officials.

These tensions are highlighted in the sustained controversy over the effects of a 1972 decree of the Federal and state governments barring subversives from public employment. The questions at issue are what should be considered proof of actual or potential seditious activities, whether the decree should apply equally to all positions in the public service, and how far it infringes on civil liberties. Conservatives, who sought and welcomed the measure, press for its most rigorous enforcement; they see it above all as a means of curbing what they consider the ideological corruption of West German youngsters by radical leftist teachers. Critics of the decree hold, however, that it stifles unorthodox opinions, intimidates opponents of the ruling establishment, and promotes the invasion of personal privacy by internal security agents of the state; some leftists even assert that it confirms a general trend toward an increasingly authoritarian capitalist regime.

The alarming pictures projected from the more extreme positions on both sides of the internal security-civil liberties issue may strike us as rather stark and overdrawn. To be sure, Communist subversion and espionage—especially from East Germany—and the terrorist acts of small anarchist groups do pose internal security problems that might become more serious. And public authorities have no doubt imposed constraints on the civil liberties of not only leftist, but rightist dissidents; such curbs might indeed become more extensive and restrictive if outright opposition to the present regime should increase substantially.

But as matters stand now, at least, West Germans do not appear very close to losing their liberties to either a "capitalist" or "socialist" police state. They

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may be more attached to law and order and less to maximum freedom for all citizens than people in countries with older libertarian traditions. However, it has been argued as well that the warning examples of Nazi and East German autocracy—and a pronounced individualistic outlook—have made West Germans, particularly young West Germans, all the more resistant to the notion that the inevitable price of internal security is less personal freedom and privacy.

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Partisan Orientation and Political Socialization in Britain, France, and the United States

GREG A. CALDEIRA
FRED I. GREENSTEIN

This article deals with adults' and pre-adults' psychological orientations to political parties in the United States, Great Britain, and France. These three nations are particularly fruitful settings in which to study citizens' partisanship for at least three reasons: variations in the institutional properties of their parties are well known; a scholarly debate over findings on partisanship in each of these nations is currently unfolding; and important changes in public orientations toward political parties appear to have developed in each nation in recent years.

The United States and Britain have shown striking continuities in the number and labels of their parties; France, in contrast, has had numerous and mutable political parties. But the British and American party systems differ from each other substantially. The American system aggregates a far more heterogeneous citizenry and, for this reason—as well as for a variety of other social-psychological and institutional reasons—has been weakly linked to the making of public policy. Britain, on the other hand, has traditionally been the textbook example of governing through political parties.

Based on survey research, the literature on citizens' orientations toward political parties in each of the nations that began to emerge in the early 1960s constitutes a major source of insight into the systemic properties of the political parties in Britain, France, and the United States. The literature, especially on

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France and the United States, suggested that national differences in the way children are socialized into partisanship might be a crucial intervening variable contributing to national differences in adult patterns of psychological attachment to political parties, and, by extension, the functioning of the party systems themselves. At present, however, because of historical changes and because of reinterpretations of the earlier surveys and the analytic assumptions that formed their base, scholarly discourse on partisan orientation in these three democracies is in a state of ferment.

Base-Line and More Recent Studies

In 1962 Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux reported comparative data on the nature and sources of partisan orientations in France and the United States, drawing on national surveys of the two countries that had been conducted four years earlier.[1] Two aspects of this highly influential article concern us here. First, the authors reported striking national differences in the incidence of partisan identification—75 percent identifiers in the United States, 42 percent in France, plus an additional 10 to 15 percent in France reporting the distinctly French phenomenon of *tendance*.[2] Converse and Dupeux argued that the low incidence of partisan identifiers in France contributes to the rise and fall of "flash" political parties, whereas widespread partisan attachment in the United States helps to stabilize its long history of two parties, each with its own long-established label, in national elections.

A second fascinating element in the Converse-Dupeux article was their emphasis on national differences in the effect of the family as a mediating influence on partisan socialization. In the United States 76 percent of the respondents were able to report what they perceived to have been their father's partisan loyalty during their own pre-adult years. In France only 25 percent could make such a statement about either their father's party or his *tendance*. Startled at finding so extraordinarily large a cross-national difference, Converse and Dupeux carefully examined the open-ended protocols from which their data had been coded. They discovered that the French response appeared "real." Respondents explictly commented that they and their fathers had never discussed paternal partisan preferences. A similar analysis of the protocols bearing on frequency of partisan attachment revealed an impression of genuine rather than instrument-induced responses —for example, some respondents expressed chagrin at their inability to sort out the complexities of French partisan arrangements, and others expressed the wish

[1] Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (1962): 1–23, reprinted in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

[2] This phenomenon is a general leaning with respect to voting preference that falls short of conceiving of oneself as attached to a particular political party. Examples of *tendance* include a left-right preference, calling oneself a moderate, and defining one's views in terms of what one opposes, e.g., anticommunism.

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that France had a simpler party system, perhaps even a two-party system. As for the ability to recall father's partisan identification, a further finding pinned down the evident importance of the family in socializing partisanship. Among those relatively few French who *could* report on paternal partisan preference, the likelihood that they themselves would identify with a party was nearly the same as among the (many) Americans who recalled their father's partisanship.

In 1968, a decade after Converse and Dupeux collected their data, Ronald Inglehart conducted a survey of a French national sample and compared his findings with the results of the 1968 study of the American electorate as well as with the earlier findings of Converse and Dupeux. Inglehart (writing with Hochstein) came to the conclusion that great changes in partisan attachments in the two nations had resulted over the decade from the powerful impact of Gaullism and the Fifth Republic's presidency, and from the progressive attrition in the United States of voting patterns socialized during the Great Depression.[3] Between 1958 and 1968, Inglehart and Hochstein argued, France and the United States had virtually reversed their patterns of partisan identification. They reported that by 1968 76 percent of the French had become partisan identifiers. This increase apparently resulted from a simultaneous socialization of individuals of all ages, since incidence of partisan identification did not vary by age.

In the United States, however, partisan identification had declined. The aggregate decline for the population as a whole was about 10 percent below the seeming rock-solid 75 percent reported in repeated studies conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s. In addition, there were major age-differences in partisan identification. The oldest group of citizens—those in the process of leaving the electorate—were even more likely to be partisan identifiers than the national norm of earlier years. But the younger age cohorts that had entered the electorate in the 1960s were no more likely to be partisan identifiers than the average French elector studied by Converse and Dupeux in 1958. Clearly a continuation of the American trend (reported by numerous scholars in addition to Inglehart)[4] would soon produce a nation of few partisan identifiers.

In an ingenious analysis of Inglehart's data of 1968 and the Converse-Dupeux data of 1958, Cameron focused on the latters' emphasis on family as an agent of partisan socialization.[5] Cameron noted that even in the Converse and Dupeux data a large proportion of those who identified with political parties were *not* able to report a paternal partisan preference. Familial political socialization, he granted, clearly was important in accounting for some individuals' partisan preference; indeed this variable was the strongest single predictor of the individual's likelihood of identifying with a party in *both* the 1958 and 1968 studies.

[3] Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein, "Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Comparative Political Studies* 2 (1972): 343–72.

[4] See the following article and the literature it draws on: Paul Abramson, "Generation Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974," *American Political Science Review* 70 (1976): 469–78.

[5] David R. Cameron, "Stability and Change in Patterns of French Partisanship," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (1972): 19–30.

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Nevertheless, Cameron maintained, the substantial variance unexplained by paternal socialization pointed to the need for a multivariate explanation of the acquisition of partisan preferences, taking account of wide-ranging determinants including such systemic influences as the frequent structural changes in French national politics.

Cameron goes somewhat further than Converse and Dupeux in speculating about the possible reasons for low levels of communication about partisanship in French families. He observes, for example, that women did not become eligible to vote in France until the 1940s and points to the likelihood that the fluidity of parties and their labels in modern France has deterred the general public (if not the more publicized slim stratum of highly informed, politically articulate French citizens) from attending to partisanship. One can imagine additional possibilities such as the controversial nature of French politics (note the brute physical dangers associated with partisan discourse during a number of periods of French history) and possible cultural idiosyncracies of French familial relations. On the matter of French culture, numerous ethnographic observers of France, including Wylie in his case study of a village in Southern France, stress the extent to which French parents control the lives of pre-adolescent children and foster a childhood environment that is cut off from adult experience and responsibilities.[6]

In the third polity upon which this paper focuses, Britain, Butler and Stokes find in repeated surveys that partisan preferences are reported by the great bulk of respondents in Britain. Although Butler and Stokes doubt that partisanship has the same subjective significance to Britons and Americans, they report data on respondents' perceptions of the correspondence of their parents' and their own partisan preferences, discussing their findings in a fashion that makes clear that they view childhood partisan socialization in need of study by analysts of British political behavior.[7]

Distributions of Adult Partisan Orientations in Three Nations

The three national time-series portrayed in Figure 1, based on findings on partisan attachments from surveys of mass publics, make it possible to clarify whether the incidence of partisanship has varied over the years within and between nations. All of the entries for the United States come from the biennial SRC studies. The well-established decline in party identification is clearly documented. The five observations from the Butler and Stokes studies graphed in Figure 1 show the consistently high incidence of reports of party attachment by British voters.

We turn now to the nation that is most interesting from the standpoint of

[6] Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951).

[7] David Butler and Donald E. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice* 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1974).

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FIGURE 1

Reports of Party Attachment in Britain, France, and the United States by Year



Source: France and U.S.: Inter-University Center for Political Research data sets; France: Butler and Stokes, *Political Change.*

this section of our discussion—France. Converse and Dupeux's 1958 study used an open-ended item to elicit the incidence of 42 percent that provides the first entry. In 1967 Converse and Pierce surveyed the French electorate, using the 1958 item. They readministered the item to nationally representative subsamples of the 1967 respondents in 1968 and 1969. In 1967 and 1969 the proportion of partisan identifiers detected by the open-ended item was 18 percent higher than in 1958 (up from 42 percent to 60 percent). But in 1968, the very year that

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Inglehart, whose survey used a fixed and forced-choice item, classified 76 percent of his French sample as partisan identifiers, Converse and Pierce found only 50 percent partisan identifiers.[8]

Two things warrant comment here: the discrepancy in the rates of partisan attachment elicited by the two 1968 surveys using different items; and the variations in the rates elicited by the item in the studies with which Converse has been associated. The 26 percent difference in the two 1968 studies is almost certainly a result of differences in question-wording as these interact with what would appear to be the still uncrystallized nature of French partisan orientations. It is instructive to note that in another nation that lacks an extensive historical tradition of stable partisanship—Germany—similar effects of item-wording have been found. Kaase,[9] in analyzing a number of German surveys of partisanship, inadvertently discovered that surveys using open-ended items elicited fewer assertions of partisan identification than did those providing alternatives. He replicated this finding by carrying out a survey using the venerable split-half sampling technique in which different wordings of the same question are administered to randomized subsets of the same sample. The split-half technique provides an excellent means of ascertaining the degree of attitudinal crystallization in a sample. Even slight differences in item-wording cause "fluctuations" if attitudes are not well entrenched; deeply internalized attitudes are not affected by even the most blatantly slanted alternative item-wordings.[10] In Figure 1 a dotted line connects the two 1968 French findings and those in prior and subsequent surveys. The diamond-shaped dotted area thus provides a visual indication of the "give" in French partisan orientations in 1968.

Further, if partisan—or other—orientations in a sample are not firmly internalized, even the same item administered in successive years should produce fluctuating responses. This phenomenon appears at least in part to account for the variations in French partisan identification found by Converse through the open-ended item used in his studies conducted with Dupeux and with Pierce. The lack of deeply entrenched French partisan orientations is also suggested by the two additional French observations in Figure 1, each of them elicited in surveys Inglehart conducted with Rabier, using a pair of items that differ from those employed in the 1958–1969 French surveys. A 1970 survey providing no list of

[8] For the Converse-Pierce time series, see Bruce A. Campbell, "French Elections and Voter Stability: A Model of Voting Behavior for the French National Electorate," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1971. We are indebted to Professor Converse for describing to us the characteristics of the truncated 1968 and 1969 samples as well as for providing us with marginals for each wave of his and Professor Pierce's panel.

[9] Max Kaase, "Party Identification and Voting Behavior in the West German Election of 1969," in Ian Budge, et al., *Party Identification and Beyond* (New York: John Wiley, 1976). See also Helmut Norpoth, "Party Identification in West Germany: Tracing an Elusive Concept," unpublished paper, 1976.

[10] See Fred I. Greenstein, "Item Wording and Other Interaction Effects on the Measurement of Political Orientations," *American Journal of Political Science* 20 (1976): 773–79 and the works there cited.

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political parties and simply asking the respondent whether there was a party he felt close to among the existing parties produced virtually the same incidence of partisan preference as the 1958 Converse-Dupeux study. In sharp contrast, a 1973 survey that provided fixed-choice alternatives—including not only political parties but also *tendances* and a "don't know" option—yielded a 60 percent rate of partisan identification.[11]

That partisan orientations appear in fact to have continued to be unstable during the Fifth Republic is consistent with the electoral aftermath of Pompidou's death. At that time two candidates from the Gaullist majority competed for the presidency and the least orthodox, Giscard, proved to be the survivor. In general, if Inglehart's and Hochstein's interpretations of their data were correct one would not anticipate the factional conflict that has been evident since 1968 among those party leaders and groupings that seek to lay claim to the heritage of de Gaulle.

Children's Partisan Orientations in The Three Countries

Let us now consider the implications of the time series in Figure 1 for what "ought" to have been happening to childhood partisan orientations at the time of Inglehart's 1968 survey. The interpretation by Inglehart and Hochstein of this survey would have led one to expect widespread partisan orientations and a high saliency of political parties among French children. Among children in the United States the well-documented decline in public partisanship, especially among young adults, leads one to expect far less partisan attachment than showed up in the studies of political socialization conducted during the heyday of widespread adulthood partisan identification in America. Given the ambiguity of the status of partisan identification as a subjective phenomenon among British adults, one is not quite sure what to expect among pre-adults other than that in a system in which party continues to be so central to the governing and electoral processes, partisan *cues* ought at any rate to be widely socialized by the time of late childhood.

The 1969–70 small-sample study of political socialization in the three countries is the one conducted by Greenstein and Tarrow. There are a number of reports on and discussions of the findings and methodology of this project. Here we merely note that the study consisted of stratified samples of children ten to fourteen years old, drawn from working- and middle-class populations in the northeastern United States; in London and East Anglia; and in Provence and Paris, with some farm children included in the French interviews. There were 80 English respondents, 106 French, and American comparison groups of 86 white and 25 black children. Only the American whites are included in the present analysis. The tape-recorded interviews were conducted by several interviewers in several schools in each nation to reduce adventitious interaction-effects resulting from styles of interviewing and milieux of schoolrooms.[12]

[11] We are indebted to Professor Inglehart for providing us with copies of the original questionnaires.

[12] For reports from the Greenstein-Tarrow project, see Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney G. Tarrow,

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The present data come from a sequence of questions in which the interviewer asks the respondent to describe to a hypothetical foreign child the meaning of various political terms that this child has heard but does not understand. Great effort was taken not to structure responses; so much so that by not asking an explicit question on the topic we undoubtedly end up with an underestimation of partisan loyalties. The sequence begins simply by listing the labels of political parties in the child's country and asking the child what these terms mean. For those children who respond with some accuracy but do not use the word "party" in their description, there is a probe asking what the term means. Then, in an open-ended item, the child is asked how he or she would vote if old enough to do so. This question is designed to establish whether the child makes spontaneous reference to parties, candidates, or other factors, or whether he or she refuses or is unable to answer the item. Throughout, the interview provided room for free expression, although we do not code responses that bring out information elicited by nonstandardized probes. In a later section of the interview schedule a fixed-choice item asks the child whether he or she "often," "sometimes" or "never" hears adults discuss politics. These items are, of course, designed to probe the various explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature and socialization of partisan orientations in the literature on the three nations.

We present numerous verbatim response-quotations to give the reader a direct sense of the different "textures" of children's partisan discourse in the three nations. In addition, the results of quantitative content analysis of the open-ended responses are reported in the tables that follow. The quantitative findings are not to be equated with population frequencies, given the small size of the sample and the quota-sampling procedure used to gather the data.

Table 1 summarizes responses to the initial item in the sequence of questions, asking the child to explain the phenomena referred to by a list of the nation's political parties and followed by a probe asking the meaning of "political party" when the child does not use the term spontaneously in response to the item. The most striking aspects of cross-national variation evoked by this stimulus are evident in the top and bottom rows of the table. Roughly four-tenths of the English, three-tenths of the American, and only one-tenth of the French children give reasonably precise explanations of the partisan labels and in doing so spontaneously make use of the word party. At the other end of the distribution

"Political Orientations of Children: The Use of a Semi-Projective Technique in Three Nations," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* 1 (1970): 479–558; Fred I. Greenstein, et al. "The Child's Conception of the Queen and the Prime Minister," *British Journal of Political Science* 4 (1974): 259–89; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader Revisited: Children's Images of Political Leaders in Three Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 69 (1975): 1371–98 and Greg A. Caldeira, "Children's Images of the Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping," *Law & Society Review* 11 (1977), forthcoming. Earlier reports of this study have presented findings on the black comparison group. The black respondents are not discussed here because their response-patterns are sufficiently different from those of the white respondents to require separate discussion and because the small number of black respondents makes interpretation difficult and sometimes deceptive.

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TABLE 1

Children's Recognition and Understanding of the Names of the Nation's Parties and of the Term "Political Party" (by country)

	England		France		United States	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Definition given with reasonable "textbook" accuracy						
Party mentioned spontaneously in definition	37.5	[30]	10.4	[11]	29.0	[25]
Familiarity with term "party" established by probe	17.5	[14]	22.6	[24]	21.0	[18]
Other respondents with vaguer descriptive responses	17.5	[14]	24.5	[26]	31.4	[27]
No information about parties	27.5	[22]	42.5	[45]	18.6	[16]
Total	100	[80]	100	[106]	100	[86]

(row four) are the children who were wholly unaware of their nation's parties. There we find that the French pattern of not spontaneously mentioning party is paralleled by the far greater expression of total ignorance of what the partisan labels refer to by French than the Anglo-American children. The English are about 10 percent more likely than the American to exhibit no awareness at all of the terms. The Americans are more likely than either of the other national groups to recognize the labels of national parties but to explain them in very vague terms (row three). This last evidence, of course, is consistent with the repeated finding in studies of younger adult age-cohorts that partisanship is no longer being widely socialized despite the continuing societal ubiquity of a visible if doctrinally ambiguous and fragmented two-party system.

Table 2 presents an inventory of the themes used by all of those children who responded in any fashion—apart from displaying sheer semantic confusion—to the item on partisan labels and its follow-up probe. As can be seen from the number of cases in Table 1, 58 of the English respondents, 70 of the American and only 61 of the French made statements codable in terms of partisan images.

Each cell in Table 2 consists of a theme, coded in terms of its presence or absence. In the course of successive codings of partisan images, three clusters of response-themes bearing upon the present discussion emerged. One cluster relates to the specific structure and functions of parties in each of the systems. Here we see that the evidence from the American children—86 percent of whom refer to the parties as being involved in elections and 43 percent of whom refer to their role in the selection of national political leaders—is consistent with the commonly articulated description of American parties as bands of loosely connected local feudalities that converge quadrennially for presidential elections. Compared with the Americans, 52 percent of the English and a mere 20 percent of the French children connected the political parties with elections. And only 14 percent of the English children—many of whom think the Queen is superior

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TABLE 2

Partisan Imagery in the Three Countries Among Children Exhibiting Some Awareness of the Parties

	England	*France*	*United States*
Images related to the structure of the political system			
Involved in elections	52%	20%	86%
Names president or p.m.	14	10	43
Governs	34	6	9
Names leaders collectively	21	7	6
Images related to trust in others/ comfort with partisanship			
Causes strife	5	13	1
Opposes president or p.m.	0	21	3
Issue-related images			
Ideology (liberal-conservative)	7	8	7
Favors groups (rich vs. poor)	10	5	6
Specific issue mentioned	16	15	9
"They have different ideas" (no further specificity)	9	29	24
N	58	61	70

NOTE: Each entry consists of the percentage of the 58 English, 61 French and 71 American children describing the party labels who made use of the various images itemized here.

to the prime minister in effective power—and 10 percent of the French children think of the parties as choosing the nation's highest political leader. Here are examples of imagery bearing on elections and choice of the president that is so common when American children describe the Republicans and Democrats:

> They . . . decide of all the candidates which one should be their representative to be president of the United States.
>
> They go and they vote which person they want to represent them.
>
> They're like loyal to one group and if a Democrat runs for an office they vote for a Democrat.
>
> First they have something like a couple of Senators who run in separate parties until they come up with one person to run for President. And then they have the voting.

Of the children from the other two nations, only the British describe the parties in a distinctive fashion that bears on their functions within the political system. One-fifth of the British children, in contrast to only a handful of children in the other two nations, state that the parties choose not a single person as the nation's leader, but that they choose its leaders—evidence of their perception of the collective nature of cabinet government. Moreover, reference to governing the nation is made by one-third of the children in Britain, where, of course, frequent public statements are made (in the plural) to what the "Government have" done, and

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among the most common adjectives modifying the word *government* are the labels of the political parties. Less than a tenth of the children in the other countries refer to the political parties as governing entities. Examples of English children's references to party government and the choice of collective leadership include:

> They're different parties who want to look after the country. They discuss things about the best way to run the country and things like that.
>
> They sort of rule the country's roads . . . and houses and all that.
>
> They are groups of people who go by what the heads of these parties say. They have meetings in these clubhouses and decide. The head of the party is someone who puts them into Parliament, you see.
>
> Political parties are bodies that try to get their policies introduced into the government of Britain and the party which gets the most votes gets to be the government.
>
> They're two different sorts of groups. One says I'll govern your country this certain way and the other says I'll govern it this certain way. And they have both got different heads, and the person who runs them.
>
> Well the Labour is one team of men that talk and the Conservatives is the other.
>
> They're two groups of people in Parliament.
>
> They're two groups of people that just happen to be the government.
>
> They are the two major parties who contest for the leadership in Great Britain in the government.

A second class of images describes political parties as a source of unpleasant contention and strife. The theme of strife is distinctively French in these 1969–70 interviews. Thirteen percent of the French children allude to unpleasant conflicts when asked what the labels of political parties mean, whereas few (5 percent) English and virtually no American children make such statements. (Since the interviewing of the Americans occurred during a period of political quiescence and well before the Watergate scandals, it is possible that a later replication in the United States might reveal more images of the parties as sources of strife, or as having other undesirable attributes.) Also falling into the politics-as-contention category is an image of the political parties viewed as groups that oppose the nation's political leader. This assertion—almost exclusively a French response—comes from one-fifth of the children in that national group. The French children who use this image sometimes stress the oppositional role of the Communist party. This is consistent with one of Converse and Dupeux's 1958 findings about French adults—that the major perceptual watershed dividing and arresting the attention of French adults was the Communist-non-Communist split. Here are examples of these two types of French responses:

> The Communists, they are the people who are against . . . General de Gaulle; when they vote, they vote against him, not for him.
>
> They are all groups, assemblies which don't all have the same point of view and sometimes it leads to wars and revolutions.

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> The Communists are the people who don't vote for General de Gaulle, against the Russians . . . The Communists are against General de Gaulle, they do not vote for the General.
>
> They are royalists, they want to put a king in power . . . They are not for General de Gaulle.
>
> Well they're the ones who are opposed . . . those who are against . . . for instance the workers, they contest [set up in opposition] because they don't have enough money . . . well everything builds up into a big fight. It's the ones who aren't satisfied . . . with a political platform, with a business . . . the students, for instance, they . . ., the workers who aren't satisfied because they don't earn enough money.

Finally we present themes in this set of responses bearing on issue-orientation, roughly following the well-known "levels-of-ideology" conceptualization first discussed in Chapter 10 of *The American Voter.*[13] Very few children in any of the nations (7 percent in England and the United States and 8 percent in France) evoke abstract left-right political distinctions. Taking the second most "sophisticated" level of issue-conceptualization used in *The American Voter*—that is, responses equating the political parties with the social groups they allegedly benefit—we note that the range of references is from 5 percent in France to 10 percent in England. Even this slight difference should not be interpreted in terms of the conventional image of high levels of British class-consciousness. The English children using this imagery in fact do not invariably link the Labourites to the working class and the Conservatives to the well-to-do. Many of them appear instead to connect their judgment of the current performance of the political party in power with the social group they favor—as this quotation illustrates:

> Labour is more or less for the working man, or it should be for the working man. But in fact today it is for the richer people or the more well-off people. Conservatives, today, are the shadow party 'cause they are the ones that were in government last. It's still a very big unit, not completely so at the lower classes—it's still supported by the people from the parts of the country. [The higher up people] support various. Although many people used to support Labour two or three years ago, people have gone off of them back to Conservative. And I think that the people, it's mainly the lower people who do the most work and should have the biggest say. But often it's the wealthy, most well-off people have, in fact, do get their say because they've got so much money. And they vote for either of the parties, whichever they think is doing best—for their pockets anyway . . . I think that I would vote Conservative.

Moving on to the open-ended item asking the child how he or she would vote if of age (Table 3), we see a dramatic demonstration that British children are more likely—58 percent compared with 3 percent in France and 12 percent in the United States—than the other children immediately to think in partisan terms when discussing electoral choice. Two categories of choice in terms of personalism were evident—references to specific individuals and references in the abstract to

[13] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald C. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

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TABLE 3

If You Were Old Enough to Vote, How Would You Vote? Initial Response

	England	*France*	*United States*
Party mentioned	58%	3%	12%
Particular person mentioned	4	17	49
For "the best person"	2	5	6
I wouldn't vote	2	10	0
I won't say—how one votes is a private matter	14	25	1
Don't know/ No response/ Haven't thought about it	20	40	32
Total	100	100	100
N	80	106	86

"the best person." Both classes of responses were more common in France and the United States than in England and references to individuals were particularly common in the United States, probably because of the 1968 presidential election and all the publicity that attended it. (The French sample includes equal numbers of children interviewed before de Gaulle announced his decision to resign and just after Pompidou's election, plus a handful interviewed during the interelection custodial government of Senate President Poher.)

French negativism toward politics also emerges in response to the question "how-would-you-vote?" Ten percent of the French children and virtually no other children state that they would not vote at all. A fourth of the French children insist that voting is a private matter, not something one discusses. Only 1 percent of the Americans show this sort of diffidence. Fourteen percent of the English do, but their responses do not carry the anti-political privatism of the French quotations that follow:

> Among friends when one doesn't agree, we don't talk about politics.
>
> I'd tell the [hypothetical foreign child] it's none of his business, each to his opinions.
>
> I think that is a personal question and I wouldn't answer. (Je pense que c'est une question assez personnelle, et je ne lui repondrais pas.)
>
> Oh, that, that's our own business. (Ah ça, ça nous regarde.)
>
> That's none of his business, it's personal. (Ca le regarde pas, c'est personnel.)

(One eleven year old, asked the even less demanding question of how to describe the President of the Republic, whispered to the interviewer: "May I speak freely?" Another child stated that in explaining political matters of any sort to a foreign child she would first have the child join her in a remote corner of the schoolyard where they could not be overheard.)

We complete our discussion of the sequence of items on partisanship with the data reported in Table 4—based on a global reading of the full sequence of each child's responses in the series on partisanship. If the child definitely indicated a

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TABLE 4

Code for Presence of Party Preference

	England	*France*	*United States*
Explicitly expresses party preference	56%	7%	31%
Response consistent with possible party preference	6	5	13
For "the best person" (U S: "independent")	1	11	20
Other and "don't know"	37	77	36
Total	100	100	100
N	80	106	86

partisan preference, then we coded the term "explicitly expresses party preference." We cannot, however, in all cases ascertain whether such preferences are stably internalized or whether they are transitory in nature. The verbatim protocols suggest that both tendencies are present but the instrument does not permit us to assess this variable for all children. If there was some ambiguity about the attachment, then we coded "possible party preference." We also coded for the spontaneous reference to being "independent" or voting for "the best person." Assertions of partisan preference are most prevalent in England, mildly so in the United States and very rare in France—*contra* the belief expressed by Ingelhart and Hochstein, prior to Pompidou's death, that France was becoming a nation of partisan identifiers.

Table 5, based on one of our few fixed-choice items, presents data about whether the child hears political conversation in the presence of adults "often," "not very often," or "never." The French and American samples are truncated, because some interviewers, especially in France, ignored the Likert-scale format and did not present to their interviewees the fixed-choice alternative. Children in the United States were much more likely than those in France to report that political conversation occurs "often"—a finding consistent with Converse and Dupeux's inferences about political discourse among members of primary groups in these two nations. In this respect, however, the English are not different from the French. This suggests that American primary-circle political discourse may be reasonably common rather than that in France such discourse is inhibited by any of the distinctly French influences mentioned earlier. The American finding

TABLE 5

Reports of Adult Political Conversation

	England	*France*	*United States*
Often	26%	24%	42%
Not very often	67	60	57
Never	7	16	1
Total	100	100	100
N	80	49	56

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may be related to distinctive aspects of familial structure in the United States, but we should note that American presidential elections are far more highly publicized than those of the other nations, and that an election had occurred shortly before the survey.

Conclusions

We found no evidence for the hypothesis that Gaullism and the institutions of the Fifth Republic have made France a nation of internalized partisan identifiers on the model of American partisanship up to the time in the mid-1960s when young American voters became decreasingly likely to form standing partisan attachments. French adults' assertions of partisan allegiance have been volatile but by most indicators appear to have continued to be less common than American partisanship, not only in the 1950s but also in later years when the frequency of partisan identification in the United States was slowly but consistently declining. British partisanship seems to have been consistently high during the years for which we have data, but, as Butler and Stokes note, the statement of a partisan preference may have a different significance from nation to nation.

In fact "party" does appear to have differed in its meaning as well as its prominence in political socialization, judging from the pattern of juvenile lack of partisan attachment and information implicit in Converse and Dupeux's 1958 findings. French children were substantially less likely than children in the other two nations to be able to describe the phenomena referred to in a list of their nation's parties. Those French children who could describe what the names of the political parties referred to had to be prodded to use the term "political parties" in their descriptions. Moreover, these terms and the electoral process evoked a rather substantial array of negative connotations and guarded, wary responses—more than in Britain and the United States.

American pre-adolescents and early adolescents interviewed in 1969–70 quite clearly were more likely to describe voting in terms of candidates than in terms of political parties. It is quite likely that political parties might have been mentioned more often a decade earlier. The parties themselves were referred to predominantly in electoral terms; this is consistent with the longstanding American tendency, especially of children, to see the parties as competing "teams" and not to attribute issue-positions—much less a role in the governing process—to them.

In England, even though partisan identification may not be a stable internalized phenomenon, party itself is far more prominent in the cognitive equipment children acquire as they begin to learn to perceive and respond to the political environment than in the other two nations. English children—at least as of 1969–70—continued to acquire perceptions of the central role of political parties as *the* bases for organizing governments.*

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Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952–1956

GARY W. REICHARD

Despite growing attention to the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a number of common assumptions about politics in the 1950s remain unexamined. One such assumption is that bipartisanship in foreign policy, though badly shaken at the end of the Truman administration, was restored under Eisenhower and prevailed throughout most of his two terms. Democrats, it has often been argued, supported Eisenhower more strongly in foreign policy than did his own party—at least until Sputnik and Democratic jockeying for the 1960 nomination caused the working relationship to come unglued. In part, this contention has resulted from greater scholarly attention to the division between nationalist and internationalist Republicans during the period, which perhaps made the Democrats seem united and relatively cooperative.

The theme of Democratic cooperation is generally only implicit in studies of the 1950s, however. Political studies of the period customarily focus on the harmonious relationship between Eisenhower and the Democratic leadership in the Congress—notably Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn.[1] Similarly, works on the partisan aspects of foreign policy in the 1950s usually center on the president's conversion of Republicans to internationalism, and on the continuation of

[1] See Norman Graebner, *The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950* (New York, 1956), p. 144; Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York, 1956), p. 312; Davis S. Broder, *The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America* (New York, 1972), pp. 6–7, 13–14; and Herbert S. Parmet, *The Democrats: The Years After FDR* (New York, 1976), pp. 101, 143.

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Truman's containment policies, implying that Democrats could (and did) naturally support Eisenhower's foreign policy since he was continuing their own programs.[2] In this view, the cooperationist-minded Democratic leadership in Congress is seen as speaking for the party as a whole.

In fact, despite their initial inclination to cooperate, some Democrats began to oppose Eisenhower early in his first term. Contrary to the common interpretation, however, they were divided among themselves. Consequently their opposition was often diffuse and ineffective. The high visibility of the cooperationist-minded party leaders in Congress masked these divisions, leaving the false impression that the party was united in a bipartisan approach.

This study, focusing on the response of Democrats in Congress as well as on the private and public remarks of party spokesmen with experience in foreign affairs such as Adlai Stevenson, Dean Acheson, Chester Bowles, and Averell Harriman, suggests that the opposition party *did* oppose Eisenhower. If by 1956 the Democrats still lacked a unified foreign policy program of their own, it can be seen that during the first Eisenhower administration they took the necessary steps toward shaping that alternative program, which in turn would help carry them to victory in 1960. Bipartisanship did not prevail on most important foreign policy issues during the Eisenhower years. Although the Democratic Congress seemed to concede the initiative to the Republican-controlled executive branch, reluctant acquiescence should not be confused with bipartisanship. In light of the more obvious partisan and institutional conflict over foreign policy which reemerged in the Vietnam era, this revised view of the 1950s suggests that bipartisanship—far from being the post-World War II norm—was an exception to the general pattern. The fact that Democratic presidents of the 1960s were able to conduct foreign policy on a long tether probably reflected the strength of party bonds, rather than evidencing a continued bipartisan acceptance of executive leadership in foreign affairs.

The Foreshortened Honeymoon

When Eisenhower assumed the presidency in January 1953, prospects for bipartisanship were mixed. In sweeping to victory in November, the Republicans had sharply attacked the Democrats for foreign policy failures—the stalemated Korean war, mistakes in Asia, and the general "sterility" of the Truman-Acheson containment posture.[3] These campaign charges naturally put the Democrats on the defensive as the Eighty-third Congress convened. Yet since the new

[2] Herbert S. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York, 1972), p. 574; Howard Bliss and M. Glen Johnson, *Beyond the Water's Edge: America's Foreign Policies* (Philadelphia, 1975), p. 65; Paul Y. Hammond, *Cold War and Detente: The American Foreign Policy Process Since 1945* (New York, 1975), p. 83.

[3] Robert A. Divine, *Foreign Policy and U. S. Presidential Elections, 1952–1960* (New York, 1974), pp. 50-58, 69-76, 82-85; Barton J. Bernstein, "Election of 1952," in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Fred L. Israel (eds.) *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968* (New York, 1971), Vol. IV, pp. 3234, 3249-3250.

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Republican president was an internationalist, like-minded Democrats might be willing to cooperate with him. Placed in the unfamiliar role of out-party, the Democrats thus faced a dilemma. While cooperation might weaken their position as an effective opposition, if they did not cooperate they would have to develop coherent policies of their own—without the advantage of leadership from a Democrat in the White House. A further complication was that many party members had come to believe—or at least had publicly proclaimed—that the president ought to control American foreign policy.

The safest path initially seemed to lie in bipartisanship. After his 1952 defeat, Adlai Stevenson urged fellow Democrats to "assume a role of positive and intelligent opposition. That opposition must be thoughtful and discriminating; we should not, and I hope we will not, automatically oppose the administration merely on grounds of partisanship." When President Eisenhower reciprocated this spirit in his first State of the Union message, other Democrats took up Stevenson's theme.[4] The most sweeping pledge of support came from one who was well positioned to do something about it: Senator Walter F. George (Ga.), senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee (FRC). Speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in the spring of 1953, George praised the principle of bipartisanship. "In foreign affairs," he asserted, "the Nation must whenever possible speak with one voice. . . . [T]his single voice in foreign affairs can be attained by seeking out areas of agreement in advance of action and then taking that action on a united basis." Insisting that Democrats would not "abdicate their right to freedom of action," he emphasized ultimate concord. "The minority party is ready at all times to give to the administration sincere bipartisan advice," George assured his listeners, "and the President may be sure of our cooperation. . . ."[5] Fellow Democratic FRC members John Sparkman (Ala.) and Hubert Humphrey (Minn.) seconded the chairman's remarks. Only bipartisanship, suggested Humphrey, would show the world that American foreign policy was "not subject to sudden change as a result of the tipping of the political scales." Another Democrat, Senator Thomas Hennings of Missouri, even lashed out at his own party's containment strategies, in effect adopting the Republican rhetoric of 1952.[6]

Thus a political honeymoon appeared likely. The prospect of Democrats meeting Eisenhower half way on foreign policy was reinforced in early 1953 by

[4] Stevenson to James E. Doyle, December 9, 1952, in Walter Johnson (ed.), *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson* (Boston, 1974), Vol. IV, p. 219. Eisenhower's message of February 2, 1953, in U. S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 13 (hereafter cited as *Public Papers*).

[5] Walter George, "The Development of Bipartisanship," address of April 17, 1953, in *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pp. A1979–80.

[6] Hubert Humphrey, "Statement on Bipartisan Foreign Policy . . . February 1953," Box 93, Hubert H. Humphrey Mss., Minnesota State Historical Society, St. Paul, Minn. (hereafter cited as Humphrey Mss.). See Sparkman's remarks, *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 921. Hennings' address of April 13, 1953, Box 256, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Mss., Western Historical Collection, University of Missouri Library, Columbia, Mo. (hereafter cited as Hennings Mss.).

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two major legislative episodes, the Yalta Resolution and the Bohlen nomination. In the case of the Yalta (or "Captive Peoples") declaration, the administration opted for a moderate course instead of placating GOP hard-core nationalists by backing a resolution condemning the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Eisenhower, in defiance of the 1952 Republican platform, presented to Congress a draft resolution which castigated the Soviet Union for subverting the "intent" of the controversial Yalta accords, instead of emphasizing wrongheaded American concessions. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, testifying in behalf of the resolution in February 1953, was the bipartisan spirit incarnate. "This resolution looks to the future, rather than to the past," he said. "The past is controversial. . . . The resolution which President Eisenhower has proposed would avoid this realm of controversy. . . . It is an act which needs, and deserves, the support of both great parties."[7] Ultimately more Republicans than Democrats objected to the proposed declaration, and after Josef Stalin's death provided an excuse for "reassessment" in early March 1953, the whole idea was scrapped before it came to a vote. Leading Democrats, however, appreciated the administration's conciliatory attitude during the brief episode.[8]

The confirmation of Charles E. Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union reflected the same spirit of interparty cooperation. In the face of Republican attacks on Bohlen for having participated in the Yalta conference, Senate Democrats stood up for President Eisenhower's nominee. In the seventy-four to thirteen confirmation vote on March 27, 1953, all but two Democrats voted for Bohlen, while nearly one-fourth of the Republicans opposed him.[9]

Early Stirrings: Debate Over Security Policy, 1953-1954

If partisan conflict over substantive foreign policy developed slowly, it flared quickly in the related area of national defense—the very area of Eisenhower's reputedly greatest expertise. Democrats began their attacks in mid-1953, criticizing the "New Look" in defense policy. This opposition broadened by 1954 to an indication of profound change in American cold war policy.

Unveiled in two stages, the New Look brought on diverse Democratic criticisms. In his Defense Reorganization message of April 30, 1953, Eisenhower first suggested the general outlines of a policy shift designed to meet defense needs while keeping "our economy solvent." He then proposed a defense budget

[7] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 200*, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pp.4–5.

[8] See Hubert Humphrey to Bertha Perter, April 1, 1953, Box 94, Humphrey Mss.; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (New York, 1966), p. 66. For more comprehensive treatment of the Yalta Resolution, see Gary W. Reichard, *The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-third Congress* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1975), pp. 52–55.

[9] See James N. Rosenau, *The Nomination of "Chip" Bohlen* (New York, 1960); Reichard, *Reaffirmation of Republicanism*, pp. 55–58.

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for fiscal 1954 some $5.1 billion below President Truman's last request.[10] Since the entire reduction occurred in the Air Force budget, Democratic airpower advocates—led by Stuart Symington (Mo.), Henry M. Jackson (Wash.), Richard B. Russell (Ga.), and John Stennis (Miss.) in the Senate, and John McCormack (Mass.), George Mahon (Texas), and Melvin Price (Ill.) in the House—immediately voiced opposition, charging that a dangerous "gap" would result between American and Russian airpower capabilities. They were soon joined by other members of their party.[11]

But Democratic critics began to disagree with one another once the New Look took specific shape. The new defense posture took a surprising turn in late 1953, when it became clear that the goal of "effectiveness with economy" would be achieved at the expense of conventional forces rather than airpower. In fact, within the reduced defense allocations, air defense was to receive the greatest emphasis.[12] While air enthusiasts continued to complain about the absolute reductions in airpower, several other Democrats (including Albert Gore of Tennessee, Hubert Humphrey, Herbert Lehman of New York, Mike Mansfield of Montana, and A.S. Mike Monroney of Oklahoma) now took the tack that the New Look represented an unsafe overemphasis on air-atomic power and a penny-pinching approach to defense in general.[13] This disagreement over tactics

[10] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York, 1961), esp. pp. 70–71. Message transmitting Reorganization Plan 6 (Defense Department), April 30, 1953, *Public Papers, 1953*, pp. 225–238.

[11] *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 7803–7855, 7932–7979, 9452 ff. Also John F. Kennedy, speech of May 14, 1953, Box 287, John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential Mss., John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Mass. (hereafter cited as Kennedy Pre-Presidential Mss.). Thomas Hennings to M. L. Stephenson, July 23, 1953, Box 153, Hennings Mss. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, X (May 22, 1953), 685; (June 26, 1953), 850; and (June 5, 1953), 726 (hereafter cited as *CQWR*). Also Eric Sevaried to Adlai Stevenson, September 5, 1953, Box 378, Adlai E. Stevenson Mss., Princeton University Library, Princeton, N. J. (hereafter cited as Stevenson Mss.).

[12] Huntington, *The Common Defense*, p. 74; Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson* (New York, 1968), pp. 71–73; see defense section of Eisenhower's 1954 budget message, *Public Papers, 1954*, pp. 121–124.

[13] See Symington and Russell comments in *CQWR*, XII (January 15, 1954), 65; also Thomas K. Finletter, *Power and Policy: U. S. Foreign and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age* (New York, 1954), esp. pp. 3, 21, 23–24. The two "wings," however, were capable of cooperating on the Senate floor: Symington joined with Gore, Humphrey, Kennedy, Lehman, Mansfield, and Monroney in sponsoring a series of amendments to the fiscal 1955 defense appropriation, designed to increase funding for Army personnel and maintenance (the group of amendments was defeated, thirty-eight to fifty, with Democrats in favor by thirty-seven to ten). See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1954*, X, pp. 155, 183.

Roll calls on defense questions during 1953–1954 showed that most Democrats, at least in the Senate, favored *both* increased air power and large conventional forces. However, "economy" advocates in the party (Senators Byrd [Va.], Ellender [La.], Gillette, [Iowa], Holland [Fla.], Edwin Johnson [Colo.], Long [La.], and Robertson [Va.]) seemed to side with the administration on both issues. There were not enough roll calls on defense matters in the House during 1953–1954 to permit such comparisons of blocs.

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was to undermine the force and logic of Democratic arguments on both defense and foreign policy for the rest of Eisenhower's first term.

The assault on administration national security policy intensified in January 1954, when Secretary of State Dulles publicly pronounced his "massive retaliation" doctrine. The New Look now appeared to take on implications for foreign policy, as Dulles explained that the new emphasis on airpower afforded an all-important capacity for instant, massive retaliation. Although the secretary had been advised beforehand by one of his assistants not "to put so much emphasis on the contrast with the previous administration," he pointedly compared this new, coherent security posture with the series of unplanned emergency measures which, he said, comprised the Truman administration's approach. When the Republicans took over in 1953, as Dulles explained it, "Change was imperative to assure the stamina needed for permanent security." It was this need that led to a policy based on "maximum deterrent at bearable cost," which would permit the United States to "shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices."[14]

Not surprisingly, Dulles' speech caused an immediate stir in the Democratic party. Chester Bowles and Averell Harriman criticized the massive retaliation doctrine as a frightening departure, as did Paul Nitze, who complained to Adlai Stevenson about Dulles "injecting so much partisanship into this central issue." Harriman offered a tactical suggestion. Arguing that the secretary had a "psychopathic urge to have a new policy," he urged Stevenson to "encourage our senators and congressmen to pursue the tactic of asking questions which it will be difficult for the Administration to answer satisfactorily."[15] Congressional Democrats did react, linking criticisms of massive retaliation with arguments against the New Look. According to Senator Gore the new doctrine, coupled with the defense budget cuts, was an invitation for a third world war. Gore's criticisms were quickly taken up by his Democratic colleagues Paul Douglas (Ill.), Mike Monroney, and John Sparkman. Henry Jackson, a well-known foe of the New Look, claimed that Dulles' pronouncements "told the Russians what kind of aggression to start."[16] In other words, in the view of many Democrats, the new security policy threatened actually to reduce freedom of action in American foreign policy making.

Yet the debate over massive retaliation again revealed important divisions among leading Democrats. Nowhere was this more evident than in two separate analyses of the doctrine written for *The New York Times Magazine* by Dean Acheson and Chester Bowles. Both called for a new "Great Debate" on foreign

[14] Memo, Carl W. McCardle to Dulles, January 8, 1954, Box 26, John Foster Dulles Mss., Princeton University Library, Princeton, N. J. Dulles address of January 12, 1954 ("The Evolution of Foreign Policy"), in U. S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents* (Washington, D.C., 1957), Vol. I, pp. 80, 81, 83.

[15] Bowles memorandum (undated), Box 398, Stevenson Mss.; Nitze memorandum (undated) and W. Averell Harriman to Stevenson, Feburary 1, 1954, Box 403, ibid.

[16] *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 647-656.

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policy and questioned the constitutionality of the new doctrine (which they said implied the threat of an "instant"—and therefore undeclared—war), but from that point they diverged. Acheson was pragmatic, arguing that the policy was both unrealistic and impractical. Bowles was essentially moralistic, despairing of the impact of the new policy on the national conscience and predicting that its implementation would mean the end of international disarmament negotiations.[17] Democrats in Congress did not feel compelled to choose between these positions in 1954, but this "realist-idealist" cleavage resurfaced periodically in their arguments throughout the decade.

Massive retaliation soon proved an elusive target for a Democratic offensive. Dulles himself assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the policy was "evolutionary" rather than "revolutionary." It was difficult to disagree. Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) believed that no real policy change was underway, even though the Republicans were trying "to create the impression that they have new and original ideas."[18] Realization that massive retaliation was only a variation of, not a departure from, the Truman-Acheson containment posture frustrated the Democrats. Confronted by a shift more rhetorical than real, they were unable to include in their criticisms of massive retaliation even the suggestion of a new, alternative policy.

Bipartisanship Forsworn: Foreign Policy Disputes, 1954

While the controversy over the New Look and massive retaliation simmered, Democrats became increasingly critical of Eisenhower on foreign policy issues. Specifically they opposed the administration on Indochina policy and on the general question of foreign aid. Unfortunately for the opposition party, on these issues, too, they attacked from differing perspectives. Yet it was clear the party was rejecting a bipartisan course.

The first foreign policy clash arose over the Indochina crisis of April-May 1954. At a meeting of congressional leaders called by Dulles in early April, the Democrats present were by far the most critical. Admiral Arthur Radford's plan for an air strike to aid the French at Dien Bien Phu seemed to the Democrats to embody the worst features of the massive retaliation doctrine. Senators Lyndon Johnson (Tex.) and Earl Clements (Ky.) asked the most probing questions, and doubtless contributed greatly to the administration's decision neither to intervene nor to ask Congress for a resolution permitting it to act in the future.[19]

[17] Dean Acheson, "Instant Retaliation: The Debate Continued," *The New York Times Magazine*, March 28, 1954, p. 78; Bowles, "A Plea for Another Great Debate," ibid., February 28, 1954, pp. 24-25.

[18] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on Foreign Policy and Its Relationship to Military Programs*, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 42, 44. Fulbright to Pat Cochrane, April 3, 1954, BCN 85, File 7, J. William Fulbright Mss., University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Ark. (hereafter cited as Fulbright Mss.).

[19] Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," *Reporter*, XI (September 14, 1954), 31-32; Chalmers M. Roberts, *First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Own Times*

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By summer 1954, the immediate threat of United States intervention in Indochina had passed, but not without considerable partisan discussion. One young senator, John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.), raised the objection that such intervention ignored the all-important issue of colonialism which pervaded the French-Indochinese conflict; this seemed to align him clearly with Stevenson and Bowles, both of whom were speaking out on the same issue. Similarly, Hubert Humphrey urged that the issue not be made "one of white man versus Asiatic."[20] Other Democrats, including a number of southerners, objected to the administration's dispatching 200 "technicians" to Indochina, on the grounds that they were unnecessary and provocative. "We are going to war," warned Senator Stennis, "inch by inch."[21] Still other Democrats raised procedural issues: the administration was ignoring the United Nations and failing to follow proper constitutional steps.[22]

Simultaneously, Democratic arguments were also marked by cold war militancy in the spring of 1954. This was true even of some of the "anticolonialists" such as Kennedy and Mansfield, but especially so in the case of those like Stuart Symington and Representative Robert L. Sikes (D-Fla.), who hinted of the possible usefulness of tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina.[23] This "hard-line/soft-line" dichotomy roughly resembled the Bowles-Acheson split on overall foreign policy: while some critics stressed the moral issues surrounding intervention, others implied more pragmatic power-related concerns. As if this bifurcation were not problem enough, Democrats were undermining their credibility as an opposition in another way. Both those who condemned the sending of conventional troops to Indochina and those who advocated possible

(New York, 1973), pp. 115, 117; William P. Gerberding, *United States Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Analysis* (New York, 1966), pp. 31-32.

[20] Kennedy had expressed such views intermittently since 1951. See Ronald J. Nurse, "America Must Not Sleep: The Development of John F. Kennedy's Foreign Policy Attiudes, 1947-1960," Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1971, pp. 80-81, 83-84, 108, 132-133; also Lee P. Marvin, Jr., to Priscilla Johnson, April 17, 1953, and John F. Kennedy to John Foster Dulles, May 7, 1953, Box 290, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Mss.; Stevenson, "Report by Adlai Stevenson," *Look*, XVII (June 2, 1953), 38; Chester Bowles to Stevenson, June 5, 1953, Box 374, Stevenson Mss.; Hubert Humphrey to Carl S. Hagemeyer, March 1, 1954, Box 106, Humphrey Mss.

[21] Opponents of the administration action included, in addition to Stennis, Senators George, Allen Ellender (La.), Guy Gillette (Iowa), Estes Kefauver, Mike Mansfield (Mont.), and John Sparkman. *Congressional Record*, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1503-1506, 1550-1552, 4577-4578, 4671-4674, 7918-7919. *CQWR*, XII (February 26, 1954), 262, and (April 30, 1954), 541.

[22] Senator Gillette remarks, *CQWR*, XII (April 30, 1954), 541 and (May 14, 1954), 607; Americans for Democratic Action press release of June 14, 1954, Americans for Democratic Action Mss., Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wis. Senator Wayne L. Morse (Ore.), press release dated April 17, 1954, Box 61, Wayne L. Morse Mss., University of Oregon Library, Eugene, Oreg. (hereafter cited as Morse Mss.). (Nominally independent, Morse was voting increasingly with the Democrats in 1954.) Hubert Humphrey to Robert C. Olson, May 5, 1954, Box 106, Humphrey Mss.

[23] See Joseph Alsop to Symington, January 25, 1954, and Symington to Joseph Alsop, January 29, 1954, Box 9, Joseph and Stewart Alsop Mss., Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Sikes's comment in *CQWR*, XII (April 30, 1954), 541.

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use of nuclear weapons there were implicitly agreeing with principles underlying the New Look—that strategic air power was ultimately the best resource.

Democratic criticisms of Eisenhower widened in 1954 to embrace the issue of foreign aid. Although congressional Democrats actually supported the president more strongly on aid measures than did Republicans in 1953-1954, the difference between the levels of Democratic and Republican support was strikingly small since foreign aid was a Democratic policy innovation of the Truman era. In the Senate, a vociferous band of sixteen Democratic fiscal conservatives (mostly southerners) voted consistently for cuts in foreign-aid spending. In the lower house it was more difficult to isolate an opposition bloc on foreign aid, but the number of those voting to cut Eisenhower's requests ranged from twenty-five to a high of seventy-five in 1953-1954.[24] In addition to posing fiscal objections, a growing number of Democrats opposed the aid program's "warlike" emphasis, claiming that it was an inevitable by-product of the administration's massive retaliation mentality.

The bipartisan good will so evident in early 1953 was becoming badly eroded. Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson privately agreed as early as August 1953 that "Eisenhower's honeymoon" should not go "unchallenged much longer," with Stevenson incorrectly predicting that the 1954 congressional session would "be the real test" on foreign policy issues.[25] Meanwhile, some Democrats who still favored bipartisanship in theory were nevertheless unhappy with the way it was working. "Let us re-instate bipartisanship into foreign policy. . .," wrote Estes Kefauver to Lyndon Johnson in December 1953, "despite our exclusion from the official policy councils." Others who were aware of their exclusion were not as willing as Kefauver to overlook it.[26] One group of dissident Democrats reacted to Kefauver's urging with a novel suggestion. The so-called Finletter group, an advisory panel working with Stevenson, suggested to the former candidate that he make a partisan issue of bipartisanship itself. "The group," reported its chairman, former Air Secretary Thomas K. Finletter,

[24] By comparison, in the Eighty-second Congress only ten Senate Democrats had generally voted for foreign aid cuts. In 1953-1954, the antiforeign-spending group included most—but not all—of those who favored economizing on the defense budget. The bloc consisted of Clinton Anderson (N. M.), Harry F. Byrd, Price Daniel (Tex.), Allen Ellender, Sam Ervin (N. C.), Allen Frear (Del.), Lester Hunt (Wyo.), Edwin Johnson, Olin Johnston (S.C.), Alton Lennon (N. C.), Russell Long, Burnet Maybank (S. C.), Pat McCarran (Nev.), John McClellan (Ark.), Richard Russell, and John Stennis. Seventeen Democrats consistently opposed such reductions.

In the House during the later Truman years, roughly twenty to sixty Democrats had voted for aid cuts. There were insufficient roll-call votes in the House during 1953-1954 to permit clear identification of an antiforeign-aid bloc.

[25] Bowles to Stevenson, August 25, 1953, and Stevenson to Bowles, August 31, 1953, Box 374, Stevenson Mss.

[26] Kefauver to Johnson, December 24, 1953, Box 71, Series I, C. Estes Kefauver Mss., Hoskins Library, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn. (hereafter cited as Kefauver Mss.). See also George Smathers' call for greater bipartisan consultation, *CQWR*, XI (October 2, 1953), 1211.

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> agreed with Kefauver's criticism . . . but did not approve of Kefauver's acceptance of this Republican attitude. On the contrary, it was felt—with Averell Harriman being the strongest on this subject—that the Democratic leadership in the Senate and House should insist vigorously on bi-partisanship and should *hammer at the Republicans to grant it*.[27]

Although no evidence exists that this suggestion was formally implemented, Democrats did become increasingly critical in 1954. Stevenson, though politely endorsing Kefauver's words, suggested to the Tennessean that there would be "ample opportunity to ridicule the Republican divisions and sharp moderation of attitudes that have accompanied Republican responsibility, *viz*. China of late." Bowles believed that unless the administration acted to bring Democrats into the decision-making process, the party would be "foolish . . . to accept responsibility for policies which it had no part in creating."[28] The official party organ, *Democratic Digest*, took the same approach, criticizing the administration for offering only "an occasional empty gesture," rather than true consultations. In mid-summer 1954, a high-level meeting of liberal Democrats focused on the same theme.[29]

The 1954 congressional elections revealed the decline of bipartisanship. President Eisenhower broke no truce when in September he called for the election of Republicans to help him in foreign policy, as well as on domestic matters—even though howls of righteous indignation came from many internationalist Democrats.[30] In fact, many party leaders, with Stevenson in the lead, had already begun to take on the administration. Stevenson's aim, as he explained to Bowles, was "to invite attention to the sloganeering, bluff-and-bluster of the administration. . . ." Numerous congressional Democrats, meanwhile, charged that the administration had denied them the consultative role that Truman had afforded Republicans, and drew attention to the "extremist" (isolationist) element in the GOP.[31]

Democratic Dilemmas and Disunity, 1955

When the Democrats won the 1954 elections, their victory replicated the conditions which had produced the original bipartisanship after World War II: the

[27] Finletter to Stevenson, January 29, 1954, Box 403, Stevenson Mss. (Italics added.)

[28] Stevenson to Estes Kefauver, January 5, 1954, Box 71, Series I, Kefauver Mss. Bowles, "Foreign Policy Position," undated (probably May 1954), Box 555g, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Mss.; Stevenson to Bowles, May 28, 1954, Box 398, Stevenson Mss.

[29] "What's Happened to the Bipartisan Foreign Policy?" *Democratic Digest*, I (April 1954), 18-19. See "Notes on Foreign Policy" (from meeting of Acheson, Harriman, and others with Senate Liberal Group, July 13, 1954), Box 555f, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Mss. On same subject, Hubert Humphrey to Barry Bonoff, May 10, 1954, Box 106, Humphrey Mss.

[30] See Eisenhower speeches of September 23, October 28, and October 29, 1954, *Public Papers, 1954*, pp. 869-870, 982, 1005-1006.

[31] Stevenson to Bowles, September 11 and September 22, 1954; Bowles to Stevenson, September 3, 1954, Box 398, Stevenson Mss.; Paul Nitze to Stevenson, September 28, 1954, Box 403, ibid. *CQWR*, XII (October 29, 1954), 1307; *Democratic Digest*, II (October 1954), 73-75.

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presidency and Congress were now controlled by opposite parties.[32] Almost immediately, Eisenhower retracted his earlier comments about the difficulties of working with a Democratic Congress and as a gesture of good will, convoked a bipartisan leadership conference on foreign policy. The bipartisan theme also figured heavily in the 1955 State of the Union message a month later.[33] Meanwhile, Senator George acquiesced in administration wishes that he take the chairmanship of Foreign Relations rather than of the Finance Committee, making it more likely that the former group would take a cooperationist line in 1955. Despite disquieting comments from a few naysayers in both parties, prospects for bipartisanship once again seemed bright in early 1955.[34]

But a crisis in the Formosa Straits soon revived partisan conflict. In response to Communist Chinese shelling of the Quemoy island group in September 1954, the Eisenhower administration had supported Chiang K'ai-shek's retaliatory air strikes against the responsible artillery positions near Amoy, on the mainland. After Eisenhower scotched Dulles' proposal of American bombardment of the mainland, the Formosa situation settled into a war of nerves, during which each of the Chinese governments acted to strengthen its military position.[35]

In this tense situation, the administration hinted privately to congressional leaders that action was needed. On January 20, 1955, Dulles went secretly to the Capitol to speak individually to leaders of both parties, suggesting the need for a resolution authorizing possible United States naval action in the Straits of Formosa. Four days later Eisenhower formally requested such authorization, telling Congress that "a suitable . . . resolution would clearly and publicly establish" his authority to act. At Dulles' insistence, he asked that the resolution include assurance of American willingness "to fight if necessary for Formosa" and "to engage in whatever operations may be required to carry out that purpose."[36]

[32] The new Senate lineup was forty-eight Democrats, forty-seven Republicans and one Independent, Wayne Morse, who voted with the Democrats on organization and within one year joined the party. The House was Democratic, 232–203. On issues in the 1954 elections, see Reichard, *Reaffirmation of Republicanism*, pp. 214–217.

[33] Eisenhower press conference remarks, November 3, 1954, *Public Papers, 1954*, pp. 321–322; memorandum of Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, November 17, 1954, White House Office Staff Secretary Records, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; James C. Hagerty Diary, December 14, 1954, James C. Hagerty Mss. (hereafter cited as Hagerty Mss.), Eisenhower Library; Eisenhower memorandum to selected agency and department heads, December 16, 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, Box 5, Eisenhower Mss. (1953–1961) (hereafter cited as Eisenhower Mss.), Eisenhower Library. State of the Union message, January 6, 1955, *Public Papers, 1955*, p. 15.

[34] Donovan, *The Inside Story*, p. 306; William S. White, "Two Parties and One Foreign Policy," *The New York Times Magazine*, August 7, 1955, p. 34.

[35] Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, "The Chinese Offshore Islands" (originally Top Secret), September 9, 1954, Box 9, Ann C. Whitman Files (International Files), Eisenhower Mss., Eisenhower Library. Mike Mansfield interview, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project (Princeton University Library), pp. 5–6 (hereafter cited as Dulles Project); Chalmers M. Roberts, "Battle on the Rim of Hell: President vs. War Hawks," *Reporter*, XI (December 16, 1954), 12; and O. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950–1955," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIV (December 1959), 524.

[36] John Sparkman interview, Dulles Project, p. 30; Walter D. Robertson interview, Dwight D.

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Senator George and Representative James P. Richards (S.C.), the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced identical resolutions on January 24. The measure authorized the president "to employ the armed forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores" and "such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands," as well as to take "such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate. . . ." The authority would expire when the president determined "that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured. . . ."[37]

Overwhelming approval of the Formosa Resolution in both houses (85-3 in the Senate, 410-3 in the House) gave the illusion of bipartisan unanimity but many Democrats expressed displeasure, distrust, or both. Congressmen Chet Holifield (Calif.), Paul J. Kilday (Tex.), Carl Albert (Okla.), and Sidney Yates (Ill.) spoke critically, and Speaker Rayburn, while backing the measure, urged that it not be considered a precedent. The sharpest attacks came in the Senate, where Wayne Morse, Independent from Oregon, and Democrats Humphrey Kefauver, and Lehman described the resolution as a "predated" license for war—at best unnecessary and at worst unconstitutional.[38] The administration had in fact known all along that unanimity was lacking. At one point Dulles had encouraged Eisenhower to press Republicans to stop "needling the Democrats" by contrasting the president's request with Truman's unilateral actions in Korea.[39]

Lopsided Senate approval of two other Asia-related matters soon followed. Like the resolution, both the mutual assistance treaty with Nationalist China (Formosa Treaty) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization received strong Democratic support, tempting observers to conclude once again that a "new bipartisanship" had taken hold.[40] But despite appearances, Democrats did disagree with the administration's China policy as reflected in the three measures—particularly what they perceived as Eisenhower's uncritical support for Chiang K'ai-shek. Behind the closed doors of the Foreign Relations Committee, Hubert Humphrey described the situation. Conceding the seeming interparty agreement, the Minnesotan insisted that there was "a remarkable difference of opin-

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Eisenhower Oral History Project (Columbia University Library, New York), pp. 120-122; James C. Hagerty's Diary for January 20-25, 1955 (Hagerty Mss.), is highly informative about the planning for the presidential request, including early drafts of the president's message.

[37] Draft embodied in S. J. Res. 28 and H. J. Res. 159. See *CQWR*, XIII (January 28, 1955), 103.

[38] Limiting amendments, offered by Kefauver, Lehman, and maverick Republicans William Langer (N.D.) and George Malone (Nev.), were all defeated. See *Congressional Record*, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 659-660, 664-665, 667-668, 670-675, 679-680, 819-821, 840-848, 925-940, 975-977, 981-987, 992.

[39] Notes of Eisenhower-Dulles telephone conversation, January 25, 1955, Eisenhower Diary, Box 5, Eisenhower Mss.; Hagerty Diary, January 27, 1955, Hagerty Mss.

[40] No Democrats opposed SEATO, but Lehman, Kefauver, and Morse criticized the Formosa Treaty. Democrats Albert Gore and Dennis Chavez (N. M.) also voted against the latter, *CQWR*, XIII (February 4, 1955), 120, and (February 11, 1955), 147.

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ion in the Senate, away beyond the difference shown by the vote on the resolution," over details of China policy.[41]

The strong Democratic vote in favor of the three Asia-related measures in early 1955 attested to effective work by the party leadership, especially Senator George, but little more. There was grumbling from the ranks. "It made me most unhappy," wrote a disgusted Senator Morse, "to find out that so many members of the Senate were willing to admit in cloakroom discussions that they would like to have joined in opposing the Resolution and Treaty, but that they simply had to go along with the Democratic leadership." According to Fulbright, even some of the leaders "resented the way the matter was presented to the Senate—and . . . most of them felt it was inspired by partisan motives," but "they did not wish to make this a partisan matter," since they believed the president had the support of the public.[42]

Institutional considerations played a decisive part in stifling Democratic opposition, especially in the case of the Formosa Resolution. In Fulbright's words, it was "no light matter" to vote against the president's request and thereby reveal to the world "a disunity and weakness which has often been characteristic of our system." Humphrey and Hennings privately expressed the same sentiment.[43] In a sense Democrats were impaled on their own earlier arguments against Republican attempts to limit presidential powers during the Korean war. Eisenhower had reason to count on this reaction from the opposition by 1955, since Senate Democrats had been instrumental in helping to defeat the Bricker Amendment the previous year, largely on the grounds of protecting executive powers in international affairs. Obviously it would have been difficult for them to reverse their arguments to block the Formosa Resolution.[44]

Hemmed in on institutional grounds, the Democrats also lacked unity on substantive policies. Stevenson's approach typified the Democratic "policy": criticism of administration programs and of massive retaliation, without offering specific alternatives. In a nationwide radio and television address in April 1955, Stevenson labeled the Eisenhower-Dulles policies "futile" in both Indochina and China, concluding that the only choice was between "another damaging and humiliating retreat, or else the hazard of war. . . ."[45]

[41] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China* (Executive Session), 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 78–79, in Record Group 46, National Archives.

[42] Morse to Benjamin H. Kizer, February 14, 1955, Box 45, Morse Mss.; Fulbright to Harold G. Gelwicks, February 24, 1955, BCN 46, Fulbright Mss.

[43] Fulbright to John T. Caldwell, January 28, 1955, BCN 46, Fulbright Mss.; Humphrey to Drew Pearson, March 8, 1955, and Humphrey to Florence Fredricksen, March 10, 1955, Box 119, Humphrey Mss.; and Hennings to William Nekola, February 15, 1955, Box 156, Hennings Mss.

[44] See Gary W. Reichard, "Eisenhower and the Bricker Amendment," *Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives*, VI (Summer 1974), 88–99.

[45] Text of Stevenson's April 11 radio address, *U. S. News & World Report*, XXXVIII (April 22, 1955), 100–104. Stevenson consulted both Lyndon Johnson and Rayburn about the speech beforehand (Clayton Fritchey to Paul M. Butler, March 31, 1955, Box 3, Paul M. Butler Papers, University of Notre Dame Library, Notre Dame, Ind.).

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Indeed, the threat of war was emphasized by a number of Democrats in early 1955. When in late April the Bandung Conference produced apparent peace feelers from the Chinese Communists, even Walter George and Lyndon Johnson clamored for the administration to talk with the Chinese. Along with other Democrats, they also urged Eisenhower to "go to the Summit," and negotiate personally with the Soviet leaders. When the president decided on such a course, culminating in the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955, however, the Democrats lost whatever "peace issue" they might have had. Eisenhower held extensive bipartisan briefings both before and after the Geneva meetings, and the resulting "spirit of Geneva"—whatever its implications for cold war diplomacy—deflated partisan conflict at home. Political commentators again hailed the resurgence of the bipartisan spirit.[46]

The Democratic "peace offensive" of early 1955 was also hampered by the party's continued criticism of administration defense policy. Efforts to brand Republicans as the "war party" suffered as defense-minded Democrats kept up the attack on the New Look as imbalanced and inadequate. Symington and Jackson were joined in such criticisms by former President Truman and Senator Hennings, who along with Symington raised the issues of government secrecy and "deceit" in defense matters.[47]

Two books written in 1955 by Acheson and Bowles, although not mirroring precisely the divisions among congressional Democrats, defined the basic parameters of policy dispute within the party. Predictably, Acheson defended the " 'traditional' policy of meeting aggression where it occurred," arguing that it was more likely to foster a coalition among free nations than was massive retaliation. Implicitly, he echoed the "defense gap" charges of Symington and Jackson, though he did not argue for air strength alone. What was needed in the 1950s, Acheson insisted, was not only an adequate nuclear deterrent, but also a "military establishment capable of meeting—we would hope jointly with our friends—force which might be employed against our interests, without involving the world in nuclear warfare." The administration's bluff-and-bluster diplomacy, he argued, had permitted the nation's conventional force capability to slip dangerously; its foreign and defense policy shortcomings were thus closely linked. Advocating traditional balance-of-power diplomacy, the former secretary called for creation of "a counterbalancing power system" against the Communists.[48]

Bowles stressed a more idealistic theme, characteristically focusing on the nuances of neutralism and anticolonialism in cold war politics. He especially

[46] Evans and Novak, *Lyndon B. Johnson*, p. 173; Richard Rovere, *Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years* (New York, 1956), p. 364; White, "Two Parties and One Foreign Policy," pp. 12, 32, 34. See also *CQWR*, XIII (July 29, 1955), 897; and Gerald W. Johnson, "Congress and Geneva," *New Republic*, CXXXIII (August 1, 1955), 12.

[47] *CQWR*, XIII (July 8, 1955), 809, and (April 22, 1955), 440. See Symington to J. William Fulbright, June 2, 1955, BCN 46, Fulbright Mss.; Symington to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., June 2, 1955, Box 155, Hennings Mss.; and Hennings to R. Walkup, March 31, 1955, Box 156, ibid.

[48] Dean Acheson, *A Democrat Looks at His Party* (New York, 1955), pp. 80, 95, 99, 195–196.

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noted the recent shift in Soviet tactics to "a new flexible policy" and the existence of growing "tensions below the surface" of Sino-Soviet relations. "[D]evelopments in South Asia, Africa and South America will assume increasing importance," predicted Bowles, "and the oversimplified arithmetic of the Cold War—'You must be either for us or against us'—will become even more meaningless." Differing sharply with Acheson's call for a global balance of power, he emphasized the need "to re-establish our anticolonial heritage" and to provide economic assistance to nations with "the capacity to develop their own resources. . . ." Moreover, in contrast to those emphasizing military preparedness, Bowles applauded Eisenhower's summit diplomacy and urged working through the United Nations toward disarmament. He agreed with Acheson that massive retaliation offered little hope of producing a sense of security among free nations (who might, he argued, insist on their right to "no annihilation without representation") and favored a flexible response capability, but insisted that "this need not mean unlimited military expansion. . . ." The real goal of American foreign policy, in Bowles' opinion, should be to employ the nation's "considerable moral resources" to extend the ideals of the American Revolution throughout the world.[49] These ideas essentially reflected the concerns of the "peace-minded" Democrats in Congress, such as Humphrey, Lehman, Fulbright, and Mansfield; they also captured the anticolonial theme sounded by Kennedy, Mansfield, and others. Stevenson, impressed by the book's arguments, wrote in a review that his "dissents" from Bowles were "only a series of footnotes and emphases."[50]

Preparing for '56

The impending 1956 election encouraged Democratic leaders to unite in a foreign policy offensive. Pro-Stevenson strategists were particularly eager to evolve an effective program. Undaunted by the successes of summit diplomacy, Thomas Finletter believed that Democrats could argue that administration policy "was not peaceful enough," in contrast to criticisms by hawkish Republicans. In September, Finletter's National Issues Project, set up at Stevenson's request, mapped out a series of conferences to discuss major issues and strategy; a conference on defense was set for November, and one on general foreign policy for December.[51] In the meantime, leading Democrats like Stevenson, Harriman, and former President Truman spoke out publicly, though keeping their criticisms general and vague. Although cooperationists like Walter George and

[49] Chester Bowles, *The New Dimensions of Peace* (New York, 1955), pp. 18, 62–63, 75, 321, 322, 330–331, 340–341, 359–362, 378–379, 383.

[50] Adlai Stevenson, "Challenge of the Post-Geneva World," *New Republic*, CXXXIII (November 14, 1955), 17.

[51] Finletter to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., September 30, 1955, and undated, unsigned memorandum, "Proposed 1955–56 . . . Schedule for Research Group," Box 416, Stevenson Mss.

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Lyndon Johnson continued to counsel restraint, theirs was becoming a minority view even among party leaders.[52]

Dulles was the Democrats' favorite target. When the secretary briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on international developments in early January 1956, Democratic members were extremely critical. After the session, Humphrey, Sparkman, and George each issued negative statements, while Fulbright confided to Stevenson, "Dulles is worse than I thought. His report to the Committee . . . was dismal."[53] The full partisan storm broke, however, only after publication of a *Life* magazine article on January 16, 1956, quoting Dulles on the subject of "brinksmanship." Particularly galling to Democrats was Dulles'seeming boastfulness about having taken the nation "to the brink of war" three times, each time forcing the other side to back down. While Eisenhower refrained from public discussion of the *Life* piece, Dulles defended the "brinkmanship" idea in a subsequent press conference, further antagonizing the opposition.[54]

Secretly pleased at the opportunity the article gave them, Democrats were publicly aghast. Hubert Humphrey, who demanded that Eisenhower immediately "tell the American people if he agrees," was especially critical:

> Taken literally, the article in effect expounds a new basis for American foreign policy. Mr. Dulles' "art" of getting to the verge of war comes precariously close to rejecting the traditional American conviction that we must . . . never bear the awful responsibility for beginning atomic warfare. . . .
>
> Much harm can be done by the way things are said, the postures we strike, and the heedless things we do for domestic political consumption. Indiscreet articles like the Dulles article sap the vitality of our alliances and dull the edge of our foreign policy.
>
> Is it too much to ask that henceforth we have an American Secretary of State, *rather than a Republican one?*[55]

Humphrey was not alone. "Bravo," wired Stevenson, "This is not a matter of politics but is [*sic*] the honesty and good faith of the United States. I hope many Democrats will help you to restore both." Even some who were normally uncritical of administration policies spoke out.[56]

Stevenson played an important role in determining Democratic strategy on foreign policy in 1956. At Bowles' suggestion, he asked Finletter to formalize a

[52] Stevenson address to Democratic National Committee, November 19, 1955, Box 315, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Mss.; text of Harriman address of November 21, 1955, in *U. S. News & World Report*, XXXIX (December 2, 1955), 113–115.

[53] *CQWR*, XIV (January 13, 1956), 52; Fulbright to Stevenson, January 10, 1956, Box 430, Stevenson Mss.

[54] James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," *Life*, XL (January 16, 1956), 70 ff. Eisenhower press conference, January 19, 1956, *Public Papers, 1956*, p. 164; Dulles's press conference, *The New York Times*, January 18, 1956, p. 10.

[55] Hubert Humphrey press release, January 13, 1956, Box 432, Stevenson Mss.

[56] Stevenson to Humphrey, January 14, 1956, Box 432, Stevenson Mss.; A. Willis Robertson to Humphrey, January 16, 1956, Box 128, Humphrey Mss.

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think-tank focused specifically on foreign policy, which might help him by coming up with something "in addition to the criticism of Dulles and the deprecation of Republican complacency, incompetence, etc." Yet Stevenson's suggestions for membership on the panel—Bowles, Benjamin Cohen, George F. Kennan, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, and Robert Tufts—invited ideological diffusion or, at best, bland consensus. The group was soon in operation, divided into eight task forces working on separate topics.[57] The former candidate's consensus strategy on foreign policy was also apparent in his major foreign policy address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1956. In a talk hailed by some as opening a "great debate" on foreign policy, Stevenson criticized the administration's loss of initiative in the cold war, but otherwise spread his arguments thin. Condemning Eisenhower and Dulles for providing inadequate military, moral, and economic leadership, he urged abandonment of the massive retaliation posture, reduction of the nation's reliance on military alliances, and energetic pursuit of arms reduction. Designed to be eclectic, the speech lacked focus.[58]

By avoiding details and not adopting the arguments of any one faction, Stevenson obviously hoped to remain "above" the foreign policy dispute in his party while he campaigned in the primaries. After Estes Kefauver's withdrawal from the race in June, Stevenson's tactic began to pay off. Other Democrats left in the field against him were more or less identified with one or another of the specific foreign policy approaches within the party. Lyndon Johnson, after slightly deviating in early 1955, had resumed the bipartisan, cooperationist stance advocated by George, Rayburn, and other southerners; he therefore seemed less critical of administration foreign policy than Stevenson. Symington, though not noted for his views on substantive foreign policy matters, remained the acknowledged leader of defense-minded Democrats; strident in his criticisms, he came across as a "realist," in the mold of Acheson and those who favored a hard-line cold war policy. Even more closely tied to the "balance-of-power" school was Governor Harriman of New York, who was supported by most northern liberals, former President Truman, and Acheson himself.[59] Stevenson emerged as the only candidate acceptable to Bowles and the "idealists," while his consciously eclectic strategy let him claim with some justification that he was not their captive.[60]

Stevenson's success was evident not only in his nomination but in the platform adopted by the Democrats in August. The foreign policy section, drafted

[57] Bowles to Stevenson, February 16, 1956, Box 426, Stevenson Mss.; Stevenson to Finletter, March 14, 1956, Box 430, ibid.; undated, unsigned memorandum, "Finletter group: Research," Box 428, ibid.

[58] See Divine, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 98–99.

[59] On Harriman, see ibid., p. 109; Parmet, *The Democrats*, p. 131; and James P. Warburg to Stevenson, June 4, 1956, Box 443, Stevenson Mss.

[60] Actually, Bowles supported the consensus strategy, even though it sometimes took Stevenson afield from the "idealist" position. See Bowles to Stevenson, February 16, 1956, Box 426, Stevenson Mss.

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by a diverse committee made up of Acheson, Bowles, Cohen, Fulbright, and Nitze, addressed itself to the same welter of concerns—and in the same eclectic way—as had Stevenson's April speech. The document attacked the Eisenhower-Dulles policies but posed no alternatives and lacked any clear position on neutralism, "liberation" of captive peoples, the appropriate level of American armament, or the best way to achieve disarmament—though it included lengthy planks on each issue.[61] The party's performance led one seasoned observer to conclude that Democrats viewed foreign affairs as "a subject for elegant allusion or vituperative phrase," but "not yet a matter for much serious thought." Disgustedly, the *New Republic* dismissed the party's stand on foreign affairs as a "dishonest conglomeration of irrelevancies and inaccuracies."[62]

The Election and After: A New Democratic Resolve

Stevenson probably could not have defeated Eisenhower in 1956 regardless of his campaign strategy. It is even more unlikely that he could have won by emphasizing foreign policy. In the face of polls showing that the voters had greater confidence in Republicans on foreign policy questions, Stevenson reluctantly yielded to the advice of most of his advisors and decided to downplay international and defense issues during the early stages of the campaign.[63] Although he broke his self-imposed silence beginning in September, familiar divisions continued to keep the party from shaping a clear image on foreign policy during the campaign. The presidential candidate spoke out in favor of ending the draft and banning nuclear tests, but other Democratic candidates undermined the "peace" theme by criticizing defense cutbacks. Meanwhile, Acheson and Bowles continued to ply their own differing wares, thereby adding to the confusion.[64] When the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolt broke almost simultaneously in the final days of the campaign, Stevenson issued savage indictments of Eisenhower-Dulles policies, but in characteristically general terms. These eleventh-hour crises probably would have benefited the administration in any event, but the Democrats' failure to offer constructive criticism

[61] Divine, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 121–122; Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson (compilers), *National Party Platforms, 1840–1968* (Urbana, Ill., 1970), pp. 524–528.

[62] C. L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times*, August 15, 1956; "Irrelevant and Immaterial," *New Republic*, CXXXV (August 27, 1956), 5.

[63] See AIPO surveys #564-K (May 1956), #568-K (August 1956), #570-K (September 1956), and #572-K (October 1956), in George H. Gallup, for American Institute of Public Opinion in William P. Hansen and Fred L. Israel (eds.), *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971* (New York, 1972), Vol. II, pp. 1427, 1441, 1447–1448, 1451. On avoidance of the defense issue, see Huntington, *The Common Defense*, pp. 259–262.

[64] See Divine, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 136, 139; Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, p. 405; Parmet, *The Democrats*, pp. 145–156; text of Acheson address of September 26, *U. S. News & World Report*, XLI (October 5, 1956), 88–91; and "Defense: Too Little, Too Late?" *Democratic Digest*, IV (August 1956), 7-16.

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did not improve their electoral chances. The electoral outcome aside, Stevenson missed an important opportunity for party leadership. By persistently adhering to an eclectic strategy on foreign policy, he allowed the Democrats to continue drifting. Instead of choosing a single line of attack and leading the party in that direction, the candidate accepted and reinforced the party's ideological pluralism on foreign policy.

Still in control of Congress, the Democrats were in disarray. A dejected Bowles urged Stevenson to exercise firm leadership, since there was "no clear, highly positioned voice today in the Democratic party on foreign policy" and "no Democrat in Congress who approaches the influence of a Taft or a Knowland." It was most unlikely, thought another concerned observer, "that Lyndon Johnson or . . . any of the Congressional Democratic leaders are either prepared to give the country a lead in foreign policy, see a necessity for a lead or have any . . . inclination to come to grips with the problem. . . ."[65] Indeed, despite Senator George's retirement from the Senate, continued "cooperationism" seemed a possibility, with critics of the administration striking their own blows in their own ways. Party morale was low. "It is extremely difficult," Fulbright wrote in December 1956, "to arouse any interest among the Democrats in a critical attack upon the policies of the President."[66]

Yet there were signs of Democratic resolve to launch a united offensive on foreign policy during Eisenhower's second term. One portent was the new Democratic Advisory Council, established for the purpose of giving the party a permanent unified voice on all issues, including foreign policy. An even more promising vehicle for attack was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, now headed by a new chairman, Theodore Francis Green, and comprised of a vigorously partisan Democratic majority.[67] The committee's mood was apparent to the administration within a week after the 1956 election, as a high State Department official complained that he was being given the runaround, with chairman-designate Green being noticeably unhelpful. Already the departing Senator George had lost all his influence within the group.[68]

Determined that the administration would be held more accountable in the future, Stevenson spurred members of the committee to be more aggressive. "I want so much to talk with you about mounting a more effective opposition this time," he wrote to John Sparkman. "I suspect it will be up to you and Fulbright and a few others on the Foreign Relations Committee to keep picking at them and make them answer some questions." Stevenson suggested the possibility of

[65] Bowles to Stevenson, November 15, 1956, Box 476, Stevenson Mss.; Harrison E. Salisbury to Stevenson, November 17, 1956, Box 479, ibid.

[66] J. William Fulbright to Ronald B. McCallum, December 17, 1956, BCN 105, Fulbright Mss.

[67] Democratic National Committee press release, Box 428, Stevenson Mss.; Parmet, *The Democrats*, pp. 151–157. Continuing Democratic members on the committee included Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, and Sparkman; in January 1957, they were joined by John F. Kennedy and Russell Long.

[68] Notes of Eisenhower-Herbert Hoover, Jr., telephone call, November 12, 1956, Eisenhower Diary, Box 11, Eisenhower Mss.

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his meeting with FRC Democrats, an idea that Sparkman approved. The Alabamian promised to set up "a kind of round robin" of periodic meetings, to include Acheson, Bowles, Nitze, Finletter, and others with foreign policy expertise, as well as Stevenson.[69] Meanwhile, Humphrey pressed within the committee for a full-scale investigation and critique of foreign policy developments; Fulbright, Mansfield, Morse, and Sparkman all thought it a good idea.[70] Institutional caution, so important an obstacle to effective Democratic opposition before 1956, was yielding at last.

After four years of frustrated opposition, the Democrats were intent on taking the offensive on foreign policy. They had rejected bipartisanship as early as 1954, but came up with no policy of their own. Moreover, through Eisenhower's first term, the Democrats' criticisms clashed with one another: some called for increased air power, while others complained that the New Look overemphasized it; Acheson and other "realists" called for renewal of balance-of-power politics, while Bowles and his allies countered with a flexible program built around the problems of emerging nations; meanwhile, the influence of a cooperationist-minded leadership combined with long-held (and publicized) Democratic beliefs about a strong presidency to reduce the chances for any meaningful or sustained opposition to administration policies. In the 1956 campaign, the party resolved half of the dilemma. The Democrats attacked, but in a formless way. Only the chastening experience of a second successive Eisenhower landslide gave party members the impetus to unite.

This new collective resolve was an important step, but events also conspired to help launch the planned offensive. Although ideological unity was not forged overnight, Democrats were soon working together. Flexible response advocates and air-power proponents, for example, found an ideal opportunity to join forces, as the launching of Sputnik and the leaking of the Gaither Report, both in late 1957, gave credibility to general charges of defense inadequacies under the Eisenhower administration. The ensuing howl about a "missile gap" implied far more than mere dissatisfaction with the American missile program, and all the Democratic presidential hopefuls took up the issue as they worked for the 1960 nomination. Likewise, the increasing bellicosity of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (notably in the 1958 Formosa crisis); the landing of American forces in Lebanon in mid-1958; and the obvious hardening of anti-American sentiment in the Middle East, Latin America, and other emerging nations permitted a coalescence of the "anticolonialist" Democrats with others who had been criticizing the militance of the Eisenhower-Dulles cold war postures. The diversity that had undermined Democratic

[69] Stevenson to Sparkman, November 17, 1956, and Sparkman to Stevenson, December 31, 1956, Box 479, Stevenson Mss.

[70] Humphrey to Albert Gore, December 17, 1956; Humphrey to Wayne L. Morse, December 18, 1956; and Humphrey to Theodore F. Green, December 18, 1956; Green to Humphrey, December 20, 1956; all in Box 129, Humphrey Mss. See also Bowles to Lyndon B. Johnson, January 2, 1957, and Humphrey to Johnson, January 7, 1957, Box 138, ibid.

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credibility in the years before 1956, now harnessed by partisan spokesmen determined to make a case against the administration, became the basis for an aggressive, many-faceted assault.

Conclusions

The Democrats' rejection of bipartisanship and consequent decision to criticize the administration on foreign policy matters had both short- and long-term implications. In the short run, the party—and particularly its ambitious and outspoken members who actively sought the 1960 presidential nomination—managed to define by the end of the Eisenhower years certain coherent positions which, while not necessarily responsible for John F. Kennedy's electoral victory, nevertheless served to make Democrats into a credible alternative on foreign, as well as domestic policy. Those positions—especially the sense of engagement in the struggles of emerging nations, the emphasis on flexible response capability, and the rejection of rigid, preannounced commitments—certainly played a role in the incremental buildup of American forces in Vietnam by Democratic presidents. Yet they were not manifestly worse, in an abstract way, than the Eisenhower-Dulles tendencies they replaced. They *were* manifestly different.

In the post-Vietnam period, it has been common to observe that bipartisan agreement, or a "cold war consensus" has prevailed continuously since World War II. "The administration of Harry Truman," notes one recent study of post-1945 American policy, "set the broad outlines and developed the rationale for the policies, and forged the consensus to support them. Eisenhower broadened the consensus and extended the policies, and the Kennedy-Johnson administration pressed them to their fullest implementation." In other words, in the cold war years "debate over the fundamentals of foreign policy was not really a legitimate activity."[71]

Yet even recognizing the basic continuities in American policies during the last three decades, it is wrong to conclude that this represented bipartisanship. The conduct of the Democratic opposition during the Eisenhower years is instructive: far from good-naturedly following the lead of the president, the opposition party has usually been as disposed to dissent on foreign policy as on domestic. The fabled bipartisan spirit of the late 1940s, shattered during Truman's last years in the White House, enjoyed only a brief revival after Eisenhower's inauguration before going into eclipse again in the middle 1950s. If on occasion Eisenhower and his successors were able to win the support of both parties in Congress on important foreign policy questions, such has also been the case on domestic issues in times of perceived crisis. This natural rallying of public officials to meet the emergency needs of a given moment should not be construed as bipartisanship, however, or even as consensus in any meaningful sense. Partisan debate over foreign policy has often been muffled, but only because the opposition—like the Democrats in the 1950s—felt the need for greater

[71] Bliss and Johnson, *Beyond the Water's Edge*, pp. 65, 1, xii.

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information, or needed an opportune moment to attack the administration. There has been no lack of underlying disagreement.

In fact, bipartisanship in foreign policy is not natural to the American political process. Perhaps it did not truly exist even in the years immediately after World War II. As William S. White wrote in 1953, "The endless salutes to 'bipartisanism' that became part of the national folklore . . . actually were salutes that the Democrats themselves cannily set off. . . . This cheering . . . tended . . . wholly to obscure the fundamental power relationship between the two parties."[72] White's observation is to the point; bipartisanship has always been more of a political expedient than a reflection of harmony among American policy makers. Just as in the late 1940s Harry Truman found it convenient (and easy) to coopt a Republican party which lacked alternative foreign policy proposals of its own, later politicians of both parties have often conveniently avoided serious discussion of pressing international issues, always in the name of a higher "bipartisan" purpose.

That true bipartisanship does not prevail in American foreign policy making should cause no concern. Partisan debate over such issues should be as legitimate as any other kind of interparty conflict, and is as likely to be productive of healthy change. What is regrettable is that political leaders—presidents and congressional members alike—have so often constructed a facade of unanimity which they assumed, rightly or wrongly, that Americans expect. More than once this has meant too little debate, too late. Americans both in and out of government need to realize that bipartisanship is not, as is commonly believed, the norm in the nation's experience—even in the post-World War II period. Only then is the system likely to function normally, or at least openly, and only then will responsible party leaders feel free to debate critical foreign policy questions when they arise—in time to avert the kinds of calamities produced when assumptions and actions go unquestioned for too long.*

[72] William S. White, "Report on the 'New Nationalism,' " *The New York Times Magazine*, June 28, 1953, p. 8.

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Paine, America, and the "Modernization" of Political Consciousness

JACK P. GREENE

The full significance of the achievement of Thomas Paine has perhaps never been thoroughly explained. His public career falls into two neatly divisible phases: the American, lasting from 1774 to 1787, and the European, stretching from 1787 to 1802. Few scholars concerned with his American career have been much interested in his European, while those studying his European activities have rarely demonstrated much sensitivity to the bearing of his American experiences upon them.[1] Numerous biographies have traced his life with varying degrees of detachment.[2] But biography, focusing as it does upon the discrete details of an individual's life, has rarely been a satisfactory vehicle for exploring the wider impact of that life. Paine's larger significance can perhaps be understood only in terms of his relationship to one of the most important transformations in modern history, a transformation that, to borrow a set of conceptions from the social sciences, may most accurately be referred to as the "modernization" of political consciousness.

This transformation was characterized by basic changes "in ways of perceiv-

[1] The major exception is Eric Foner's recent *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (New York, 1976), the best book thus far written on Paine.

[2] The best of these are David Freeman Hawke, *Paine* (New York, 1975); Audrey Williamson, *Thomas Paine: His Life, Work, and Times* (New York, 1974); and Alfred Owen Aldridge, *Man of Reason: The Life of Thomas Paine* (Philadelphia, 1959).

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ing, expressing, and valuing" within the political realm, changes that were every bit as fundamental and as far reaching as those produced in the religious sphere by the reformations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The result was a wholly new political mentality for participants at all levels of the political process, a mentality that was not only receptive but eager for change, oriented toward the present and future rather than toward the past, confident of the efficacy of human reason to shape that present and future, and committed to the revolutionary beliefs that criteria for membership in the political nation should be universalistic rather than prescriptive, and that social and political advancement should be based on achievement rather than ascription.[3] This transformation was accompanied by—and played a key role in bringing about—two crucial developments: the mobilization of large segments of society that had previously been politically inert, and the desacralization of the traditional political order. As the title implies, the two principal, if highly speculative, contentions of this essay are that Paine played a central role in the initial phases of this transformation during the last decades of the eighteenth century, and that the social and political facts of America, as Paine encountered them during his American career, were crucial in determining the shape and content of his special contribution to that transformation.

Farmer of Thoughts

Paine was already thirty-seven when he arrived in Philadelphia on November 30, 1774. Although we know only the broad outlines of his life up to that time, he could scarcely have been described as in any way a success: for more than two decades he had drifted from one livng to another without leaving much of a mark. Up to that time, he tells us, he had never "published a syllable in England." Encouraged by Benjamin Franklin, who found him "*a worthy, ingenious*" fellow, Paine had made the voyage to Philadelphia in the hope of getting still another start in the world. His "particular design was to establish an academy on the plan [on which] they are conducted in and about London." Instead, he early became involved in editing and writing for the *Pennsylvania Magazine*, a job that finally brought him to the discovery, as he later remarked, of the "one kind of life I am fit for, and that is a thinking one, and, of course, a writing one." Like so many immigrants before and after, Paine found in America his true vocation. It was as an author, as "a *farmer of thoughts*," that he would satisfy a boundless passion for fame.[4] Although he soon abandoned all plans to

[3] For a systematic discussion of the modernizing process, see Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (London, 1974), pp. 15–17, 289–91. The term *modern* does not for me connote something better. It is here used as a convenient label for a set of structures and attitudes that began to achieve prominence in the early modern European and American worlds and have subsequently characterized much in the course of human development.

[4] Written in 1792, Paine's "The Case for the Officers of the Excise" had been printed for the House of Commons but not published. The only known Paine writing before his arrival in America, it was

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open an academy, he persisted in his design to become a teacher. But he took for his pupils not a class full of adolescent Philadelphia boys but the whole of the emerging American political nation.

His success as a pedagogue with his new pupils was virtually instantaneous. Knowing from a friend, a former subpreceptor of George II, "the true character of the present King from his childhood upwards, and, you may naturally suppose, of the present ministry," Paine perceived that Americans "were all wrong, by an ill-placed confidence" in the King, who, no less than the ministry, Paine was persuaded, was bent upon "a total conquest" of the colonies. No doubt at the urging of friends, Paine "determined . . . to write the pamphlet [*Common*] *Sense*." Published on January 10, 1776, just a few days more than thirteen months after his arrival in America, *Common Sense* was an uncompromising brief against monarchy and for American Independence. More important, it enjoyed a literally unprecedented reception, at least in the Anglophone world. The "number of copies printed and sold in America," Paine wrote in 1779, "was not short of 150,000—and is the greatest sale that any performance ever had since the use of letters, —exclusive of the great run it had in England and Ireland." There were seventeen printings in London alone in 1776; French editions were published in 1776 in both Paris and Rotterdam; and German editions were published in Philadelphia in 1776 and in Lemgo in 1777.[5] So important in early 1776 was *Common Sense* in persuading strategic segments of the American political community that independence was a desirable and possible objective that on the basis of that achievement alone Paine could justifiably, as he wrote the Pennsylvania financier Robert Morris in February 1782, take "honest pride" in "thinking and ranking myself among the founders of a new Independent World."[6]

But Paine was destined for an even larger role in an even grander theatre. With publication—first in London, then in Paris, the United States, and most of the publishing centers of Europe—of Part I of *The Rights of Man* in February 1791 and Part II twelve months later, this "man of freedom," as his French tranlator said, undertook to explain "to the whole world with the same success as in America . . . the theory of the practice of the Rights of Man." Sales soon outstripped those of *Common Sense*. As Paine reported a decade later, *The Rights of Man* "had the greatest run of any work ever published in the English language. The number of copies circulated in England, Scotland, and Ireland, besides translations into foreign languages, was between four and five hundred thousand." From very unpromising beginnings extending through his first thirty-seven years and "with all the inconvenience of early life against" him, Paine had

not issued to the public until 1793. Paine, "American Crisis"; Paine to Henry Laurens, Spring, 1778, Januay 14, September 14, 1779, in *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York, 1945), 1:72, 2:8–9, 1143, 1161, 1178.

[5] Paine to Laurens, January 14, 1779, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 2: 1161–63; Richard Gimbel, *Thomas Paine: A Bibliographical Check List of Common Sense* (New Haven, 1956), pp. 57, 124.

[6] Paine to Morris, February 20, 1782, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 2: 1207.

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thus succeeded both in contributing "to raise a new empire in the world, founded on a new system of government," and in achieving, as he put it, "an eminence in political literature, the most difficult of all lines to succeed and excel in, which aristocracy, with all its aids, has not been able to reach or to rival." No other man, he liked to think, had "*contributed [so much] to the liberty of both worlds*," in Europe as well as in America.[7]

Paine's phenomenal literary success, his ability "usefully and successfully [to] attract the public attention," fascinated contemporaries and has never ceased to intrigue scholars. It was a phenomenon that interested Paine himself, and he offered a number of plausible, if partial, explanations. His "disinterestedness," he thought, his publicly exhibited and carefully nurtured reputation as a man who was "determined to follow [his] . . . genius, and not [his] . . . fortune," a person who never attempted to make money from his public writings and had neither "profit, place [n]or power" in view, "compelled respect" among the reading and listening public. He also thought that the deep popular resonances he evoked were attributable to the power of his arguments, the simplicity of his style, and his faith in the capacity of the populace for political understanding: Men, he assured Lafayette in the dedication of Part II of *The Rights of Man*, could "always understand their true interest, provided it be presented clearly to their understanding, and . . . in a manner [calculated] not to create suspicion by any thing like self-design, nor offend by assuming too much."[8]

Modern historians have offered other, complementary explanations. Bernard Bailyn has emphasized Paine's ability to articulate and give concrete expression to the accumulated social rage of the late eighteenth-century world, while Eric Foner has stressed Paine's social affinity with the "mass audience" to whom he spoke so effectively. Whatever the explanation, there can be no doubt, as Foner has remarked, that "for Paine, the medium was of one piece with the message."[9] A crucial figure in the decisive late eighteenth-century shift from a primarily oral-aural to a mainly typographic culture, Paine was the herald of the linear rationality of the emerging typographically literate society who could manipulate the new typographic medium in such a way as to communicate powerfully with those segments of society still attuned to the modes of intellectual exchange from the older oral-aural world.[10] But it is important to emphasize that with Paine the medium was emphatically not the whole of the message. Why so many people on both sides of the Atlantic found the irreverence, iconoclasm, and rage that infused his writings so congenial and why they

[7] Translator's Preface to *Rights of Man*; Paine, *Rights of Man*; Paine, "To the Citizens of the United States," 1805; Paine to John Hall, November 25, 1791, in ibid; 1: 346, 405–06; 2: 910, 920, 1322.

[8] Paine, *Rights of Man*; Paine, "Address to the People of Pennsylvania," December 1778; Paine, "Six Letters to Rhode Island," January 1783; Paine to George Washington, July 21, 1791, in ibid., 1: 347, 405–06, 2: 279, 366, 1319.

[9] Bernard Bailyn, "Common Sense," in *Fundamental Testaments of the American Revolution* (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 7–22; Foner, *Tom Paine*, pp. 79–87.

[10] See Walter J. Ong, *The Presence of the Word* (New Haven, 1967), pp. 22–87.

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were so receptive to the particular sociopolitical vision he offered are questions that cannot be answered without close attention to the content—as well as to the form—of his writings.

Teaching Americans to Reverence Themselves

Most fundamentally, perhaps, the corpus of Paine's political works constitutes a massive attack upon all the primary institutions and beliefs that had traditionally sustained the old European political and social order. His first concern was to strip the veil of sanctity from tradition, to expose the absurdities in what people had formerly revered, and thereby to wean them "from those narrow prejudices and partialities [they] . . . had imbibed" from the repressive cultures in which they had been raised. His initial task was to persuade people that rationally formed opinion, rather than prejudice, was the proper basis for individual political action. "No man is prejudiced in favor of a thing, knowing it to be wrong," Paine wrote in *The Rights of Man*: "He is attached to it on the belief of its being right; and when he sees it is not so, the prejudice will be gone. We have but a defective idea what prejudice is. It might be said that until men think for themselves the whole is prejudice, and *not opinion*; for that only is opinion which is the result of reason and reflection."[11]

Thus, before Paine could obtain an effective hearing for his case in behalf of American independence in *Common Sense*, he had first to destroy some of the most integral components of the colonial belief system: that the connection with Britain was essential to the prosperity and safety of the colonies, that the British constitution was the most perfect political contrivance in the history of man, and that monarchy was both a legitimate institution and an essential component of that constitution. He had to persuade the colonists that their extraordinary prosperity under the aegis of Britain did not mean that they might not have done even better had they been on their own; that separation from Britain and neutrality in European wars might mean more, not less, safety; that the British was "a rotten constitution of government," the "base remains of two ancient tyrannies [monarchy and aristocracy], compounded with some new Republican materials"; and that monarchy, which gave one person "*a power which the people are afraid to trust, and [are] always obliged to trust*," was unworthy of the attachment of any man and, along with aristocracy, incompatible with a truly free constitution. Hereditary succession, said Paine, was only a "superstitious tale conveniently [trumped up] and timed, Mohamet-like, to cram [monarchy] . . . down the throats of the vulgar" by obscuring the base beginnings of "the present race of Kings," whose "paltry rascally original" could have been "nothing better than the principal ruffian of some restless gang; whose savage manners or pre-eminence in subtilty obtained him the title of chief among plunderers; and who by increasing in power and extending his

[11] Paine, *Common Sense*; *Rights of Man*; "Emancipation of Slaves," 1779, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 7, 353, 2: 22.

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depradations, overawed the quiet and defenseless to purchase their safety by frequent contributions." So "exceedingly ridiculous" were monarchy and hereditary succession, said Paine, that only the mentally "weak" could possibly continue their attachment to them once their folly had been exposed.[12]

This equation of a continuing commitment to the old system with weakness and passivity was one of Paine's most effective rhetorical devices. It was high time, he later declared in *The Rights of Man*, for people to become "rational, and not be governed like animals for the pleasure of their riders." Americans, he had told the readers of the *Pennsylvania Magazine* in 1775, had to learn to "disdain" a connection with Britain that systematically "degrade[d] them to an equality with a war horse, or an elephant" and deprived them of "the liberty of thinking for themselves." "Man," said Paine, "ought to have pride or shame enough to blush at being thus imposed upon, and when he feels his proper character, he will." For only by "divest[ing] himself of prejudice and prepossession, and suffer[ing] his reason and his feelings to determine for themselves," he declared in *Common Sense*, could a man rouse himself out of the "fatal and unmanly slumbers" into which he had permitted himself to sink through centuries of neglecting to permit his rational faculties free play and once again "put on . . . the true character of a man." And only when enough men so behaved, only when a sufficient number reclaimed their manhood by conquering prejudice with reason, could America acquire "spirit enough to become her own master."[13] Paine thus inextricably linked American Independence and manhood with reason and continued dependence upon Britain and servility with prejudice, thereby virtually assuring a largely favorable response to his attack on the old system among a people so obsessed with their manhood (and the personal independence thought to be essential to that manhood) as were the Americans.[14]

Never an admirer of Paine, John Adams once remarked that Paine had "a better Hand at pulling down than building."[15] But this judgment, so often reiterated by later scholars, seriously misreads the character of Paine's achievement. For Paine not only had to destroy those cherished misconceptions that caused so many Americans to "think better of the European world than it deserves"; he also had to teach Americans "the manly doctrine of reverencing themselves." It was not enough for them simply to learn to treat "those imaginary beings called kings and lords, and all the fraudulent trumpery of court" with the contempt they deserved.[16] Americans had also to be shown that so many of the features of

[12] Paine, *Common Sense*, in ibid., 1: 7–9, 13–14.

[13] Paine, *Common Sense*; "American Crisis"; *Rights of Man*; "Dialogue between General Wolfe and General Gage," 1775, in ibid., 1: 17–18, 22–23, 121, 421, 2: 49.

[14] In this connection, see Jack P. Greene, *All Men are Created Equal: Some Reflections on the Character of the American Revolution* (Oxford, 1976).

[15] As quoted by Winthrop D. Jordan, "Familial Politics: Thomas Paine and the Killing of the King, 1776," *Journal of American History* 60 (1973): 298.

[16] Paine, *Common Sense*; "American Crisis"; and Paine "To Mr. Secretary Dundas," June 6, 1792, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 21, 59, 2: 452.

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American society for which they had traditionally been so apologetic—its simplicity, its newness, its rusticity, its innocence, its very size—were not deficiencies but advantages.[17] "The infant state of the colonies, as it is called," wrote Paine, "so far from being against, is an argument in favor of independence." "Youth is the seed-time of good habits as well in nations as in individuals," he argued, pointing out that history revealed "that the bravest achievements were always accomplished in the non-age of a nation" and that a "vast variety of interests, occasioned by an increase of trade and population" might subsequently make it more "difficult, if not impossible, to form the continent into one government." The simplicity, rusticity, and innocence of America were virtues. The highly differentiated society of England only meant that there were a few overwhelmingly rich and a very large "class of poor and wretched people," while its "exceedingly complex" government caused "the nation [to] . . . suffer for years together without being able to discover in which part the fault lies." "The more simple anything is," Paine declared, "the less liable it is to be disordered, and the easier repaired when disordered." Nor were the disadvantages of size anywhere nearly comparable to the benefits. The vastness of their country, Paine contended, merely made it easier for Americans to "forget the narrow limits of three hundred and sixty miles (the extent of England)" and, "triumph[ing] in the generosity of . . . sentiment" that was the natural result of living in such an "extensive quarter of the globe," to "surmount the force of local prejudices."[18]

The vision Paine held out to Americans, moreover, not only gave them a new sense of worth but a place of the first importance in the unfolding course of human history. Discovered just prior to the Reformation as "if the Almighty graciously meant to open a sanctuary to the persecuted in future years," America had subsequently served as "the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from *every part* of Europe." But it was now destined for an even greater role. "Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression," Paine wrote in a famous passage in *Common Sense*: "Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia and Africa have long expelled her. Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her warning to depart." "Had it not been for America," he would later write in *The American Crisis*, "there had been no such thing as freedom left throughout the whole universe."[19]

It was America's role not just to be the last remaining asylum of liberty but, Paine wrote in 1776, to become "the theater where human nature will *soon* receive its greatest military, civil, and literary honors." "The cause of America," he said in *Common Sense*, "is in a great measure the cause of all mankind." A "people who" had "virtue enough to defend themselves against the most powerful nation in the world should [not] want wisdom to contrive a perfect and free

[17] See Jack P. Greene, "Search for Identity: An Interpretation of the Meaning of Selected Patterns of Social Response in Eighteenth-Century America," *Journal of Social History* 3 (1970): 189–220.

[18] Paine, *Common Sense*; Paine to Dundas, 1792, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 6–7, 19, 36, 2: 451.

[19] Paine, *Common Sense*; "American Crisis," in ibid., 1: 19, 21, 30–31, 123.

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form of government." Americans had "a blank sheet to write upon." It was "as if [they] . . . were the *first men* that *thought*." They had it in their "power to begin the world over again. A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world," he predicted, "is at hand, and a race of men, perhaps as numerous as all Europe contains," might "receive their portion of freedom" and form an ever burgeoning stream of liberty that might ultimately wash the stains of tyranny from the world. "Not a place upon earth might be so happy as America," and in America's happiness lay the salvation, perhaps the last chance for the salvation, of the world.[20]

For America, Paine's was a powerful, self-legitimating, and exhilarating vision, a veritable "land-flood," wrote an anonymous contributor to the *Connecticut Gazette*, "that sweeps all before it. We were blind, but on reading these enlightening works the scales have fallen from our eyes; even deep-rooted prejudices take to themselves wings and flee away . . . The doctrine of Independence hath been in times past, greatly disgustful; we abhorred the principle—it is now become our delightful theme, and commands our purest affections." Moreover, "as the independence of America became contemplated and understood," Paine subsequently wrote in his *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*, "the local advantages of it to the immediate actors, and the numerous benefits it promised mankind, appeared to be every day increasing; and we saw not a temporary good for the present race only, but a continued good to all posterity."[21]

Desacralizing the Old Order

During the two decades following publication of *Common Sense*, Paine transformed this vision into a grand and totally new conception of the sociopolitical order that was as resonant in the old world as his original vision had been in America. In a series of occasional writings, the culmination of which was *The Rights of Man*, Paine proceeded to do for the old world what he had previously done for the new: reverse the "underlying presumptions" and shift "the established perspectives to the point where the whole received paradigm within which" the traditional order had been conceived "came into question."[22] Building upon the premise that "time, and change of circumstances and opinions, have the same progressive effect in rendering modes of government obsolete, as they have upon customs and manners," Paine constructed his new paradigm upon a whole series of sharp antitheses between what he referred to as "the old and new systems of government." "Government on the old system," said Paine,

[20] Paine, *Common Sense*; "American Crisis"; "The Forester's Letters," 1776; "A Dialogue," 1776, in ibid., 1: 3, 45, 54, 2: 82–83, 90–93.

[21] *Connecticut Gazette*, March 22, 1776, as quoted by Jordan, "Familial Politics," 295; Paine, *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*, 1782, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 2: 238.

[22] Bailyn, "Common Sense," 15.

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> is an assumption of power, for the aggrandizement of itself; on the new, a delegation of power, for the common benefit of society. The former supports itself by keeping up a system of war; the latter promotes a system of peace, as the true means of enriching a nation. The one encourages national prejudices; the other promotes universal commerce. The one measures its prosperity, by the quantity of revenue it extorts; the other proves its excellence, by the small quantity of taxes it requires.[23]

The differences between these two systems were absolute and irreconcilable. They were based, said Paine, "on the two distinct and opposite bases of Reason and Ignorance." "There are two ways of governing mankind," Paine wrote in *A Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania* in 1778: "First, By keeping them ignorant. Secondly, By making them wise. The former was and is the custom of the old world. The latter of the new." "The more ignorant any country" was, in fact, "the better [was] it . . . fitted for" the old system of government. That system, Paine contended in the mid-1790s in *Agrarian Justice*, supported "itself by abject civilization, in which debasement of the human mind, and wretchedness in the mass of the people, are the chief criteria. Such governments consider man merely as an animal; that the exercise of intellectual faculty is not his privilege; *that, he has nothing to do with the laws but to obey them.*" "All the forms of government . . . in the old world" thus depended "upon breaking the spirit of the people by poverty" and maintaining them in a state of "superstitious awe" and "enslaving reverence" as people who lived under them grew so "familiar to their absurdities" as to become "reconciled to them." "*Hereditary government over a people*" was thus "*a species of slavery,*" "a farrago of imposition and absurdity" that could only be "cram[med] . . . down the throat[s] of" those who were not sufficiently wise to "be *rationally* governed." Who could thus be in any way surprised "at the abject state of the human mind in monarchical countries" in which prejudice, that "spider of the mind," could find such a perfect "fitness of reception"?[24]

The old system of government had thus "crushed mankind" and deserved only the contempt, the "immovable hatred," of all "as being too debasing to the dignity of man." Its principle institutions were fit subjects only for ridicule. "The whole character [of monarchy] was . . . absurd and useless": "it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him to act in cases where the highest judgment is required." The whole "monarchical system" was "a system of mental levelling" that indiscriminately admitted "every species of character to the same authority" by putting "Vice and virtue, ignorance and wisdom, in short, every quality, good or bad . . . on the same level" and permitting kings to "succeed each other, not as rationals, but as animals." Moreover, the "idolatrous honors . . . expected to be paid to [a king] . . . under the name of a crowned head," the "kneeling to kiss a man's hand, wrapt up in

[23] Paine, *Rights of Man*, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 343–44, 363–64.

[24] Paine, *Rights of Man; Agrarian Justice*, 1795–96; *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*; "Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania"; and *Letter to the Addressers*, 1792, in ibid., 1: 338–39, 364–66, 390, 620–21, 2: 242, 289–90, 484.

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flannels with the gout, and calling a boy of one and twenty the father of his people"—these were all "debasing absurdities" that should not be tolerated by rational men.[25]

Nor were the aristocracy and the Church, the remaining two pillars of the old system, any more conducive to the benefit of mankind. Aristocracy was a "wax-work order," the "disgrace of" which "would be lessened if it could be considered only as childish imbecility." Its members were mere "drones, a seraglio of males, who neither collect the honey nor form the hive, but exist only for lazy enjoyment." "We pardon foppery because of its insignificance," wrote Paine in his *Dissertation on First Principles* in 1795, "and on the same ground we might pardon the foppery of titles. But the origin of aristocracy was worse than foppery. It was robbery. The first aristocrats in all countries were brigands. Those of later times, sycophants."[26] Similarly, the Church was simply another instrument of oppression that drained off a large share of the fruits of honest industry to support its ostentation and unwieldy establishment and sought to fetter the minds of men by its quest for religious orthodoxy. "Persecution," said Paine in *The Rights of Man*, "is always the strongly masked feature of all law-religions, or religions established by law."[27]

The old system was thus not only ridiculous but in all ways pernicious to the interests and debilitating to the spirits of the men who lived under it. Even the inclusion of a representative element in "the unnatural compounded system of the English Government" did not mitigate its ill effects. "The moving power of" that system, Paine declared, was "of necessity, corruption." However much in need of electoral reform, the British House of Commons still gave "exercise to a greater portion of reason than is convenient to the hereditary part." But those parts had easily resolved this problem simply by "buy[ing] the reason up." The Crown had so much money and so many offices and monopolistic privileges at its disposal that it could easily convert the representative body into a mere "cipher" and its members into an unthinking herd of "*sinecure placemen and pensioners*," the slavish clients of administration. Together these clients and the aristocracy used their resources to extend this system of clientage down to the bottom of the political nation until the whole of the ruling class, those "bears of the country," had become nothing more than "the spaniels of the government." Thus did a vast, unwieldy, expensive, and unnecessary system of privilege and patronage engross most of the resources of the country at the expense of the honest industry of the broad body of the people. There were thus "two distinct classes of men in the nation, those who pay taxes, and those who receive and live upon the taxes."[28]

[25] Paine, *Common Sense*; "American Crisis"; *Rights of Man*; "Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania"; "Letter to the Abbé Sieyès," in ibid., 1: 8–16, 51, 56, 72, 364–66, 2: 289–90, 520.

[26] Paine, *Rights of Man; Dissertation on First Principles of Government*, 1795, in ibid., 1: 289, 330–31, 412, 2: 412.

[27] Paine, *Rights of Man*, in ibid., 1: 293.

[28] Paine, *Rights of Man*; "Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania"; *Letter to the Ad-*

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Such an unreasonable system, founded as it was on an unjust distribution of rewards without regard to merit or industry and a patent and indefensible "inequality of rights," could only persist because the people who lived under it "had . . . resigned the prerogative of thinking" and "stood torpidly by" while advocates for the old system brazenly and against all "reason and common interest" defended it on "the mere score of antiquity." By thus "putting time in the place of principle," by "preaching up the doctrine of precedents" and "associating those precedents with a superstitious reverence for ancient things, as monks show relics and call them holy," such people were merely seeking to disguise the defects and injustices of the old system and keep the people in the "universal languor" that had long gripped the "mass of the nation" in all the societies of the old world. But "government by precedent, without any regard to the principle of the precedent," declared Paine, was a form of "political popery" and "one of the vilest systems that" could "be set up." It was either designed to keep men "in a state of ignorance, or . . . a practical confession that wisdom degenerates in governments as governments increase in age, and can only hobble along by the stilts and crutches of precedents."[29]

The whole of the old system was "founded on principles and opinions, the very reverse of what they ought to be," and it could be maintained only by thus "blinding the understanding of man, and making him believe that government is some wonderful mysterious thing." It demonstrated an "obedience to ignorance," and, Paine remarked in *The Rights of Man*," when once the mind can bring itself to pay this indiscriminate reverence, it descends below the stature of mental manhood." In Europe, as in America, Paine's first task had been to demystify the old order, to expose its "absurdities," to shake "the fabric" and "to break the chains of political superstition, and [thereby to] raise degraded man to his proper rank" as a full man by persuading him of two fundamental truths he and all earlier immigrants had discovered in America: first, "that government was not that complicated thing, enshrined in mystery, which Church and State, to play into each other's hands, had represented," and second, that the capacity for political understanding of almost every man was such that he could be treated, as Paine sought to treat all his readers, *"as a man and not as a child."*[30]

Spreading the American Principle of Government in Europe

But Paine could not be "satisfied with the simple detection of error or imposition" in Europe any more than he had been in America. What Paine held out to

dressers; Paine to Onslow Craney, June 21, 1792, in ibid., 1: 281, 330–31, 338–39, 394–95, 2: 293–94, 300–01, 463, 478, 482–83.

[29] Paine, *Common Sense; Rights of Man; Letter to the Addressers*; "Answer to Four Questions," 1792; *Dissertation on First Principles; Prospects on the Rubicon*, 1787, in ibid., 1: 3, 386, 446–47, 2: 470, 483, 536, 573, 577–78, 623.

[30] Paine, *Rights of Man*; "Reflections on Titles," 1775; "Serious Address to the People of Pen-

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Europeans was the vision of a freer—and less demeaning—life through "the progressive increase of political knowledge." "Notwithstanding the mystery with which the science of government has been enveloped, for the purpose of enslaving, plundering and imposing upon mankind," Paine assured his readers in 1795, "it is of all things the least mysterious and the most easy to be understood. The meanest capacity cannot be at a loss, if it begins its inquiries at the right point." Those who would free themselves from the influence of ancient prejudices and act "in a style superior to the little politics of narrow thinking" would quickly find that by taking "nature, reason, and experience" for their guides they could "elevate the science of government to a height of perfection of which we now have no conception" and contrive a form of government that would be "best calculated to secure the end for which a nation is at the expense of supporting it," that is, the public good, which Paine defined as the ability of "every man . . . to pursue his occupation, and enjoy the fruits of his labors, and the produce of his property, in peace and safety, and with the least possible expense."[31]

The best form to achieve this end, Paine himself was absolutely persuaded, was the representative. Men would smile, said Paine, at the suggestion that literature and the sciences be made hereditary. "As the republic of letters brings forward the best literary productions, by giving genius a fair and universal chance; so the representative system of government is calculated to produce the wisest laws, by collecting wisdom where it can be found." Once men had become aware of the many benefits of representative government, they would discover, Paine contended, that "all men are republicans by nature, and royalists only by fashion." For republican government actually had "more *true grandeur* in it than a kingly one. On the part of the public," Paine pointed out, "it is more consistent with freemen to appoint their rulers than to have them born; and on the part of those who preside, it is far nobler to be a ruler by the choice of the people, than a king by the chance of birth." Representative governments were, moreover, necessarily more responsive and more sensitive to the newly discovered political truth that government "is not a trade which any man or body of men has a right to set up and exercise for his own emolument, but is altogether a trust."[32]

To provide "a rule for the conduct of [this] . . . government" it was highly desirable to have a constitution, not, like the so-called English constitution (which was, in any case, only a government and not a real constitution), one that had been accidentally and mysteriously derived but one that had been

sylvania"; *Letter to the Addressers*; "To the People of England," 1804; "To the Citizens of the United States," 1802–03, in ibid., 1: 375, 386, 368, 2: 33, 289–90, 471, 488, 676, 928.

[31] Paine, *Rights of Man*; "Rules of the Society for Political Inquiries," 1787; *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*; "Candid and Critical Remarks," 1777; *Letter to the Addressers*; "Answers to Four Questions"; *Dissertation on First Principles*, in ibid., 1: 367–70, 388, 2: 41–42, 245, 274, 471, 487, 496, 531, 571.

[32] Paine, *Rights of Man*; "The Forester's Letters," 1776, in ibid., 1: 367–68, 371, 379, 2: 79–80.

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freely established and would guarantee the natural rights of its citizens and the supremacy of the rule of law. A viable representative government also had to be based upon a wide franchise that included all independent adult males, an absolute equality of rights, and a total prohibition of monopolies so that "every man would be free [both to participate in government and] to follow any occupation by which he can procure an honest livelihood, and in any place, town, or city, throughout the nation." "*Representative government*," declared Paine, "*is freedom*," and "the floor of Freedom" had to be "as level as water."[33] Liberty, Paine thought, should always take precedence over "the defence of property," but there was no real danger to property from an equality of rights and a broad franchise. Freedom, he had learned in America, quieted, rather than promoted, contention. The free and "unceasing circulation of interest" and ideas in a broadly participatory society would, Paine predicted, invigorate "the whole mass of civilized man" so that "all property [would be] . . . safe under their protection."[34]

Paine's call for the people of the old world to recognize "no majesty but that of the people, no government except that of its own representatives, and no sovereignty except that of the laws" was a call for them "to recast," in Eric Foner's words, the "government in the Old World on the model of the New." "It was the American principle of government," Paine assured George Washington in 1796, "that I was endeavouring to spread in Europe." The old world would be regenerated "by the principles of the new," which Paine vowed "in the most undismayed manner to publish . . . on the house-tops, for the good of others."[35] Far from concealing "the hideous figure of anarchy, or the gloomy monster of tyranny" under "the fair name of liberty," as so many people had initially feared, the American Revolution, Paine thought, had "contributed more to enlighten the world, and diffuse a spirit of freedom and liberality among mankind, than any human event . . . that ever preceded it." Alone among all countries, America did not need to "be ashamed to tell her birth, nor to relate the stages by which she rose to empire." The American Revolution had marked the very "morning of reason" that had opened "a new system of extended civilization." It had given reason and liberty, said Paine, "*a place to stand upon*." "So deeply rooted were all the governments of the old world, and so effectually had the tyranny and the antiquity of habit established itself over the mind, that no beginning could be made in Asia, Africa, or Europe, to reform the

[33] Paine, *Common Sense; Rights of Man; Letter to the Abbé Raynal*; "Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania"; *Dissertation on First Principles*, in ibid., 1: 29, 281, 387, 390, 413–14, 2: 259, 282–89, 579–80.

[34] Paine, *Rights of Man*; "Thoughts on Defensive War," 1775; "The Forester's Letters"; *Letter to Abbé Raynal*; "Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania"; "Address to the People of France," September 25, 1792, in ibid., 1: 359, 2: 54, 87, 245, 250, 262, 286, 538.

[35] Foner, *Tom Paine*, p. 217; Paine, "To the Sheriff of the County of Sussex," 1792; "Address to the People of France"; "Letter to George Washington," 1796; "To the Citizens of the United States"; Paine to Condorcet et al., June, 1791, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 2: 464–65, 538–39, *697, 707, 912, 1315*.

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political condition of man," Paine declared in *The Rights of Man*: "Freedom had been hunted round the globe; reason was considered as rebellion; and the slavery of fear had made men afraid to think."[36]

By giving mankind "a revolution in the principles and practise of governments," America had thus become "the Parent of the . . . world." It would "be in magnitude," what "Athens was [only] in miniature . . . the one was the wonder of the ancient world; the other is becoming the admiration and model of the present." The American "system of government," Paine told his European audience, was "free from corruption, and now administered over an extent of territory ten times as large as England, *for less expense than the pensions alone in England amount to*; and under which more freedom is enjoyed, and a more happy state of society is preserved, and a more general prosperity is promoted, than under any other system of government now existing in the world": "There the poor are not oppressed, the rich are not privileged. Industry is not mortified by the splendid extravagance of a court rioting at its expense. Their taxes are few, because their government is just; and as there is nothing to render them wretched, there is nothing to engender riots and tumults." That this utopian condition could be achieved by man America was a standing example for the rest of mankind. A flame kindled by "a small spark . . . in America," Paine predicted would wind "its progress from nation to nation" until man had acquired "a knowledge of his rights by attending justly to . . . [his] interests, and" discovered "in the event that the strength and powers of despotism" consisted "wholly in the fear of resisting it, and that in order, *'to be free, it is sufficent that he wills it.'* " Paine invited his readers to become free by becoming men.[37]

The American Roots of Paine's Political Vision

Where precisely Paine derived this vision of a new "modern" political world can perhaps never be accurately ascertained. Little is known about his beliefs prior to his coming to America. That he had already read sufficiently widely to appreciate the impact of commerce and science upon traditional ways of life and thought seems overwhelmingly probable.[38] Throughout his maturity, moreover, he had always lived so close to the line between independence and dependence that he could scarcely have failed to gain a sharp appreciation of the "trying and necessitous circumstances" of poverty and to be sensitive to the many injustices of a society in which "a small Part," as his friend Benjamin Franklin wrote of Scotland and Ireland in 1772, were "Landlords, great

[36] Paine, "American Crisis"; *Rights of Man; Letter to Abbé Raynal*, in ibid., 1: 230–32, 353–54, 396–97, 239–40, 256.

[37] Paine, *Rights of Man*; "To Mr. Secretary Dundas," June 6, 1792; "To the Sheriff of Sussex"; Paine to Thomas Jefferson, January 1, 1805, in ibid., 1: 353–54, 360–61, 371–72, 398, 2: 449, 464–65, 1454.

[38] See Paine, *Letter to Abbé Raynal*, in ibid., 2: 241–42.

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Noblemen, and Gentlemen, extreamly opulent, living in the highest Affluence and Magnificence" while the "Bulk of the People[were] tenants [or other dependents], extreamly poor, living in the most sordid Wretchedness, in dirty Hovels of Mud and Straw . . . cloathed only in Rags," and "abject in Spirit."[39] Whatever experiences and knowledge Paine brought with him to America—and, as he later wrote Nathanael Greene, "it was in a great measure owing to my bringing a knowledge of England with me to America that I was enabled[in *Common Sense*] to enter deeper into politics, and with more success, than other people"[40]—remaining evidence strongly suggest that America provided him with inspiration for and gave shape to his model of the modern world.

The traditional emphasis in Paine scholarship has been upon his impact on America, and one scholar has argued with force that Paine was so addicted to the heady wine of reason that his knowledge was rarely enriched by "observation of actual . . . facts."[41] But a powerful case can, I think, be made that what Paine did for America, America had already done for Paine, that Paine's subsequent conception of what political society should be like was in very large measure shaped not merely, as Eric Foner has suggested, by the "rapid social and political changes American society underwent in the Revolutionary era" but by the radical character of American society itself—before as well as after the Revolution.[42] If, as Paine remarked in *The American Crisis*, "it was the cause of America that made" him "an author," America itself struck him with enormous force, unlocking the accumulated rage of thirty-seven years and sharpening and raising to an explicit level his own perceptions of and discontents with the evils of the old world. "*Paine*, and other writers upon American politics, met with such amazing success," the Vermont cleric and historian Samuel Williams declared in 1794, "not because they taught the people principles, which they did not before understand; but because they placed the principles which they *had learned of them*, in a very clear and striking light, on a most critical and important occasion." Paine, Williams insisted, had learned his "principles from the state of society in America." Nor did Paine ever write anything that contradicted Williams's judgment. On the contrary, he always insisted that America, as he later wrote George Washington, had been "constantly in my mind in all the publications I afterwards made" and, as he suggested in his *Letter to Abbé*

[39] Paine, "The Case of the Officers of the Excise," 1772, Paine's only known piece of political writing prior to his emigration to America, in ibid., 2: 8–9, 11; Benjamin Franklin to Joshua Babcock, January 13, 1772, in *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Albert Henry Smyth (New York, 1905–07), 5: 361–63.

[40] Paine to Greene, September 9, 1780, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 2: 1189.

[41] Cecelia M. Kenyon, "Where Paine Went Wrong," *American Political Science Review* 45 (1951): 1087.

[42] Foner, *Tom Paine*, p. xvii. Foner argues, in sharp contrast to the argument presented here, that most of Paine's "ideas were fixed by the time he arrived in America," tracing them to such "formative influences" as his father's Quakerism, his service as a government excise officer, his poverty, his acquaintance with the ideas of Newtonian Science, and the ideas of radical British dissenting whigs. Ibid., pp. 3–17.

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Raynal, that he had only gotten "a just idea of" America and appreciated its fullest implications for the subsequent transformation of the old world "by coming to it."[43]

What struck Paine so forcefully about America was its almost total dissimilarity from the old world. "The case and circumstances of America," he wrote, "present themselves as in the beginning of the world" before it had been engrossed and corrupted by the monopolizers of power and resources. As Winthrop Jordan has remarked, Paine identified the state of nature and "the beginnings of human society and government with the early settlement of America." "Those who are conversant with Europe," he wrote just a few months after his arrival in America, "would be tempted to believe that even the air of the Atlantic disagrees with the constitution of foreign vices; if they survive the voyage, they either expire on their arrival, or linger away in an incurable consumption. There is a happy something in the climate of America, which disarms them of all their power both of infection and attraction." What that something was was space and opportunity. There was no "country in the world," it seemed to Paine, that had "so many openings to happiness as" America. "The vastness of its extent, the variety of its climate, the fertility of its soil, the yet unexplored treasures of its bowels, the multitude of its rivers, lakes, bays, inlets and other conveniences of navigation"—all made America "one of the richest subjects of cultivation ever presented to any people upon earth." "The scene" presented "to the eye of a spectator" had "something in it which generates and encourages great ideas. Nature appears to him in magnitude. The mighty object he beholds, acts upon his mind by enlarging it, and he partakes of the greatness he contemplates." "While men remained in Europe as subjects of some hereditary potentate [and in an unjust and evil society] they had ideas conformable to that condition," Paine wrote, "but when they arrived in America they found themselves in possession of a new character . . . and, like converts to a new religion, . . . became inspired with new principles."[44]

The result was that the "spring, the progress, the object, the consequences, nay, the men, their habits of thinking, and all the circumstances of the country" diverged sharply from those of the old world. "Mutual prejudices" were "worn off, a humane and philosophical spirit . . . cherished, and youth . . . stimulated to a laudible diligence and emulation in the pursuit of wisdom." Political consciousness was awakened and reshaped. "Elevated above their former rank," immigrants to America soon learned to consider "government and public affairs as part of their own concern," "the theory of government" became "well known

[43] Paine, "American Crisis"; *Letter to Abbé Raynal*; "Letter to George Washington," July 30, 1796, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 235, 2: 250, 694; Samuel Williams, *The Natural and Civil History of Vermont* (Walpole, N.H., 1794), pp. 372–73. The italics in the Williams quotation are added.

[44] Paine, *Rights of Man*; "An Act for Incorporating the American Philosophical Society," 1780; "Six Letters to Rhode Island"; "To the People of England"; "The Magazine in America," January 24, 1775, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 353–54, 375–76, 2: 39, 346–47, 676, 1110; Jordan, "Familial Politics," p. 296.

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by almost every farmer in America," and there was "no such thing . . . as power of any kind, independent of the people" and "no other race of men . . . but the people." The differences between Europe and America were thus the differences between a world with a numerous "class of poor and wretched people" and one without, between a world "wrapt up in the most absurd species of slavery, and the other possessing and enjoying all their natural and civil rights."[45]

If Paine's vision of the modern world was fundamentally American, the Revolution in America provided him with a powerful example of how that vision might be achieved in the old world. For the American Revolution, Paine believed, had created the possibility of a vast political awakening of a magnitude unparallelled in the history of the world and not even dreamed of prior to that event. "As the mind closed itself toward England" in America, Paine told his European audience, "it opened itself toward the world." Old prejudices "underwent . . . a mental examination" until "every corner of the mind" had been "swept of its cobwebs, poison and dust," and "a mass of sense long lying in a dormant state" had been activated. Relieved of the "shackles" of their former prejudices, Americans thenceforth enjoyed "a freedom of mind" that was appropriate to the freedom of circumstance they had so long possessed. This new freedom not only enabled them to make the first "improvement[s] . . . in . . . principle and . . . practise" in "the science of government" since antiquity but provoked a revolution in the "style and manner of thinking . . . more extraordinary than the political revolution of the country." With the Revolution, Americans came to "see with other eyes; . . . hear with other ears; and think with other thoughts than those formerly used." So sweeping was the revolution in consciousness that Americans" really [became] another people" and could never "again go back to ignorance and prejudice." "If I ask a man in America if he wants a king," Paine wrote in the early 1790s, "he retorts, and asks me if I take him for an idiot." "The mind once enlightened," Paine believed, could not "again become dark": "once the veil begins to rend, it admits not of repair." The American Revolution had thus "thrown a beam of light over the world, which reaches *into* man" in ways that could never be reversed. It was the first bud in a political spring that, sooner or later, would necessarily be followed by a "political summer" with "a general revolution in governments" all over Europe. Once ignorance and superstition had been banished, once political consciousness had been awakened and extended and men began "to feel their consequences by their usefulness, and their right[s] as members of society," it would "no longer [be]possible to govern them as before." The only question was whether revolution would be violent, as it would become in France, or whether it would be as "passive, rational and costless," as it had been in America.[46]

[45] Paine, "Act Incorporating Am. Phil. Soc."; *Letter to Abbé Raynal*; "Six Letters to Rhode Island"; "To Mr. Secretary Dundas"; "To the People of England," in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 2: 39, 220–21, 258, 336–37, 344, 451–2, 676.

[46] Paine, *Rights of Man; Letter to Abbé Raynal; Letter to the Addressers; Dissertation on First Principles*; Paine to Thomas Jefferson, September 18, 1789, in ibid., 1: 320, 326, 368, 404–05, 447, 449–51, 453–54, 2: 242–44, 481, 571, 580, 1296.

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In his tireless advocacy of using the experience of the new world to transform the old, Paine became the self-appointed instructor in the "American system of government" to the rest of the world. As Arthur Sheps has recently shown, America had already become "the cynosure of radical eyes" in Britain well "before the influence of Paine could have been [widely] felt" following publication of *The Rights of Man* in the 1790s. "Under the impact of the example of the American republic," Sheps argues persuasively, the political ideas of British radicals underwent "a kind of paradigm revolution" in which "common words [and concepts] like the constitution, republicanism, the representative basis of government, and the sovereignty of the people . . . began to take on new or expanded meanings." The primary contribution of Paine, Sheps contends, came during the 1790s. By setting America up as a model for social as well as political reform, Paine helped to give British radicalism an entirely new dimension by stimulating its adherents to a hitherto missing "concern with the social benefits of political reform." If, however, British radicals had indeed already taken "America as a standard of reform" before Paine had achieved his major impact in Britain, he may still have been a "pivotal figure" in the "readjustment" of political ideas that occurred in Europe in the wake of the American Revolution. For no one else was either so persistent or so prolific in spelling out for Europeans the relevance of the American experience for the old world; and no one else came close to achieving such widespread popularity. Once the French Revolution had opened up "the prospect . . . of extending the principles of liberty . . . through the greater part of Europe," Paine devoted himself compulsively to the task of teaching Europeans the political and social lessons he had learned in America, and he did not return to America until, having previously been harried out of Britain, he had become persuaded that the French would never "understand any thing at all of the principles of free government."[47]

However unsuccessful Paine had been in persuading the French to adopt the true "American" principles of free government, he had spearheaded—if he had not been the central figure in bringing about—a far more fundamental and sweeping revolution in political consciousness, a revolution that redrew the cognitive map and relocated the central—the underlying and previously virtually unchallenged—mental correlates of the traditional political world. In Paine's hands, much that had been thought to be right and good in that world was said to be pernicious, while much that had been thought to be pernicious was said to be right and good. Words themselves acquired new connotations, as he gave hitherto essentially perjorative terms such as *innovation, novel, new fangled,*

[47] Arthur Sheps, "The American Revolution and the Transformation of English Republicanism," *Historical Reflections*, 2: 4–28; Paine to George Jacques Danton, May 6, 1793, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 2: 1395; Foner, *Tom Paine*, p. 253. See also Joyce Appleby, "America as a Model for the Radical French Reformers of 1789," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 28: 267–86, which shows that fascination with the American example in France also antedated publication of the *Rights of Man* by fifteen years and was deliberately distorted by *americanistes* to serve their own political objectives during their battles with the admirers of the English constitution.

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and *modern* a favorable meaning.[48] Paine helped even to transform the meaning of the word *revolution* itself. As J.H. Elliott has argued, the men of early modern Europe who might be classified as proponents of revolution were "obsessed with *renovation*," with "the desire to return to old customs and priviledges, and to an old order of society." The contribution of Paine, with the circumstances of America constantly before him, was to redefine revolution as a phenomenon that looked to the future rather than to the past, stressed the need to "establish a new social order" rather than to "return to a golden age in the past," and emphasized innovation rather than renovation. It was "in vain to look for precedents [for the American Revolution] among the revolutions of former ages," Paine told the Abbé Raynal. "What were formerly called revolutions, were little more than a change of persons, or an alternation in local circumstances," Paine wrote in *The Rights of Man*: they had all "been worked within the atmosphere of a court" or a small group within the ruling class "and never on the great floor of a nation. The parties were always of the class of courtiers; and whatever was their rage for reformation, they carefully preserved the fraud of that profession." Extending "only to a change of persons and measures, but not of principles," such revolutions "rose and fell like things of course, and had nothing in their existence or their fate that could influence beyond the spot that had produced them." But the revolution of the late eighteenth century, "revolving from West to East . . . by a stronger impulse than the government of the sword revolved from East to West," interested "not [a few] particular individuals, but [whole] nations, in its progress." It promised to bring "a new era to the human race," in "which every thing may be looked for," an era built upon a total reversal "of the natural order of things" and a new and constantly extending political consciousness committed to "a system of [political] principles as universal as truth and the existence of man, and combining moral and political happiness and national prosperity."[49]

With its emphasis on a political society based upon universal principles, choosing leaders on the basis of merit and composed of informed, highly autonomous, cognitively flexible, and participatory citizens, each of whom had a pronounced sense of both personal worth and a belief in the efficacy of the individual in the drive to improve the condition of mankind, the new political consciousness stimulated by Paine was essentially modern.[50] That the world could

[48] Foner makes the point in regard to Paine's use of such words as republic, democracy, and revolution (*Tom Paine*, pp. xv, 217). But Paine's contributions in this area went far deeper. See Paine, *Rights of Man*; "A Dialogue between . . . Montgomery . . . and an American Delegate," 1776; *Letter to Abbé Raynal*; "Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania," in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 453, 2: 91, 257, 281.

[49] J. H. Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," *Past & Present*, 42: 43–44, 52–56; Paine, *Letter to Abbé Raynal; Rights of Man*, in *Complete Writings of Paine*, 1: 340–44, 355–56, 360–61, 400, 2: 220.

[50] Inkeles and Smith, *Becoming Modern*, pp. 16, 19–25, 290. For another, somewhat different analysis of the specific aspects of Paine's thought that made him modern, see Foner, *Tom Paine*, pp. xix–xx.

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be changed for the better and man liberated from the tyranny of his ancient prejudices was Paine's primary message to the world, and the primary model that gave shape—and credibility—to that message was America. Inspired by the openness, the basic modernity, of American society and impressed by the liberating and energizing character of its Revolution, Paine helped to give Americans an appreciation of their own social virtues, inner worth, and what he thought was their superiority over the old world. In the process, he laid the foundations for his subsequent contributions to a powerful new vision of political society that was the product not merely of pure reason but of reason operating on—and generalizing from—experience, the *American* experience. Eliciting strong resonances in the old world, this vision quickly replaced, even in Britain where it was most effectively resisted, traditional conceptions of political society, and, for better or worse, has subsequently given—and still gives—structure to and dominates perceptions of much of the contemporary political world. Paine first achieved fame by rescuing the Americans from what he thought, having seen America at first hand, was a false and debilitating reverence for the traditional and metropolitan world. But he wound up helping to rescue not just Americans but the whole world. In a fundamental sense, we are today all Paine's children. It was not the British defeat at Yorktown, but Paine and the new American conception of political society he did so much to popularize in Europe that turned the world upside down.

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Threat Perception in International Crisis

RAYMOND COHEN

Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in international crisis. When threat is not perceived, even in the face of objective evidence, there can be no mobilization of defensive resources. Hence the phenomenon of surprise. Conversely, threat may be perceived, and countermeasures taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent.

The project described here set out to investigate empirically, on the basis of the comparative analysis of historical case studies, the conditions under which threat is perceived. Six examples were chosen, each involving a different state actor, from the past hundred years. Adequacy of documentation and diversity were two criteria of selection. Examples consisted of:

—*The "War in Sight" crisis, 1875.* Two years after the end of the German occupation of France which followed the war of 1870 the French government found itself the target of a German campaign of intimidation and innuendo. Accusations of French preparations for a war of revenge were published by the German press, apparently on the instructions of Birmarck, with the probable intention of dissuading France from rearmament. In France these charges were perceived to be the prelude to an imminent German preventive attack.

—*The Italian invasion scare, July 1889.* At the beginning of June 1889 an incident occurred at Gabes in Tunis involving the supposed ill-treatment of Italian fishermen by French officials. Franco-Italian relations, which had been deteriorating for some time, entered a period of tension. When the

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Pope, concerned by an anticlerical demonstration, expressed doubts about the possibility of his continued stay in Rome, Francesco Crispi, the alarmist Italian prime minister, jumped to the erroneous conclusion that France was encouraging the Pope to leave the city as a pretext for a quarrel which would end in a French seaborne invasion of Italy.

—*The Liman Von Sanders crisis, 1913.* The partition of the ramshackle Ottoman Empire had long been anticipated by the European Great Powers before World War I. Russia was especially interested in achieving its traditional objective of control over Constantinople and the Straits. When the German government, which had succeeded in establishing close relations with Turkey, released the news that a German general was to be placed in command of the garrison at Constantinople at the head of a German military mission, the Russian government concluded with alarm that the appointment would give Germany a determining voice in the future of the area.

—*Britain and the Prague crisis, March 1939.* Barely six months after the Munich Agreement had supposedly settled German grievances against Czechoslovakia, German troops marched into Prague and German protectorates were declared over Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. To the British government it suddenly became apparent that German aims could no longer be considered to be limited to redressing legitimate objections to the Versailles settlement. On March 17, after coming under strong pressure from public opinion, prime minister Neville Chamberlain expressed his fears of German expansion in a speech at Birmingham which was to mark a turning point in British policy.

—*Poland and the Corridor crisis, March 1939.* Although public opinion in Poland was strongly aroused by the German destruction of Czechoslovakia on March 15, foreign minister Josef Beck was at first prepared to allow German policy the benefit of the doubt. A series of German demands, presented to the Polish government on March 21, for a revision of the status of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, was received with dismay in Warsaw. Drawn together by a common concern to oppose an expansionist Germany, Britain and Poland entered into negotiations which were to lead to the declaration of a British guarantee of Poland and a later treaty of alliance.

—*The Straits Question, August 1946.* The year 1946 saw a progressive deterioration in Soviet-American relations in which the situation in Iran and Turkey, strategically placed between the Soviet Union and the countries of the Near East, played a central role. As early as January 1946 President Truman believed that the Soviet Union intended to invade Turkey and seize the Straits. In March an invasion of Iran seemed imminent. Although the area had traditionally been a British rather than an American concern, Soviet pressure on Turkey, culminating in a note of August 7, 1946 in which the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of a new regime for the Straits, was followed in Washington with great attention and anxiety.

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> Within the administration it was solemnly concluded that the United States would have to be prepared, if necessary, to meet Soviet aggression in Turkey with force of arms.

Threat, it should be stressed, is used here in the passive sense of an anticipation of impending danger rather than in its active sense of an undertaking by one actor to impose a sanction on another.[1] An operational definition of threat perception was provided by four separate indicators: The articulations of decision makers[2]—their expressions of judgement and of personal reaction to the threatening cue; descriptions by contemporary spectators (foreign diplomats, colleagues etc.) of the state of mind of decision makers; evidence of exploration by decision makers of alternative responses to the threat (such as intensive internal consultation, increased information flow, the search for external support); and finally, 'coping processes' put into effect by decision makers in response to the threat (such as the strengthening or mobilization of resources, diplomatic countermoves, etc.). While any single one of these indicators might be present without the existence of a perception of threat, their convergence provides unmistakable evidence of it.

Usually it is assumed that threat *perception*, like *perception* as such, refers to a more or less immediate act of recognition. According to this view threat is perceived in the sense that a book is perceived. That is, one learns the concept of 'threat' in the same way that the concept of 'book' is learnt; threat perception involves the recognition that a certain pattern of sense-data is subsumed under the concept of threat.[3]

In point of fact it is only rarely that cues are unambiguously and immediately recognizable as threats. Troop concentrations on one's border will usually be perceived as threatening. But what about troop concentrations on somebody else's border? In the cases studied it was found to be more helpful to distinguish between two stages of perception: An initial stage of *observation*, at which cues are received; and a secondary stage of *appraisal* at which they are evaluated and defined as threatening or benign.

Both observation and appraisal possess an important common feature: They are both psychological processes entailing the selection of material; they both filter out information implicitly or explicitly considered to be irrelevant. Observation involves the selection of cues for attention from a universe of contemporary events; appraisal involves the selection of explanations for these signals from a universe of possibilities. Thus the question arises, basic to the investigation, as to the criteria which guide the selection and interpretation of evidence by the observer.

[1] Or, as David A. Baldwin puts it, as an "outcome" rather than as an "undertaking": "Thinking about Threats", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15 (1971): 71–78.

[2] By decision makers we mean ministers and officials who participate in the conduct of foreign affairs and have access to classified information. The term observer is also used synonymously.

[3] See J. Gosling, "Mental Causes and Fear", *Mind* 71 (July 1962): 289–306.

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Predispositional Factors

Writers on the perception of threat and related subjects are agreed that observers are guided by certain principles in their observation and appraisal of cues. Roberta Wohlstetter sees certain "hypotheses" or "expectations about human behavior" as helping one "to discriminate significant sounds against . . . (a) . . . background of noise."[4] Dean G. Pruitt argues that perception is influenced by "predispositions" derived from such sources as distrust, past experience, contingency planning, and personal anxiety.[5] The social psychologist Richard S. Lazarus talks, for his part, of "a constellation of ideas and expectations" to which "data are assimilated."[6]

Three central criteria of selection were identified in our case studies. The first, apparent in 1889, 1913, Poland in 1939, and 1946, was geographical. The attention of decision makers was drawn to the events in question because they concerned or involved areas strategically or emotionally of high priority and pressing relevance. In 1889 the focus of attention for Italian decision makers was the status of Rome, challenged in the July crisis by a Papal threat of departure and an apparent French willingness to restore the Italian capital, by force of arms, to the possession of the Papacy.[7] In 1913 Russian fears centered on the despatch of a German mission to Constantinople, a city of immense strategic, historic, and sentimental importance to any Russian. During the crisis it was constantly reiterated that "everything that transpires in Constantinople is of the highest importance for Russia."[8] In 1939 it was Danzig, situated at the mouth of the Vistula, the main Polish outlet into the Baltic and a notorious source of tension, which provided the object of Polish concern and German claims. Polish sensitivity on this point was constantly stressed.[9] Finally, the crisis of August 1946 was provoked by Soviet proposals to alter the regime governing passage through the Straits. American decision makers, like those of Russia before World War I, were highly alert to the paramount strategic significance of the sole outlet from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean.[10]

A second factor making for sensitivity to threatening signals and extreme pes-

[4] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 392.

[5] Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action", in *International Behavior*, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 400.

[6] Richard S. Lazarus, *Psychological Stress and the Coping Process* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 44.

[7] William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950) pp. 473-4.

[8] Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme, eds., *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914*, vol. 38 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft Für Politik Und Geschichte, 1926), p. 206.

[9] Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933-1939, The Polish White Book* (London: Hutchinson, 1940), p. 49.

[10] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Signet Books, 1969), p. 262.

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simism in their interpretation was an atmosphere of tension and mistrust in ongoing relations between the actors involved. This was the case in 1875, 1889 and 1946. The war scare of 1875 was only one of a continuing series of alarms which preoccupied French decision makers after their defeat at German hands in 1870. Following one such instance in July 1874 the Duke Decazes, French foreign minister, instructed his diplomatic corps to continuing vigilance about German aims.[11] Thus suspicion of Germany was incorporated into the operating code of the French Foreign Service. In 1889 a similar relationship of suspicion and vigilance existed between France and Italy. From 1887 onwards, when Francesco Crispi became prime minister, incessant friction marked relations between the two countries. Crispi himself became notorious for alarmism about French intentions.[12] The final example of what has been aptly called the "bad faith model"[13] is provided by the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Straits crisis of August 1946 was, as in the French and Italian cases, one example in an ongoing relationship of hostility and mistrust. Wherever Soviet and American interests came into contact—in Manchuria, Korea, Trieste, Germany and the Near East—wartime cooperation had been replaced by abrasive and hostile disagreement. In March 1946, in response to information about Soviet troop movements towards the Iranian border, President Truman had remarked that the United States might soon be at war.[14]

In our other three cases tension did not exist to the same extent as in the examples given above. Nonetheless a history of enmity and dispute had left a barely disguised residue of unease between the actors involved. Russo-German relations had been marked, long before the emergence of the crisis in November 1913, by mistrust and periodic tension. Both actors were members of opposing alliances. Russian decision makers had been suspicious of German ambitions in Asia Minor since the initiation of the Baghdad Railway scheme at the turn of the century. In 1909 the Bosnia crisis brought Germany, and her ally Austria, to the brink of war with Russia. Despite some improvement in relations between the two countries after 1911, mutual suspicion was never far below the surface.[15] Anglo-German relations before the Prague invasion of March 1939 can be similarily characterized. Throughout the winter of 1938–39 the German press, notwithstanding the Munich Agreement, was filled with anti-British abuse. In January 1939 Edward Halifax, British foreign secretary, brought before the cabinet information about a possible German air attack on England.[16] By the

[11] Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères, Commission De Publication Des Documents Relatifs Aux Origines De La Guerre De 1914, *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1st series, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1929), p. 336.

[12] Gaetano Salvemini, *La Politica Estera di Francesco Crispi* (Roma: "La Voce," 1919), pp. 41–47.

[13] Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy", in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1967), p. 26.

[14] Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror* (New York: Norton, 1971), p. 83.

[15] I.I. Astaf'ev, "Potsdamskoe Soglashenie 1911 G.," *Istoricheskie Zapiski Akademii Nauk SSSR* 85 (1970): 112–158.

[16] Ian Colvin, *The Chamberlain Cabinet* (London: Gollancz, 1971), p. 180.

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beginning of March 1939 he could report, ambiguously, "a negative improvement in the situation, in that rumours and scares had died down . . ."[17] This same ambivalence in attitude toward the opponent is found in the Polish example from March 1939: Poles and Germans were traditional enemies and the Danzig issue had been a constant source of dispute throughout the 1930s. Yet, until Prague, Polish Foreign Minister Josef Beck and Adolf Hitler made an effort to maintain a proper relationship. The visit of Ribbentrop to Warsaw in January 1939 was thus accompanied by protestations of mutual friendship; that of Ciano, Germany's Italian ally, in February 1939, by anti-German street demonstrations.[18]

A third and final criterion of selection, found in five out of six cases, was the observer's sense of vulnerability to the given opponent in the area involved. Faced with an invading Germany army, estimated by French intelligence to number 600,000 men, resistance would have been hopeless for a France preoccupied in 1875 with military reorganization and rearmament. On their Eastern border the French had stationed merely token forces (one army corps, five regiments and two cavalry divisions).[19] Thus at the height of the crisis Duke Decazes made it clear to the German Ambassador that, in the event of war, France would retreat beyond the Loire. "Do what you like. Take Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, it makes no difference. We shall not fight."[20] In the 1889 crisis Francesco Crispi was obsessed by the weakness of the Italian Fleet and the vulnerability of the long Italian coast to naval attack. On several occasions over the previous eighteen months he had tried, and failed, to redress the naval balance by agreements with either England[21] or Austria.[22] Two days before the invasion scare Crispi expressed his fear of Italian weakness: "The great powers are arming in feverish haste and ours is precisely the country most exposed to attack."[23] In the 1913 Von Sanders Affair Russian impotence in Constantinople was both diplomatic and military. The previous July Sergei Sazonov, Russian foreign minister, had ignominously failed to coordinate with the other Great Powers pressure on Turkey to return Adrianople to Bulgaria.[24] At the same time it had emerged that Russia was incapable of sending an expeditionary force against Turkey in the Black Sea area.[25] One of the lessons Sazonov drew from

[17] David Dilks, ed., *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945* (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 156.

[18] Comte Jean Szembek, *Journal 1933-1939* (Paris: Plon, 1952), pp. 411, 424.

[19] J. Defrasne, "L'Armée Française devant l'Alerte de 1875", *Revue Historique de l'Armée* 26 (1970): 37-58.

[20] *Die Grosse Politik* 1: 265.

[21] Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), p. 143.

[22] Langer, *European Alliances*, p. 479.

[23] T. Palamenghi-Crispi, ed., *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, vol. 2 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912), p. 392.

[24] M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question* (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 299.

[25] Baron Mikhail Aleksandrovich Taube, *La Politique Russe d'avant Guerre* (Paris: Leroux, 1928), p. 307.

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the Von Sanders affair was the urgent need for Russia to augment its military and naval power in the Black Sea.[26] British thinking, in the crisis of March 1939, was dominated, as Leslie Hore-Belisha, minister for war, admitted, "by fear of the effects of London being bombed."[27] At the height of the crisis Neville Chamberlain wished to mobilize Britain's skeletal air defences even though German aircraft did not have the range to carry out a bombing mission and return home.[28] Finally, in the 1946 Straits crisis, the Soviet Union possessed overwhelming local superiority over drastically depleted American forces in the Near East. The atom bomb, the United States' great apparent advantage, was not considered a useable asset in a local disagreement; the United States Navy, the strongest of the services in relation to the Soviet Union, was seen by James Forrestal, secretary of the navy, to be at "a dangerously low point of efficiency" due to rapid demobilization.[29]

There was one important exception to the pattern associating the perception of threat with a sense of vulnerability. Polish decision makers in March 1939 perceived the danger of a German attack while simultaneously expressing contempt for German strength. Poland, Josef Beck assured his officials, would not be overcome by German forces and possessed "all the trump cards."[30] The deputy minister for war thought the *Wehrmacht* "a great bluff" and no match for the Polish army.[31] Interestingly, once the initial shock of German demands over Danzig had passed, the possibility of war tended to be discounted.[32]

THE THREATENING CUE

At first sight the events in the external environment which gave rise to perceptions of threat appear to conform to no single paradigm. On the contrary, as can be seen from the list below, they include a wide range of diverse activities:

—1875, an article in a German newspaper attacking French military reorganization following information of German diplomatic activity and arms purchases;
—1889, reports that the Pope, with French encouragement, was about to leave Rome;
—1913, the despatch of a German military mission to Constantinople;
—1939 (Britain), the entry of the German army into Prague and reports of an ultimatum to Rumania;

[26] Russia, Foreign Office, *Un Livre Noir*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1922–23), pp. 369–370.
[27] Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Memoirs* vol. 2 (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 227.
[28] Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, *Total War* (London: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 95–96.
[29] Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 196.
[30] Szembek, *Journal*, p. 434.
[31] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Akten Zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*, serie D, band 6 (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, 1956), p. 120.
[32] M. Zgormiak, "Les Préparatifs allemands d'attaque contre la Pologne (1939) d'après les Informations du deuxième bureau d'état major polonais," *Revue D'Histoire De La Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, vol. 20 (1970), p. 42.

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—1939 (Poland), German proposals for negotiations over Danzig following the declaration of a protectorate over Slovakia;
—1946, Soviet proposals for renegotiation of the Montreux Convention.

As can be seen, these events are both military and diplomatic, verbal and nonverbal, and derived from official and indirect sources.

The common denominator of these events lies not in their objective nature but in their perceived meaning. In all six cases the relevant cue or cues were perceived by decision makers to imply the betrayal of a trust or the performance of an illegitimate action—the infringement, in some sense, of rules of the game governing relations between the actors involved. As Pruitt, following Schelling, has argued: "The sign from which an intention is inferred consists of *stepping over* a "boundary" on a conceptual dimension."[33]

German accusations of French military reorganization in the War in Sight crisis of 1875 were understood by French decision makers to be aimed at intimidating them into voluntary disarmament and preserving German military superiority indefinitely. French Prime Minister Broglie saw this as a blatant infringement of French sovereignty: "The right of every nation to constitute and to dispose of her military forces at her own will . . . is a condition of her independence, and a sovereign prerogative, which in principle she cannot and must not allow to be questioned by anybody . . ."[34] In the 1889 case reports of a papal departure from Rome, with French encouragement, possessed a deep significance for Crispi. The status of Rome as the capital of a united Italy and not, as formerly the case, a possession of the Papacy, rested on a law of 1871 never formally accepted by the Vatican. By leaving Rome the Pope would signal the termination of the existing arrangement, reopen the Roman Question, and throw down a grave challenge to the territorial integrity of the new, united Italy. Any French support for the Pope's departure was thus seen directly to imply war with Italy.[35] The appointment of General Liman von Sanders to command of the Turkish garrison at Constantinople would, in the Russian view, infringe the gentleman's agreement of equality of status governing conduct between the Great Powers in the Turkish capital. Germany would acquire a "privileged position" and the "balance of powers" in the Turkish Empire would be overturned.[36] For the British government in March 1939 the German entry into Prague was seen blatantly and cynically to infringe assurances, some explicit, others informal, personally made by Adolf Hitler to Neville Chamberlain at Munich. But not only was the German action "completely inconsistent with the Munich Agreement." It was also, as Edward Halifax told the British cabinet, the

[33] Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation," p. 403.

[34] Duke de Broglie, *An Ambassador of the Vanquished* (London: William Heinemann, 1896), p. 177.

[35] Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London, Correspondence from Rome, 1889, *FO* 45/622/163.

[36] B. von Siebert, ed., *Graf Benckendorffs diplomatischer Schriftwechsel*, vol. 3 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1928), p. 209.

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"first occasion on which Germany had applied her shock tactics to the domination of non-Germans" and thus infringed the doctrine of national self-determination.[37] As far as the Polish government was concerned, any breach of the Munich Agreement, to which Poland was not a signatory, was of little interest. The rules of the game between Germany and Poland were based on different principles: The 1934 Non-Aggression Pact; the 1919 Settlement defining the status of Danzig; and Polish "rights" to extend a sphere of influence over Slovakia in the event of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Each principle was broken in turn: The 1934 agreement by German failure to consult with Poland before the invasion; Polish rights in Danzig by blunt demands for its return to Germany; and Polish ambitions in Slovakia, well known to Germany, by the German declaration of a protectorate over the area.[38] Finally, the Soviet proposals of August 7, 1946 infringed rules of the game in a number of ways. First, they would exclude non-Black Sea Powers, including the United States, from any future arrangement regarding the Straits, replacing international status by Soviet domination.[39] Second, and in breach of the Potsdam Agreement, Soviet proposals did not envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936, but a "new regime on a fundamentally different basis." Nor was the accepted procedure for proposing a revision followed.[40] Third, the Soviet Union paid no attention to the machinery of the United Nations, nor to that body's principles of equality which were so important to the United States at that time.[41]

THE PROCESS OF APPRAISAL

How are we to account for the gravity attached by decision makers to infringements by the opponent of rules of the game? The obvious place to search for an explanation of this phenomenon is in the arguments put forward by decision makers to justify and to reason out the consequences of the threatening cue. After all, perceptions of threat are anticipations of the future. To understand the perception, therefore, we should do well to investigate the expectations aroused in the observer by the perceived infringement.

Two characteristic arguments run unerringly through our case studies: that by infringing the rules the behavior of the opponent had suddenly ceased to be predictable; and that the opponent had abandoned all restraint on his actions and now aimed at a sweeping policy of domination and aggression.

The Duke Decazes, writing on April 10, 1875 at the very height of the crisis, described German press accusations as "the prelude to an action of which I cannot foresee all the bearings." Bismarck would choose for France "the terrible

[37] Cabinet Records, Public Record Office, London, *Cab.* 23/98.

[38] *Polish White Book*, pp. 63, 144.

[39] United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1946, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 847.

[40] Ibid., p. 836.

[41] Ibid., p. 848.

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lesson through which he intends to cure Europe of her relative independence." The "Old World" was to be "mastered and laid under the yoke of German terror."[42] Francesco Crispi wrote of French aims in similar terms. He hardly dared "to face the consequences of a conflict whose results no one can foresee."[43] "It was impossible to predict what might happen from one week to another."[44] French support for the Vatican was seen as the tip of a sort of iceberg of subversion and aggression directed against Italy and the European balance. At first Crispi feared a French attack on land and sea; then a coordinated Russo-French attack on the Triple Alliance; and finally a French plot to foment internal revolution in Italy.[45] Sazonov, for his part, in November 1913 ascribed to Germany equally ominous and far-flung intentions: "a combined move by the powers of the Triple Alliance to seize Turkey was becoming apparent."[46] Once in possession of Constantinople the way would be open to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, to penetration into Asia Minor and hegemony in the Balkans.[47] The Liman von Sanders mission was seen as the thin end of a German wedge to overthrow the equilibrium among the powers at Constantinople and to seize control of the Near East. For British decision makers in March 1939—indeed for public opinion as a whole—the occupation of Prague was the point at which Nazi Germany dropped the mask. The future was obscured by a new uncertainty. Neville Chamberlain wondered: "Is this the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a new?" Once Hitler had repudiated his Munich promises, any further assurances he might give could no longer be relied upon.[48] Edward Halifax concluded that the German government "were seeking to establish a position in which they could by force dominate Europe and, if possible, the world." There was no state in Europe which was not "directly or ultimately threatened."[49] In Warsaw at this time the atmosphere was heavy with foreboding. The situation was serious, in Josef Beck's words, because one of the main elements of Poland's situation, Germany, had "lost its calculability." Having defined the limits of Polish interests—Polish territory, or an imposed settlement of Danzig—Poland would fight rather than submit. Germany was "marching across Europe" but would not overcome Poland.[50] In 1946, finally, the implications of Soviet proposals were considered to be so grave that President Truman was prepared to take the risk of armed conflict to oppose them: "We might as well find out whether the Russians were bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years."[51] The primary object of Soviet proposals, a joint

[42] Gabriel Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, vol. 3 (London: Constable, 1907), p. 216.
[43] Palamenghi-Crispi, *Memoirs*, p. 393.
[44] Foreign Office Archives, *FO* 45/625/165.
[45] Ibid., 45/624/158, 159, 160.
[46] *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 3rd series, vol. 8, p. 658.
[47] *Un Livre Noir, vol. 2, p. 366.*
[48] Keith Feiling, *Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 400.
[49] Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939*, 3rd series, vol. 4 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), pp. 271, 400.
[50] Szembek, *Journal*, p. 434.
[51] Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 192.

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memorandum of the State, War and Navy departments argued, was to obtain control of Turkey. Once this happened it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the Soviet Union from extending its domination over Greece and the whole Near and Middle East. Mastery of this region would then place the Soviet Union in a much stronger position to obtain its objectives in India and China.[52]

Threat Perception: A Theory

Onlookers, both at the time and in retrospect, find it difficult fully to appreciate either the alarm of decision makers or the sweeping arguments used to explain their fears. Exaggeration and alarmism are accusations frequently put forward. Indeed it is hard not to admit that the step from a German military mission or a revision of the Montreux Convention to continental domination seems far-fetched. And again, why did the occupation of Prague so dismay British decision makers after they had accepted with equanimity the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, and Munich?

The key to this puzzle lies, we suggest, in the function performed by rules of the game in international relations. Such rules, as can be seen from our examples, include precepts of international law, international agreements, bilateral pacts, concepts such as those of sovereignty and spheres of influence, and arrangements which are never explicitly stated, but which remain tacit and unwritten. The common feature which they share is that they are anticipatory: They entail certain expectations about the future conduct in given circumstances of other actors in the international system. There is nothing logically necessary about such anticipated behavior. In this sense rules of the game in international relations are quite different from the listed or stipulative rules in bridge or football. In these latter cases the rules define the game and to infringe them blatantly and systematically is simply to cease playing the game and to court disqualification. In international relations there can be no disqualification of actors or termination of the game. If anything the rules of international conduct approximate more closely to those understandings or conventions which develop among players to settle questions left open by the listed rules.[53] Indeed it is by analyzing the overall function of conventions of this kind that we can best shed light on the nature of rules of the game in international relations.

As Thomas Schelling,[54] and then David Lewis, who developed philosophical aspects of the concept, argue, conventions—rules of the game—function as a solution to a particular problem of communication which frequently arises: that where participants are required to coordinate or harmonize their behavior without their being able to communicate freely or directly. At a trivial level

[52] *Foreign Relations 1946*, vol. 7, pp. 840–1.

[53] David K. Lewis, *Conventions: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 104–5.

[54] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

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such problems include meeting a friend after a football match after having been separated by the crowd or restoring a telephone connection which has been cut off inadvertently. Similar problems arise in every walk of life from the setting of fashion trends to price-fixing in an oligopolistic market. They also occur in international relations.

Faced with the problem of coordinating his behavior with that of others in the absence of means of communication, an actor is left with only a single practical alternative: He must attempt to anticipate how those others will behave and act in accordance with such an anticipation. Where many participants are involved, for example in the stock market, it is only a question of anticipating others' behavior. In normal circumstances there is no possibility of the small speculator by himself affecting others' actions. Where only two, or at least a very limited number of participants are involved, the individual must recognize that he himself constitutes an important factor in the equation: He must therefore take into account what others expect him to do. Thus the problem of tacit communication is soluble on a basis of coordinated expectations, of arriving at common anticipations to those of other participants.

Thomas Schelling, to his great credit, recognized and systematically developed the idea that many problems of international, and especially strategic behavior are structurally very similar to those of everyday life. So it is with the problem of coordinating mutual expectations. For instance, he argues, in questions such as the limit to concession in negotiations and the delineation of international frontiers, some prominent feature of the situation can become a focus for the mutual expectations of the actors. It is also vitally necessary for the Great Powers to agree upon limits to the use of weapons and the scope of belligerency if some local conflict is not to escalate into nuclear war.[55] Since formal agreement may be difficult to reach, it is to tacit ground rules that the actors may have to look.

Schelling's ideas on the possibility of opponents harmonizing their behavior in a situation where direct communication is not possible—by coordinating expectations—seem to us to have a relevance beyond those select problems he describes. In most situations short of total war or total harmony actors are obliged somehow to agree on the limits of permitted action. Much of the time, for example, actors neither work together nor act in opposition, but are engaged in the routine administration of concerns which do not entail or require their mutual interaction at the high policy-making level. To permit such coexistence actors must necessarily develop certain rules of the game to prevent, or at least to limit, unwelcome contact. Without these rules relations would continually deteriorate into abrasion and crisis. The international system would be locked in a state of perpetual anarchy in which the slightest collision might lead to war. Established interests could not be maintained and with no reciprocal framework of restraint would be continually threatened. Rules obviate abrasive contact—

[55] Ibid., chap. 3 and appendix A.

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not always successfully, of course—by inserting a degree of certainty in the relations between states and by permitting most life and contact to be conducted at a routine level, if at all. Hence states are left free to occupy themselves with what is their essential business most of the time: the management of their domestic affairs and the administration of interests.

The most obvious example of such routinization is provided by international law in a limited number of areas such as the rights of foreign nationals, shipping, foreign trade, etc. The very success of international law in these areas is attested to by the frequent charge that it deals only with the noncontroversial. Such subjects, about which wars were once fought, are now noncontroversial precisely because of the success of international law in setting up clear and mutually beneficial ground rules of behavior.

The best way to coordinate the mutual expectations of actors is, as we learn from international law, by universal, specific, and generally accepted rules of conduct. Another good way is by prior contingency agreement. As we see from our case studies, rules of the game often derive from a formal agreement such as the Polish-German Ten Year Pact of 1934 or the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Explicit agreement, however, may not always be possible. There are a number of reasons for this. Most obviously, explicit arrangements cannot possibly be reached to cover all contingencies. And then even if it were technically possible to foresee all contingencies negotiation between adversaries would still raise numerous and interminable difficulties, some of them insuperable. Factors such as domestic and alliance opinion, bureaucratic in-fighting and prestige factors would all hinder agreement. Where explicit agreement and international law are not available as foci of expectations, a third possibility arises. In recurrent situations—unique situations raise different problems—coordination can also be achieved by adhering to recognized and regular patterns of behavior, "norms" in Schelling's terminology, "conventions" in Lewis's. These have two possible sources, tradition and tacit agreement. Conventions are not only a substitute for formal agreement, they may also possess clear advantages: They enable greater flexibility and leave more scope to improvization in unforeseen circumstances. They do not raise the negotiating problems often involved in formal agreements; they are less embarassing, can be publicly denied and bypass the bureaucratic process and alliance partners. Their clear disadvantage compared with formal agreements is that they may very well be imprecise, misunderstood or contradictory. By their very nature they are subjective and, as we have seen, sometimes contain an element of wishful thinking.

This discussion has put us in a position to account for the association between perceptions of threat and infringements of the rules of the game and to provide an overall explanation of why threat should be perceived at all. The key to the puzzle lies in Schelling's theory of the coordination of mutual expectations. Let us, therefore, consider the consequences, in terms of the model, of infringements of the rules. To simplify matters we assume that we are dealing solely with a two-actor situation.

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The Function of Rules of the Game

It will be recalled that the function of prior agreement, whether tacit or formal, is to enable actors to harmonize their behavior in a situation in which they are unable to communicate with each other. By conforming to rules mutually understood they obviate the risk of collision and unnecessary conflict. Without such rules it would be impossible to prevent the system from breaking down into anarchy. International relations, if it is nothing else, is a continuing process of transaction and mutual accomodation. This recurrent nature of international relations has at least one important implication: It raises any single example of interaction between states beyond the level of a momentary encounter to a learning situation with implications for any future transaction in the continuing process. Once this is understood, the far-reaching effect of the failure of a given actor to keep to the rules becomes apparent. By infringing the rules an actor disappoints expectations. His behavior becomes unforeseeable. And inability to rely on any expectations of that actor's behavior critically disrupts the possibilty of harmonizing one's own actions with his in a situation in which direct communication is ruled out, as it often will be. At stake in an infringement of rules of the game is the possibility of tacit communication. When this becomes impossible both parties in an interaction are condemned to a *dialogue des sourds*. In this situation coordination is ruled out and relations between the actors plunge into that state of uncertainty, previously avoided, which is the prelude to chaos. The threatening prospect at hand goes far beyond the immediate consequences of the infringement and extends to the very future state of the international system.

A rule, we have argued, enables actors to coordinate their behavior by providing a focus for their mutual expectations. We can call this the signpost function of rules of the game. Rules point the way to a predetermined rendezvous. Should the signpost be knocked down or altered then travellers journeying apart will be unable to arrive at a common destination; coordinated behavior becomes impossible. But rules also perform a second, complementary, boundary function: They demarcate the territory of the permissible from that of the forbidden. And just as an infringement of rules of the game removes the only means of tacit communication between actors, it also removes the only means for tacit restraint between them. After the frontier has been crossed, there is no other immediately plausible line of demarcation to fall back upon. The boundary was created, whether tacitly or explicitly, as a mutually recognized and recognizable limitation of other actors' behavior. Beyond it there is unlikely, in the short term at least, to be another stopping place that can be tacitly acknowledged by both sides.[56] At this point the calculus of mutual expectations re-enters the picture. Since the boundary—the inhibition—marks the

[56] Ibid., p. 259. This does not mean that the infractor may not, as a matter of fact, stop short at a new boundary of his own choosing. In time the victim may come to accept this, either through negotiation or tacitly, because of *force majeure*.

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only agreed restraint on action, the victim will understand the infringement as a statement of intent by his opponent to proceed further. The infractor, the victim will go on to argue, must be well aware that beyond the boundary there is no other agreed stopping place. He knows that the infringement will not be seen as a purely limited operation and that he can expect to meet with forceful opposition. Understanding the implications of his infringement, the infractor would only have undertaken it if he were prepared from the beginning to risk conflict. Therefore, the victim will conclude, his action can only be interpreted as a challenge to the existing balance of relations as a whole.

Once the crucial function of rules of the game is grasped, the anxiety of decision makers in the face of their infringement becomes much more intelligible. Perceived to be at stake in our case studies were not merely limited attempts to achieve immediate gain at Constantinople, Prague or Danzig, but the repudiation of overall systems of communication and restraint. By rejecting these systems opponents were seen to be knowingly calling into question the entire structure of relations between the parties involved. In Josef Beck's words: "Regardless of what Danzig is worth as an object . . . under the present circumstances it has become a symbol. This means that, if we join that category of eastern states that allow rules to be dictated to them, then I do not know where the matter will end . . ."[57]

Within any structure of relations which it is desired to preserve, certain rules of the game will be developed which regulate permissible behavior between the actors. In a dangerously uncertain world they allow a minimal degree of certainty. But they are like a seamless web. Damaged at one point, the whole fabric threatens to disintegrate. Threat, then, is like a tug on this web of rules, its perception an anticipation of a descent into disorder and uncertainty. And chaos, as any biologist knows, is the ultimate abhorrence of sentient organisms.

[57] Szembek, *Journal*, p. 434.

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Book Reviews

The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy *by George F. Kennan. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 234 pp. $8.95.*

Defending America *by Theodore Draper et al. New York, Basic Books and San Francisco, The Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1977. 255 pp. $13.95.*

In 1946–47, George Kennan helped forge the containment policy to defend American global interests against a Stalinist Russia that Kennan defined as militaristic and expansionist. Thirty years later his view of the Soviets has changed radically, but his old Mr. X formula has been adopted—and only slightly adapted—by fourteen authors in *Defending America* who argue that the nation's future can only be assured by vastly increasing military spending and steadfastly refusing to be deluded by the bitch-goddess détente.

The key reference point for these fourteen authors is an earlier, simpler time when American power was overwhelming. Robert Conquest makes this explicit in his interesting essay on human rights: "The crises of the 1940s were solved by military strength and a staunch political will, now alas lacking." Even the Truman administration, however, apparently faltered: "since the root of the problem [by which Conquest evidently means the Soviet system] was not after all dealt with, it has continued over the decades to bear the bitter fruits of psychological aggression. The danger of war has remained in being" (p. 212). In the final essay, Paul Seabury focuses on the results in the 1970s, reiterating the theme that runs throughout *Defending America:* "If the Soviet Union now is well on its way to becoming the world's preponderant military and naval power, . . . this tendency is more apparent after seven years of détente" than it was before 1969 (p. 235).

The George Kennan of the 1970s will have little to do with either Conquest's history or Seabury's fear. Kennan belittles the supposed power of the Soviet navy, argues that the Russians' military buildup since the 1960s is understandable given their fear of China (and a potential Sino-Japanese partnership) on one flank, and, on the other, the NATO alliance anchored by a West Germany whose power Kennan compares to that of pre-World War II Germany. In *Defending America,* Eugene Rostow warns once again the Russians are coming, this time through the Middle East to squeeze Western Europe. His

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analysis strikingly resembles Dean Acheson's selling of the Truman Doctrine-Mr. X formula to doubtful congressmen in February 1947. Convinced that the "Arab states have turned to the Soviet Union for help in order to destroy Israel" (p. 62), a view that must be interesting to the Saudis, Egyptians, Iranians, and Jordanians, Rostow urges curing our "strange illnesses of the spirit" (p. 63), making a full commitment to Israel, and never forgetting that Soviet behavior toward the Indochina agreement of 1973 is analagous to Hitler's contempt for the Munich agreement. Kennan supports a commitment to Israel, short of sending U.S. troops, but otherwise disagrees with Rostow. Soviet policies in the Near (or Middle) East, Kennan argues, "are considerably more moderate, less ambitious and less disturbing from the Western standpoint than was the case some years ago" (p. 165). He attacks massive arms sales to Iran as unduly provocative from the Soviet view, and has no objections to pruning NATO of Greece, Turkey, and even Italy so the alliance will be lean, effective, and more politically united.

Kennan shares one view with many of the fourteen authors: they believe American society is increasingly incapable of conducting an effective foreign policy. The authors of *Defending America*, however, are too conservative to suggest significant structural changes; they can only urge us to stand tall. "Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom," as James R. Schlesinger once again borrows the standard call-to-action for his Foreword (p. xiii). Kennan is becoming a classic American conservative, but of a quite different kind than the fourteen essayists. He sees the need for structural changes in policy formulation, in the military-industrial complex, and in energy policy if his values are to be preserved.

In the international realm, the two books represent the opposing views of détente that exist within the foreign policy establishment, although by placing low priority on the third world, human rights, the playing off of China against Russia, and Soviet activities in Angola, Kennan is farther from official opinion than are the authors of *Defending America*. Above all, Kennan blasts the assumption that underlies the anti-détente views: "If we insist on placing military considerations at the heart of our . . . discussion of Soviet-American relations, we run a strong risk of eventually bringing about the very war we do not want and should be concerned to avoid" (p. 201). Kennan believes that America can best be defended when Americans free themselves from most of the thirty-year-old assumptions of Mr. X.

WALTER LAFEBER
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Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948 *by Robert J. Donovan. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1977. 473 pp. $12.95.*

Few American presidents have been the source of such intense controversy among scholars or have had such ups and downs in the popular imagination as Harry Truman. Reviled during his administration by much of the mass media and conservative opinion as a political accident whose cynicism and ineptitude opened the gates to corruption at home, Communism everywhere, and a frustrating "police action" in Korea, Truman was

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nevertheless perceived by cold war establishment scholars and policy makers as both the guardian of moderate and necessary New Deal reforms and as the symbol of the containment policy that ended American isolationism and preserved political freedom and Western civilization.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, Truman emerged from the shambles of Vietnam and Watergate as the lone survivor in popular mythology among postwar presidents, the one national leader who, in best-selling paperbacks, plays, and films, embodied the humor, dignity, and democratic aspirations of the common people. At the same time, younger scholars, responding to both mounting archival materials and the collapse in the United States of the cold war consensus over what was acceptable national policy, came to perceive the Truman administration as a major source of the general postwar crisis; and Truman himself as a political disaster whose policies had contributed mightily to the rise of McCarthyism, and to the international climate that had engendered the nuclear arms race, the Korean war, and the American intervention in Vietnam.

In the United States, as in other societies divided by class, academic scholarship is usually divorced from the popular tradition and restricted largely to learned circles and university initiation rites. Often, both popular and scholarly writers confuse the gathering and repetition of empirical data with theoretical understanding, with the popularizers tending to rely on colorful anecdotes and the professional scholars, outside of their classrooms, on dry detail. In *Conflict and Crisis*, Robert J. Donovan, a veteran journalist of considerable skill, has attempted to write a general synthesis of the early Truman years that combines archival work with much of the empirical material of the recent critical scholarship and the underlying assumptions of the popular Truman myth.

The result is a work that is both impressive and uneven in its research, that highlights extensive and in some instances very recently released material from the Truman Presidential Library without presenting the background research in the private archives of other major political figures of the period. Gleaning many important secondary sources with a considerable amount of care, Donovan has produced a kind of massively documented Time Magazine history of the late 1940s, rich in detail but often uninformed by analysis, and occasionally unable to distinguish the merely interesting from the genuinely important. Indeed, the book reads like a compendium of newspaper stories held together by chronology, with forty-three chapters of text, and an average of ten pages a chapter (thirteen pages for example are devoted to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, six to Taft-Hartley).

Although Donovan's work probably presents no real threat to the pop culture productions of Merle Miller and Margaret Truman, it should do exceedingly well among educated laymen and may make its way into college survey courses. About very controversial questions it has managed to say very little, but to say it well. For those who have questions about the relationship of the American economy to American foreign policy, the struggle between labor and capital to American politics, and the nature of the world socialist movement and national liberation movements to international relations, other books must be consulted. From his footnotes, Donovan has consulted some of these books but has really learned little from them.

NORMAN MARKOWITZ
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Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai Stevenson *by John Bartlow Martin. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Company, 1977. 946 pp. $15.00.*

The Papers of Adlai Stevenson, vol. VII: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society, *1957–1961 edited by Walter Johnson, Carol Evans, and C. Eric Sears. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 655 pp. $22.50.*

Readers who persevered through the first volume of John Bartlow Martin's biography of Adlai Stevenson were rewarded with glimpses of some little-seen aspects of the nation's leading Democrat of the 1950s. Stevenson, it seemed, rarely read serious books; he worked hard to produce what appeared to be the effortless elegance of his public speeches; he had many close women friends; he did not shrink from the toughness of partisan politics. Readers of this second and concluding volume will recognize many of the same traits in the Stevenson of 1952–1965. They will be reminded also that Stevenson reacted sluggishly to the civil rights revolution of the 1950s, that he subscribed in 1953 to a domino theory concerning Vietnam, that his 1956 campaign disappointed many liberal followers, and that he shared most of Kennedy's and Johnson's views on foreign policy. Readers will find confirmation of other speculations about Stevenson: he yearned to be secretary of state under Kennedy or Johnson; he found Kennedy to be "cold-blooded, even heartless" (Martin's words, p. 586); and he regarded Dean Rusk as "just a good technician" and "wooden" (p. 588). Martin shows that Stevenson could not endure being long out of the spotlight, that he rarely troubled to read through position papers, that he very much needed the adulation of women friends, that he spent far too much time wining and dining with wealthy women during his last years as ambassador to the United Nations, and that New Frontiersmen found him wordy and diffuse.

Martin's biography is reticent on some matters, including the nature of Stevenson's romantic attachments. Written with the cooperation of the Stevenson family, it is friendly and admiring. Indeed, Martin claims uncritically that the Stevenson who was slow to respond to the needs of blacks deserves great praise for articulating in the 1950s all the ideas of the New Frontier and the Great Society (pp. 22, 89, 232). Yet in the course of providing an almost day-by-day account of Stevenson's activities, Martin presents enough information so that readers can appreciate some of the unhappiness which plagued Stevenson in these later years. Clearly, Stevenson was a restless and highly vulnerable human being; for many readers, he is as likely to be pitied as admired.

The seventh volume of Stevenson's papers, edited capably by Walter Johnson and associates, complements Martin's biography. Like the earlier volumes, it is a highly selective collection of Stevenson's voluminous letters, diaries, and speeches. Much of the material for 1957–1958, when Stevenson was traveling widely and writing postcards and thank you notes, is of interest primarily in reminding readers of Stevenson's very wide acquaintance with world figures. By 1959, Stevenson became increasingly concerned with the politics of 1960. Some documents for these years are important primary sources exposing Stevenson's private opinions of political and diplomatic figures, including the Kennedys (pp. 507, 579, 613). Though the letters reveal Stevenson's considerable warmth and attentiveness to friends, they otherwise expose little of his personal side.

Martin's biography is complete; Johnson's labors nearly so. Yet these monuments of

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compilation by no means exhaust the subject. Johnson, indeed, reminds us that Adlai Stevenson III has papers in his private possession, and Martin, who has mined virtually the same body of materials, has done very little additional research, either in official documents or in other scholarly work on the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, he has plowed through the private papers, reporting all but making no effort to distinguish the significant from the banal or the trivial, or to offer any informed analysis about what he reports. Readers who want to know what play Stevenson saw, who his dinner companions were, or where he went on all his travels, will stay with Martin through 900-odd pages. They will find a convenient chronology of his correspondence and public engagements. Scholars, however, must hope that a scholar will sift through those materials, supplement them with wider research, and bring to the task of biography the artistry, discrimination and interpretive skill which a figure like Stevenson deserves.

JAMES T. PATTERSON
Brown University

The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and America Realized the Enlightenment *by Henry Steele Commager. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1977. 342 pp. $10.00.*

This book is a survey of the Enlightenment on both sides of the Atlantic: "The Old World imagined, invented, and formulated the Enlightenment, the New World—certainly the Anglo-American part of it—realized it and fulfilled it" (p. xi). "Americans," Commager asserts, "not only embraced the body of Enlightenment principles, but wrote them into law, crystallized them into institutions, and put them to work. That, as much as the winning of independence and the creation of the nation, *was* the American Revolution" (p. xi, author's emphasis). The speedy success of the American enterprise flowed from a fortuitous combination of ideas, men, and circumstances. In this view, the Enlightenment simply could never have been realized in most of Europe at the time. In the eighteenth century usage of the term, the "climate" was not right.

The volume is unabashed praise of American national beginnings. Mr. Commager could have written with no more confidence had he been present at the creation. The book is thus an appropriate echo both to the Bicentennial and to Watergate, experiences which have summoned many to reflect on the political origins of the country and the continuing utility of fundamental law. The first of two volumes, *Empire of Reason* appears, moreover, during an era when even the British are discussing once again the relative merits of a bill of rights, American-style.

Three points about the present book seem to be in order. First, the pages are an unfolding bibliography of the figures of the Enlightenment. Yet Commager could profitably have allotted space to its critics. Edmund Burke, for one, is cited occasionally but then only to note his opposition to some trend or principle. The author's heroes would have appeared in sharper detail had he portrayed them against the background of others. Instead, the critics become like characters in a play who remain almost always off-stage. The audience is aware of their existence, but they have little to say. Consequently, they never develop

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fully as characters nor do they contribute by way of bold relief to an understanding of those with most of the lines.

Second, the Enlightenment in America was probably of greater significance for its offspring than for its progenitors. Commager notes a paradox: "the nation most deeply committed to the supremacy of law over government, should be perhaps the only one where the principle was not really needed." And, "the nation whose people were most deeply suspicious of power in government was the only one whose leaders seemed immune to the temptations of power" (p. 124). Surely a chief national resource consisted of statesmanship. Still, even if constitutionalism was not really necessary for so enlightened a generation of political elites—and Commager is not fully dispositive on this point—who or what was to guide the second and third generations and beyond? It is the political version of the chicken-and-egg query: do Americans remain a free people because of constitutionalism, or do Americans continue to accept constitutionalism because they are a free people?

Finally, one cannot conclude reading such an impressive piece of scholarship without reflecting on its meaning for contemporary political life and institutions. Certainly the "climate" has changed over the course of the past two centuries. The fortuitous combination which enshrined the Enlightenment in America has largely disappeared. Current democratic theory rejects the primacy of Reason. Indeed, the party system, which the Constitution was intended in part to preclude, makes ignorance in individuals a virtue. Nonetheless, the political process is open today to a degree that would have boggled the minds of many of the disciples of the very movement which inspired the process. At the same time, much of life has moved from small scale to large. In government it is misleading to think in terms of individuals; rather, one is accustomed today to institutions, agencies, and masses of people. This has of course been true of the executive bureaucracy for several decades, but the same is becoming true for the Congress and the presidency. And where they go, can the Supreme Court be far behind? Commager's book gives pause as one contemplates the present health and prospects of democratic politics, the roots of which lie deeply in distant soil.

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The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism

by Alan Wolfe. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 432 pp. $14.95.

Wolfe's intelligent exploration of the state of capitalism hinges upon inherent conflict between liberalism, defined as unfettered capitalist accumulation, and democracy, interpreted as extending beyond the formalities of electoral franchise to genuine power sharing between capitalists and other claimants.

Wolfe has written a comparative study of responses by European and American capitalists to increasingly strident demands for a larger share of the economic and power pie by family farmers, urban proletariats, and small entrepreneurs. He identifies six stages of a continuing quest for legitimation of their power by capitalist elites. At the dawn of industrialization "the Accumulative State" . . . "made accumulation its own mechanism of legitimation" (p. 247). When accumulation slowed and class contradictions became

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glaring, there emerged the Harmonious State whose legitimacy derived from a more or less plausible demonstration that "under capitalism all classes had an interest in allowing the bourgeosie to control the state" (p. 247). But intermittent depression and obvious maldistributions of income and wealth aroused mounting skepticism among the working class losers. The Expansionist State soothed disaffected wage earners with the pageantry of colonial conquest as well as, here Wolfe echoes Lenin, some actual material benefits derived from the workers' share of the exploitation of colonial populations.

However, World War I revealed the inherent fragility of the Expansionist State. The world was simply too small to accommodate the amount of colonial conquest needed for stability among domestic interests and nations.

Nothing daunted, in the wake of World War I capitalists experimented with variant forms of corporatism which Wolfe labels the Franchise State. The core of corporatism is delegation of state power to private interests, much as the New Deal NRA endeavored to endow trade associations with responsibility for economic recovery. After World War II, the failure of the Franchise State became manifest when private interest groups did a poor job of regulating themselves. Next on the crowded ideological stage marched the Dual State, "one charged with keeping order and the other with preserving a democratic facade" (p. 249). Wolfe offers the security apparatus partially revealed by Watergate as an example of the covert member of this duality. Now with us, is the Transnational State, of which two odd examples presented by Wolfe are the European Common Market and the United Nations. But this last attempt to preserve capitalism is also doomed to fail for transnational experiments "do not resolve the contradiction between accumulation and legitimation but raise it to a new level" (p. 249). When and how these contradictions will resolve themselves, Wolfe is far too prudent a critic of capitalism to project.

My reservations about this lively and unusually original essay in grand theory are those to which big thinkers are unavoidably subject. Wolfe's classifications are not entirely persuasive. As he occasionally concedes, each political form is an ideal type. When, if ever, such a type approximated even at a moderate distance the life of an actual society is less than clear. Moreover, as Wolfe also notes but usually fails to emphasize, in the untidy real world new capitalist responses seem to arise before their predecessors depart. In 1977 one needn't look too hard to locate American traces of the Franchise State, the Dual State, the Transnational State (under the sponsorship of our global corporations), and even the Harmonious State. The different mixture of these elements in other countries raises considerable doubt about Wolfe's conclusion that a universal crisis of legitimacy afflicts the capitalist world.

Still, Wolfe has written a book well worth the reading if not necessarily the believing.

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Women and Equality: Changing Patterns in American Culture *by William H. Chafe. New York, Oxford University Press, 1977. 207 pp. $8.95.*

Cutting through the rhetoric of the women's movement to its fundamentals and mastering the vast literature of women's history, Professor Chafe has brought the scholar's fabled combination of sympathy and detachment to an examination of "equality" as it has imbued the minds and lives of women. After an incisive discussion of the methodological problems of women's history, and a backward glance at its broad outlines in America, he proceeds to the substance of his analysis: what are the forms of social control and social change that have characterized the unacknowledged, and often unintended, efforts to keep women down?

Using the similarities and differences in the experience of blacks as a running analogy, he demonstrates that women were all but unique in believing as long as they did that their problems were individual and not collective. For this reason their progress may have been slower than that of other oppressed groups. On the other hand, women's experience is analogous to that of blacks in its supposition of white male superiority and intimidation, whether pervading the conscious or unconscious mind of the intimidated.

Women liberationists, in their eagerness to overcome the stunted feminine self-images issuing from an overpoweringly male milieu, underrate the tenacity of feelings of helplessness nurtured by psychological isolation and physical fear. Chafe's political analysis throws light upon literary-cultural theories of the American woman as tyrant. How much, it might be asked, do men suffer the consequences of their own oppressor role in the shape of women whose frustrations and fears are converted into the subtler forms of domestic domination?

Another of his observations relates to the intrasex rivalries fostered among women by the process of socialization itself. Women have been notoriously ill-equipped to express effective forms of overt hostility, hence the "oblique forms of aggression largely directed at other females" which diminish their effectiveness and sap their psychological strength (p. 69). Like blacks, women have historically released emotion in order to withstand crises rather than to overcome them.

Chafe concludes that social control, for both women and blacks, is grounded in the pivotal conception of the oppressor as "other." Powerless to conceive of action as originating in one's own needs, both women and blacks look outside themselves for fundamental direction and for validation of their own worth. Many women will confirm the accuracy of this assertion, but what they may not perceive as clearly is that society itself suffers a serious loss by perpetuating systems of dominance and control that render both males and females incapable of contributing their fullest to the common good.

Are there prospects for change? In examining the impact of an external force upon established patterns of discrimination, one begins to entertain hopes that historical events themselves may accomplish what men of good will have failed to bring about. World War II initiated unprecedented changes in the conditions of women and blacks. Chafe searches the mechanisms of change for both: atypical character traits are encouraged, contradictions between norms and reality become evident, the appearance of a catalyst gives "form and direction to the otherwise unrelated components of change" (p. 101), innovative tactics (the "sit-in," the "consciousness-raising session") are forged. Ultimately

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the system itself is challenged. When this in turn produces a drive for separatism, as happened in both the civil rights and the women's movements, the threat to society comes into sharper focus. It is out of the ensuing compromises that forward movement results.

In a briskly paced retrospective of the contemporary women's movement and a concluding essay sketching future dilemmas, Chafe's close familiarity with the concrete data does not impede his grasp of the entirety of his subject. He realizes that both new recognitions and enlarged needs require specific political solutions to the problems of sexual equality—and that only such solutions can insure men and women a milieu in which the traditional American allegiance to individualism and laissez-faire liberalism can simultaneously be maintained. The implementation of affirmative action, new work patterns, and day care facilities all raise complex questions of competing values. And on a broader scale, so do the drive for achievement, the culture of masculinity and the disequilibrium of parental roles. Political imagination of a high order will be required to find answers, however tentative.

Chafe has staked out this territory in a style so graceful and compelling that the challenge he offers can hardly be declined, for his is a book about women by a man who neither flatters nor condescends.

ANNETTE K. BAXTER
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Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment *by Raoul Berger. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977. 483 pp. $15.00.*

The thesis of this heavily annotated and fervently argued blockbuster of a book is that in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court has consistently violated what Berger holds to be the basic canon of constitutional construction, namely, that the intention of the authors of the Constitution is absolutely binding upon the judges who are called upon to interpret it. Berger insists that this is the way other written instruments are construed by the courts, such as wills, contracts or statutes, and apparently he assumes that in this respect a constitution falls in the same category. To equate a constitution with a will, or a contract, or a statute, strikes me as a very odd thing to do.

In any event, Berger is certain that the only thing that the 39th Congress had in mind when it adopted the Fourteenth Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was strictly limited to a few basic rights, such as the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and give testimony in court, to inherit, purchase, sell or lease property, and to "the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . ." He is convinced that the members of the 39th Congress did not intend to create federally enforceable limitations on the states in regard to such matters as racial segregation and voting. While at the end of the book Berger expresses his personal distaste for racial segregation, he devotes an enormous amount of space to the argument that the racial segregation decisions of the Supreme Court have constituted a completely improper construction of the Constitution.

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According to Berger, the only way we can depart from original intent is to amend the Constitution through the procedure spelled out in Article V. I suspect that if the nation had considered itself bound to such a proposition from the very beginning, we would now have a constitution as long as a horse blanket, or some other constitution, or no constitution at all. Berger, who seems to be a rather excitable chap, goes so far as to say that since the Constitution derives its interpretation from the views of the prevailing majority of Supreme Court justices, we are in danger of undermining the entire democratic structure, "and the way is paved from Weimar to Hitler (p. 410). This is a very curious remark for an educated man to make.

It is not all that clear to me that it is possible for us to determine with Berger's absolute certainty just what the members of the 39th Congress had in mind when they submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states in June 1866. Furthermore, we have no idea whether the state legislatures which ratified the amendment thought they were ratifying the various speeches made in Congress, or indeed, whether they knew about the speeches. This subject is not explored at all. Furthermore, if the American people were so adamantly opposed to Negro suffrage in 1866, as Berger insists, then he ought to explain how it happened that in February 1869 Congress was fully prepared to submit to the states an amendment declaring that "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," and giving Congress power to enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation. In addition, no mention is made of the fact that while it is true that Congress thought that the Fourteenth Amendment would remove the constitutional doubts about the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which had been stated in President Johnson's veto message, Congress went on to adopt a huge body of legislation, amounting to a veritable code, in the civil rights acts of 1870, 1871, and 1875, embracing subjects which Berger still insists were left to the states, not subject to federal supervision without benefit of a constitutional amendment. And no mention is made at all of the vast body of legislation which Congress adopted between 1957 and 1970 on all sorts of civil rights on the basis of the Civil War amendments.

Original intent is not an absolute rule, but only an aid to construction. After all, on many subjects of grave importance, for example, the right of a state to leave the Union, or the power of Congress to limit the removal power of the president, the Constitution is altogether silent. There is therefore no textual context in which to develop a rule of constitutional law based on historical intent. Indeed, when the Court ruled in *Coyle v. Oklahoma* (1911) that a newly admitted state is on a plane of juristic equality with all existing states, because this is and ought to be a union of equal states, it simply ignored the intent of the Founding Fathers, which was exactly to the contrary. (See Madison's notes for August 29.) According to Berger, we would have to struggle along with first and second class states until the original intent was corrected by a constitutional amendment. I rejoice that the Court was not so antiquarian in its approach to constitutional interpretation that, in deference to original intent, it would permit the development of such a monstrosity as a federal union of unequal states.

In one of his letters to Jefferson, John Adams speculated, with some hilarity, on what sort of country Plato's republic would be if it were actually realized. As I read Berger's

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book, I wondered where we would stand today if the Supreme Court had read the Constitution the way he thinks it must be read. I shudder at the thought.

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Constitutional Counter-Revolution? The Warren Court and the Burger Court: Judicial Policy Making in Modern America *by Richard Y. Funston. New York, Schenkman Publishing Company, 1977. 399 pp. $19.50.*

There is a strong tendency in much of the current writing about the Supreme Court toward polemic and hyperbole, a sizeable portion of it alleged to be in the scholarly tradition. Furthermore, when an author assumes the task of analyzing and passing judgment on some twenty-five years of the Court's work, he can easily produce a kaleidoscopic jumble rather than a treatise with a sharp focus. For the most part Professor Funston has avoided both pitfalls in this well-balanced and judicious comparison of the work of the Warren and Burger Courts in selected areas (race relations, reapportionment, criminal procedure, religious freedom, and obscenity).

Setting the tone and framework of the book in his first chapter, the author argues that there is little "danger of absolute rule by the Supreme Court" (p. 12) since the design of the Constitution along with the Court's self-limiting internal devices serve to guard it against oligarchic tendencies, to insulate it from contemporary political struggles, and to minimize its policy making potentialities. But if the Court is to provide us with "that symbol of historical continuity which all nations apparently need" (p. 26), it must ground its decisions in wise and intelligent reasons. It must "be not only candid but also *persuasive* in explaining the reasons for the policy judgments it is making" (p. 27).

And how has the Supreme Court measured up under the current Chief Justice and his immediate predecessor? Not very well, according to the author, although the Burger Court fares the better of the two. In those areas that the late Chief Justice considered his most significant contributions to American constitutional development—desegregation, reapportionment and criminal procedure—the author suggests that the opinions in the aggregate not only were devoid of acceptable rationale but lacked political sensitivity and judicial craftsmanship as well. He suggests that Warren's "result oriented" jurisprudence has not even produced the desired results. This is a harsh judgment, deserved to a degree, but perhaps overstated. It is easy to criticize the opinion in *Brown*. It is a sitting duck, and Funston blasts away at the social science jurisprudence used in the opinion, asking what constitutional wonders might be fashioned if the Burger Court were to employ the same method using Arthur Jensen and Richard Herrnstein as authorities. The Burger Court, however, has had to react to the aftermath of *Brown* which called for a creative response of a different nature. While abandoning the concept of "all deliberate speed," it did not, when given the opportunity in *Swann, Milliken* and *Keyes*, answer the crucial question: How much desegregation is enough?

In his chapters on reapportionment and criminal procedure Funston dramatizes the inherent weaknesses in many of the Warren majority's judicial creations and the consequent

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revision or erosion during the Burger years of the Warren precepts. The reapportionment decisions are called "the Warren Court's great success story" (p. 130) in the sense that legislative bodies have been reapportioned substantially on the basis of population, and the present Court, while assuming a more flexible position on mathematical precision than that of its predecessor, has nevertheless insisted on compliance with *Baker* and *Reynolds*. In his examination of criminal procedure the author maintains that the differences between the Warren and Burger Courts do not simply stem from a "dichotomy between conservative and liberal values but from a greater preference on the part of the Burger majority for legislation as the vehicle for policy reform" (p. 208).

If one is looking for some novel insights about the Supreme Court, he will not find them in this book, but the reader *will* find a comprehensive analysis not only of the major judicial innovations of the past quarter century but also of the Court's critics, both hostile and friendly. The author is conversant with virtually all of the literate commentary and does, in fact, rely heavily on the late Alexander Bickel and on Philip Kurland—certainly among the best of our time—in forming his generalizations. He concludes that in the coming years the nation does not need "a wholesale reversal of Warren Court decisions . . . but a refinement of them, a renewal of respect . . . for the Court's limitations and traditional processes, a rebirth of craftsmanship . . . a return to prudence, and retreat from the advanced and untenable position the Warren Court had staked out for itself in the policy-making process" (p. 366). This is a large order in a time of litigation ludicrous in the extreme combined with a voracious mass media that builds lawsuit after lawsuit into a *cause célèbre* before the Supreme Court even begins to hear arguments (witness *Bakke*). But the author has a point, and he makes it boldly and with an acute awareness of the subtle divisions of power in the American system, powers which need to be kept in balance lest the system founder and go the way of great civilizations of the past. At the very end of his career Justice Jackson went to the heart of the matter when he wisely observed in *The Supreme Court in the American System of Government* that he knew of "no modern instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole people from the great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have threatened liberty . . . that the attitude of a society and of its organized political forces, rather than its legal machinery, is the controlling force in the character of free institutions" (pp. 80–81).

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Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court *by Gary J. Jacobsohn. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1977. 214 pp. $12.50.*

Discussions of constitutional interpretation and judicial reasoning often assume the existence of dichotomies. Judges are either restrained or activist. Jurisprudence is mechanical or sociological. Constitutional construction is strict or loose. Plaintiffs are Hohfeldian or non-Hohfeldian. Ranged in adverse relationship are deduction and induction, rules and facts, neutral principles and purposive jurisprudence, formalism and realism, law-finding and law-making, stare decisis and judicial creativity.

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These dualisms are too rigid for the facts of the real judicial world, of course, and have to be qualified by considerations of degree to be usable. But there is also the possibility of inventing principled constructs in the space between these polar opposites, drawing characteristics from each and reconciling irreconcilables. One such effort was George C. Christie's proposal for a model of legal argument that would permit judges to legislate, but only in "a restrained and stylized manner" by concentrating on the "significant differences" between cases (78 *Yale Law Journal* 1311, 1349 [1969]). This book represents a more elaborate attempt to discover a middle way or a third force between judicial formalism and pragmatic jurisprudence, which Gary Jacobsohn calls "judicial statesmanship."

The pragmatic method of justice and the relation between pragmatism and democracy is examined at length. Pragmatism as a philosophy Jacobsohn defines as a systematic approach to solving problems. As a method of justice it challenges the syllogistic process of legal reasoning. "The object of the pragmatists was to establish an empirical jurisprudence that included a consciousness of the moral basis of law" (p. 65). Cardozo and Pound are examined as the most thoughtful and responsible of the pragmatists.

For an illustration of pragmatic jurisprudential principles in action, Jacobsohn selects the doctrine of "one man, one vote." As he sees it, Warren began his decision in *Reynolds v. Sims* with the facts—population variance ratios—and then pragmatically deduced the finding that would "render the immediate problematic situation unproblematic" (p. 112). The dogma of "one man, one vote" resulted, though the author does not contend that there is a necessary connection between pragmatism and dogmatic adjudication.

The alternative to pragmatism is judicial statesmanship. Jacobsohn defines the statesmanlike judge as one who "will adapt the Constitution to changing social realities without altering the meaning of the document. The substantive content of constitutional principle thus remains fixed, but prudence demands that judicial doctrine . . . reflect the social realities of the moment" (p. 17). There was, for example, a statesmanlike alternative in *Reynolds* provided by Stewart's opinion. Stewart agreed with Warren that the Court had a duty to invalidate districting systems that were clearly incompatible with equal protection and due process requirements, but recognized that equal protection might be secured with a variety of representation schemes, of which "one man, one vote" was only one.

A second example of a judicial statesman is the first Justice Harlan. His dissent in *Lochner v. New York* is praised by Jacobsohn in contrast to the much better known dissent of the pragmatist Holmes. Where Holmes would have given carte blanche to the legislature to regulate working hours, Harlan undertook to state the limits of judicial deference, holding state infringement on economic freedoms to a "severe standard of constitutional adequacy," with the judge, not the legislator, in control (p. 30). Another statesman was Chief Justice Hughes, whose opinion in the Minnesota mortgage moratorium case is rated high.

Probably no member of the Court has ever written so profusely about the obligation of judges to be statesmen as Frankfurter, but after devoting two chapters to his pre-Court writings and his judicial performance, Jacobsohn rates Frankfurter an apostle of judicial avoidance, not a statesman.

Jacobsohn provides some relief from Wechsler's "neutral principles." A statesman may

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limit adherence to principles if necessary to secure their survival in the long run. But he must know "when the compromise of principle lapses into the abnegation of principle" (p. 197). Unfortunately, one man's compromise may be another man's abnegation.

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The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest *by Robert Engler. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977. 337 pp $12.50.*

The Evolution of OPEC *Strategy by Fariborz Ghadar. Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath, 1977. 196 pp. $18.00.*

Books about energy often make dull reading. Either writers have specific axes to grind or they get bogged down in technical details that fatigue specialists as well as general readers. Although neither Robert Engler nor Fariborz Ghadar manages to avoid these traps, their books may be recommended to those who want to know about OPEC or the oil companies.

Ghadar presents three case studies, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, to show that the national oil companies (NOCs) in "developing oil-exporting nations" follow a Walt Rostow "stages of growth" model. The obvious criticisms of this model do not deter the author from projecting similar patterns as other countries enter the oil fray. While economists may find the wealth of detail about prices, ownership, refineries, production, taxes, and subsidies useful, political scientists will be more interested in the descriptions of national oil companies, their relationships with governments, other companies, and OPEC as a "transitional entity." Ghadar argues that "the OPEC strategy toward NOCs seems to be indirect" (p. 55), designed to promote intergovernmental agreements that will regulate NOC behavior in the oil industry. His conclusions that this task will become more difficult as additional NOCs enter joint ventures with the oil majors and with consumer nations seems persuasive.

Two questions remain in the reader's mind after reading Ghadar's work. How much of what happened in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia should be attributed to external circumstances or chance occurrence, rather than calculation, as these governments acted to exploit their oil resources? What effect does national culture or tradition have on the NOC as these enterprises move through Ghadar's three stages of growth? These questions are of greater concern to the sociologist than the economist, but indicate how fruitful scholarly collaboration might proceed in the future.

Robert Engler writes from a quite different perspective. As a political scientist he is chiefly concerned with power and influence in the energy world. The profit motive so dominates "oildom" that American national interests have been manipulated, Engler asserts. Understandably, he is outraged at instances of bribery, distortion of reserves, false advertising, and oil companies' attempts to monopolize coal and uranium markets. Yet he glosses over some of the real obstacles to the development of alternative sources to oil. Huge amounts of capital are needed, both private and public investment are required.

Engler uses a variety of sources to document his views, ranging from company reports

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to federal legislation. He is very skillful in deducing intent from the verbiage that the companies and the government agencies pour forth to justify their legitimate and not so legitimate activities. His analysis of the role of oil in American domestic politics, especially on the rising fortunes of politicians like Johnson, Nixon, and Connally is masterful. Engler's discussion of such foreign policy ventures as the Cuban blockade, Middle East arms races, and the Vietnam War is less convincing because it is too narrow.

Engler reserves his most biting criticism of the oil companies for the last part of his book. In demanding "democratic planning" of resources and technology, he insists that: "Ending corporate secrecy, whether masked as national security, proprietary rights, or technological readiness, becomes a step forward toward a responsible economy. But it is not one to settle for. There is no need to exaggerate the factors of information and expertise" (p. 219). Sensible as this judgment may be, it overlooks any disinterested contribution the companies may have made to the public debate in years past. Consistently, Engler fails to acknowledge that, along with the companies' liabilities have come advantages, for example, the post-war economic resurgence of Japan, Western Europe, and America. Moreover, his diatribe against the companies seems somewhat dated in view of the rise of OPEC as a prime actor in energy politics since 1973.

Whatever their faults, Ghadar and Engler present important subjects in decent prose. For that, scholars and policy makers should be grateful as they scour the uneven literature.

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Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis *by Rajeshwar Dayal. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976. 335 pp. $17.50.*

The abortive invasion of the Zairean province of Shaba (Katanga) last spring has revived memories of the Congo crisis of 1960–1963, of the United Nations operation in the Congo, and of Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the organization from 1953 to 1961. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian diplomat who was Hammarskjold's special representative in the Congo from September 1960 to May 1961, has now produced a personal account of some of those chaotic days, which stretched the flimsy fabric of United Nations peace keeping to the breaking point. His story runs four months past his own involvement, to cover the Katanga episode of September 1961, in which Hammarskjold lost his life.

Dayal's account begins with his appointment as the head of the Congo operation, in succession to Ralph J. Bunche and Andrew Cordier. On arrival in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) on September 5, 1960, he was plunged into the constitutional crisis caused by President Kasavubu's dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba, followed by Lumumba's attempt to unseat Kasavubu. Dayal dissociates himself from Cordier's decision to close the airports and the radio station temporarily, an action which in retrospect is seen to have helped Kasavubu. Dayal makes it clear, however, that Cordier acted in good faith in an attempt to maintain law and order and prevent large scale civil strife. Hammarskjold considered the closure to have been a mistake, but in typical fashion he publicly shouldered responsibility for it.

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There followed months of deepening and spreading chaos, which the United Nations forces had neither the authority nor the strength to quell, since they were forbidden by their mandate to take sides in internal political disputes. Meanwhile, political forces, especially external ones, were at work which sought to divert the United Nations operation from its policy of impartiality and reconciliation. Dayal paints a Breughel-like panorama of inexperienced or venal men acting in erratic, corrupt, or even suicidal ways. He might, it seems to us, have taken greater advantage of hindsight to sort out more clearly the political and economic forces that were pulling strings in the background.

Hammarskjold is shown throughout as a firm guide, wise counsellor, and faithful friend, whose instructions were invariably based on clear insight into the political and military dynamics of the situation. However, Hammarskjold found himself battling for political survival in New York, where the chaos was more legalistic and rhetorical but no less serious than in the Congo.

The erratic figure in the story was Patrice Lumumba himself, who despite his abilities was quite incapable of distinguishing between the feasible and unfeasible, and between friend and foe—fatal flaws in any political leader. Determined to end the secession of Katanga by the use of force, he could not grasp the potentialities of Hammarskjold's peaceful approach, or accept that the United Nations Force was not in the Congo as an arm of the government and was in no position, legally or militarily, to conquer Katanga for him. Rebuffed by the African foreign ministers, who urged him to act through the United Nations, Lumumba launched his unruly mob of an army against Katanga. The troops promptly got bogged down midway in Kasai, fell on the unfortunate Baluba tribe, and butchered them. This turned the Baluba into deadly foes of Lumumba and played a major part in his subsequent capture and death.

For a short time during the second half of September 1960, U.N. efforts at reconciliation between Lumumba and Kasavubu were on the verge of success. Lumumba wrote to Dayal thanking him profusely and promising cooperation. The conciliation scheme collapsed when both Kasavubu and Mobutu, the army chief, reneged. Dayal lets it be clearly understood that "sinister influences" (p. 88) originating in the Western embassies were working on Kasavubu, one of the least attractive of this book's cast of characters. The embassies were opposed to reconciliation, since they had persuaded themselves, on the basis of scant evidence, that Lumumba was a Communist agent. It took the Kennedy administration "many vital months," Dayal writes, to evolve a coherent policy toward the Congo, and not until Hammarskjold's death did it give firm support to the United Nations (p. 121).

Like Brian Urquhart's definitive study of Hammarskjold (Knopf, 1972), whose account he often parallels in striking ways, Dayal demolishes the widespread canard that the United Nations in the Congo was somehow responsible for Lumumba's assassination. He cites incident after incident when the United Nations troops, often against great odds, saved Lumumba from his Congolese foes, and from his own mistakes. He had been warned and fully understood that if he left his United Nations-protected house, ONUC troops would not be in a position to defend him by force against government troops. Indeed, he did not ask for United Nations assistance or protection on leaving Leopoldville. As so often in the past, Lumumba overestimated his magnetic powers over the populace and underestimated the determination of his foes to do him in. When held in captivity, he

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refused Kasavubu's offer of a ministerial post, whereupon the president, his Congolese associates, and Belgian advisers delivered him to his enemies in Katanga, to be slaughtered.

However tragic the murder of Lumumba and of his associates, it had the effect of galvanizing the United Nations into heeding Hammarskjold's demand for a revision of the hitherto accepted theory of peace-keeping, which prohibited initiatives in the use of force and required peace to be maintained by the symbolism of the United Nations presence. On February 21, 1961, the Security Council substantially strengthened the mandate, authorizing the use of force as a last resort to prevent civil war and to remove mercenaries and other foreign elements.

In the end, it turned out that Hammarskjold had been following the right policy all along. The national conciliation that he and Dayal sought (often frustrated by interference from both sides of the cold war) was in fact achieved shortly after Dayal's resignation—for which, he makes it clear, the Western powers, then banking on Kasavubu, were largely responsible. In July 1961, the Congolese parliament was reconvened under United Nations protection and on August 2, a new prime minister, Cyrille Adoula, was chosen, effectively neutralizing Kasavubu and clearing the way to dealing vigorously with the secession of Katanga. It is only sad that tragedy had to strike again, with the death of Hammarskjold on his mission of peace in September 1961, before the United Nations could complete the task of peace keeping in the Congo.

The late Ralph J. Bunche, who after Hammarskjold's death assumed responsibility for the Congo operation, liked to call it the most successful United Nations effort of its kind. It had safeguarded the unity of a country that was on the point of disintegration, tribal strife, and foreign-supported secession; it neutralized the dangers of foreign interference; it restored a functioning administrative, judicial, educational, and communication system, and subsequently chanelled vast economic development assistance into the country.

Mr. Dayal's book gives a taut and often illuminating account of his eight-month mission, emphasizing the close and confiding relationship that prevailed between himself and Hammarskjold. His is by no means the last word on the subject, since many of the decisive events in the Congo crisis occurred after Dayal was obliged to leave his post. But he has made an important contribution to the understanding of peace keeping and crisis politics, at the United Nations and in the field.

GEORGE L. SHERRY
*United Nations**

* The opinions expressed in this review are those of the reviewer and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Science, Technology and Society: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective *edited by Ina Spiegel-Rösing and Derek de Solla Price. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1977. 607 pp. $29.95.*

Especially in the social sciences, but also to some extent even in physics and biology, social problems are one of the important sources of new disciplines and specialties. Social problems, of course, are not necessarily new social phenomena; they may be that in part;

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but often they are just very old and persistent phenomena, like poverty, that some significant sections of the public have come to define as bad and in need of reform. So it has been with the social science of science, the discipline or set of specialties that includes the sociology of science, science policy studies, the economics of science and technology, and the politics of science. Since World War II, science has been a social problem, a social concern that has helped to define intellectual problems, to provide research resources, and to recruit a small but very able group of researchers whom the East Europeans call "scientists of science." Science has become a social problem for at least two general reasons. Countries all over the world have learned about the enormous power of science for good, and want more or better science. But science has caused unexpected and sometimes untoward social consequences over which these same countries want more control. For both reasons, nations everywhere have encouraged and supported the social science of science in all its forms. The not unusual result has been an outpouring of theory and research. The Society for the Social Study of Science, founded in 1975 and composed primarily but not entirely of Americans, already has more than 500 members and holds annual meetings.

Derek Price, one of the leading scholars in this field, and his co-editor, the German scholar Ina Spiegel-Rösing, have produced the first "cross-disciplinary" encyclopedia of knowledge in this field. Made up of essays by seventeen contributors from nine different countries, West and East, North and South, each chapter includes a valuable comprehensive bibliography. In addition to the usual index at the back of the book, the editors have provided detailed cross-referencing in each chapter to relevant sections of other chapters.

The editors have been successful in obtaining leading specialists to contribute. For example, Jean-Jacques Salomon of OECD on "Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy"; Sanford Lakoff on "Science Policy Studies: The Policy Perspective"; Dorothy Nelkin on "Technology and Public Policy"; Harvey M. Sapolsky on "Science, Technology and Military Policy"; and Eugene B. Skolnikoff on "Science, Technology and the International System." The sociology of science is somewhat skimped by comparison, except for a good piece by Michael Mulkay of York University. Edwin Layton has a fine critical summary of scholarship on "The Conditions of Technological Development." Christopher Freeman of Sussex discusses "The Economics of Research and Development" and Roy MacLeod's "Changing Perspectives in the Social History of Science" is exceptionally interesting. J. R. Ravetz deals with "Criticisms of Science" in a knowledgeable and sympathetic way. Spiegel-Rösing rounds out the encyclopedia with an overview of the field in "The Study of Science, Technology and Society (SSTS): Recent Trends and Future Challenges."

This is an excellent reference work for those who want to know where the social science of science now stands. It has its limitations, of course. Mulkay's essay on the sociology of science will not, especially in its discussion of values and norms in science, please all American sociologists of science, especially those who work in what Mulkay and other anti-Mertonians call "the Mertonian paradigm." And the good essay on "Science Policy and Developing Countries" by Ziavddin Sardar and Dawvd Rosser-Owen of the Muslim Institute in London lapses into pro-Arabism, which will seem out of place to some in an otherwise highly scholarly volume.

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For all their weakness, the social sciences do progress, in theory, in methodology, and in substantive knowledge. As they progress, they more and more need these periodical and even annual review volumes. For the social science of science, the Price-Spiegel-Rösing volume is a valuable example of this review volume species.

BERNARD BARBER
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Columbia University

Beyond the Crisis *edited by Norman Birnbaum. New York, Oxford University Press, 1977. 232 pp. $11.95.*

Six prominent sociologists—two Americans, two Frenchmen, one German and one Yugoslav—spent nearly three years discussing the crisis of modern society under the sponsorship of the Agnelli Foundation; this volume presents the result of their deliberations. The mountains labored and produced a measly mouse.

Good sentiments, André Gide used to say, make bad literature. On the evidence of this volume, his judgment also applies to the social sciences. Five of the authors argue from an ideological position that seems appealing. They oppose technocracy, undue centralization, repression and bureaucratization in the economy and the polity. They favor human autonomy, the liberation of the self, respect for the natural environment, and cultural creativity. But to bolster these elevated sentiments, all they provide is unsupported assertions, banalities, and clichés dressed up in a spicy sauce of continental chic. The ratio of verbiage to information or novel ideas is unacceptably high.

The German sociologist Hans Peter Dreitzel contributes an essay entitled "On the Political Meaning of Culture" that reads like an unintentional parody of New Left ideas of the 1960s. He calls on Norman O. Brown, Marcuse, Habermas, antinuclear ideologists, defenders of the natural environment and of communal lifestyle, on all of them and many more, to contribute their mite to his thin soup of the received ideas of yesteryear. Dreitzel moves from assertion to assertion, never bothering to provide even a shred of documentation. "A system of political power," he writes, for example, "is but the expression of the relations of production" (p. 89). Really? His native Germany moved from parliamentary democracy to fascist dictatorship and back to parliamentary democracy in thirty short years; what changes in the relations of production did this entail?

Dreitzel's paper, though cliché ridden, stays within the limits of rational discourse. Serge Moscovici, who teaches social psychology at the Sorbonne, is instead given to vatic pronouncements in "The Reenchantment of the World." "Only when productivity is abolished," he states, "will we see the death of frantic competition" (p. 155). He wishes, one gathers, to return to nature and so make fragmented man whole again. "We call for a society which is pro nature and thus freed from its greatest fear" (p. 150). Individuals, he argues, "must liberate [themselves] through their bodies, welcoming as perfection their possession and expression" (pp. 163–4). "For the collectivity," on the other hand, "the goal is ethnicity" (p. 164). In the "struggle for nature" (p. 146), we must "untame life" (p. 161).

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Moscovici's Sorbonne colleague, Alain Touraine, in "Crisis or Transformation," writes in a more restrained style, but he is so vague and wooly that it is hard to fathom his meaning. He foresees large-scale social conflicts and confrontations in both capitalist and state socialist societies, but feels that these will no longer be economic in nature. What they will be remains unclear. "We are entering class struggles without real classes, class heritage, or transcendental stakes—whether religious, political, or economic" (pp. 41–42). Everything can be changed through action, he concludes triumphantly—and vacuously.

Rudi Supek, the leader of the Yugoslav *Praxis* group which has courageously criticized the drift of Yugoslav society into a technocratic, bureaucratized, and administered order, here argues in "The Visible Hand and the Degradation of Individuality" for a return to the original vision of Marx. He wishes to bring about a society of unalienated associated producers regulating their lives autonomously and with respect for human dignity. All this has been said many times before, but maybe it is worth repeating.

Norman Birnbaum, in "On the Possibility of a New Politics in the East," argues for a renewal of the socialist vision in Europe and America. He aligns his arguments with his accustomed clarity and style, but although I happen to agree with much of what he has to say, I have learned nothing new from this paper.

Richard Sennett's essay, "Destructive Gemeinschaft," belongs in completely different company because of its philosophical orientation. The author shares none of the conceits of the other contributors. In fact, their shibboleths are largely his critical targets. He argues that the lifting of the repressions of nineteenth century society, far from having led to liberation, has created new forms of psychic distress and narcissistic self-absorption. The quest for intimacy and "openness" has replaced the earlier quest for privacy, but the untrammeled sexuality of the present, having replaced the eroticism of old, has been allotted burdens of self-definition and self-revelation that it simply cannot bear. A *Gemeinschaft* built on the quest for the imperial self is destructive. In total disagreement with the other contributors, Sennett ends his essay by stating, "I haven't much hope . . . that people can use their intimate experiences as a model for rebuilding society, but rather I think that a new kind of *Gesellschaft* will have to be built in order to change the destructiveness of intimate relations" (p. 197). This brilliant, controversial, and highly stimulating essay, I was about to say, is worth the price of admission. But $11.95 is, after all, too steep a price.

LEWIS A. COSER
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Interpretations of Fascism *by Renzo De Felice. Tr. by Brenda Huff Everett. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977. 298 pp. $15.00.*

Renzo De Felice is perhaps the most prolific of all contemporary historians of modern Italy and is certainly the outstanding student of Italian Fascism. To date he has written or edited at least twenty-one volumes, his masterpiece being the massive six-volume biography of Mussolini, of which four volumes had been published by 1974. By the late 1960s he had been inevitably drawn into the burgeoning international "fascism debate"

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among historians and political scientists, to which his first major contribution was this volume, originally published in Italian in 1969 and now the first of De Felice's books to be translated into English.

Interpretations of Fascism is primarily composed of two parts: a section on the general interpretations from the 1920s to the 1960s that sought to explain comparative or "generic" fascism, and a section on specifically Italian explanations of Italian fascism, though, as De Felice recognizes, there is a certain amount of overlap between the two. When it was first brought out in Italian, this book stood almost alone as an exposition and analysis of the various theories that sought to explain fascism, though since that time A. James Gregor's book of the same title in English has covered much of the same ground and in certain respects gone beyond it. It should be noted that De Felice followed this book with a massive anthology and commentary, *Il fascismo: Le interpretazioni dei contemporanei e degli storici*, that constitutes the most thorough presentation of classic doctrines about fascism that has been published in any language. Due to its length (702 pages), this second book is not likely to appear in English.

De Felice does not doubt the existence of an historical phenomenon that can be defined as generic fascism, but he believes that much more care should be exercised in its definition and that it is important to recognize the differences between varieties of fascism, especially between Italian Fascism proper and German National Socialism. He would also limit the category to Europe between the world wars, and doubts the feasibility of such constructs as "Latin American fascism" or "Third World fascism," since the political, social and ideological phenomena referred to differ so greatly.

Near the outset De Felice tries to establish a kind of working definition as to what is meant by fascism but the typology that he proposes as an expanded alternative to Ernst Nolte's "fascist minimum" is not entirely satisfactory, managing to be at one and the same time both complex and vague. De Felice has no set overarching interpretation of his own to offer, and finds much to criticize in such standard theories as the classic Marxist interpretation, the concept of fascism as the inevitable product of specific countries and single-factor social scientistic explanations.

Not surprisingly, he is most at home in Italian interpretations of Italian Fascism, and comes closest to endorsing Luigi Salvatorelli's *Nazionalfascismo* of 1923, which interpreted the Mussolini movement as the special product of the ideas and political and socioeconomic changes produced by the World War I crisis. Salvatorelli saw Italian Fascism as the political vehicle of radical national sectors of the lower middle classes—not of the bourgeoisie as Marxists would have had it—and this tends to correspond with De Felice's own approach.

De Felice was perhaps the first major scholar to distinguish between Italian Fascism as a movement and as a regime—the former to some extent a revolutionary and a liberating force, the latter different in character, authoritarian, repressive and in some respects quite conservative. During the past three years he has become the subject of enormous controversy in Italian cultural and political circles, primarily for two reasons. Volume four of his Mussolini biography, published in 1974, was subtitled "The Years of Consensus, 1929–1936," a conclusion anathema to the prevailing leftist interpretations. Soon afterward, the American historian Michael Ledeen published a brief book of interviews with De Felice, *Intervista sul fascismo* (Bari: Laterza, 1975), which enabled the latter to ex-

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pound his own interpretation of Italian Fascism at greater length. His suggestions that it was not primarily a reactionary or antimodern force, but related to the main radical west European ideas derived from the Enlightenment drew howls of rage from Italy's predominantly Marxist intelligentsia.

Interpretations of Fascism is no longer so original a book as when it was first published in 1969, but parts of it retain their utility and it will still be an important reference for students of fascism and twentieth century radical movements.

STANLEY G. PAYNE
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat *by Albert Parry. New York, The Vanguard Press, 1976. 624 pp. $17.50.*

This lengthy study of terrorism by Albert Parry contains a useful historical summary of the major campaigns of "left-wing" terrorism carried out during the 1960s and early '70s (pp. 244–487). Unfortunately, this is the limit of the book's usefulness; as analysis, *Terrorism: From Robespierre to Arafat* is neither coherent nor credible.

Professor Parry's intense dislike of terrorism leads him, initially, to deny that it is a form of political violence. Thus he defines terror variously as rationalized rage (p. 18), religious fanaticism (p. 19), insanity (p. 23), criminality (p. 33), and sheer "lust for violence" (p. 34). On the other hand, his equally intense repugnance for social revolution leads him to equate terrorism with Marxism and Leninism. Brushing aside distinctions between individual or small-group terrorism (which Lenin opposed), revolutionary terror (which Lenin advocated), and state terror (which Lenin opposed, but may unwittingly have fostered), Professor Parry lays all forms of political violence which he dislikes at the feet of "Lenin: High Priest of Terror" (pp. 131 *et seq.*).

At this point, analysis sinks beneath the waves of polemic. Professor Parry apparently feels that virtually every lunatic who calls himself a "Marxist-Leninist" is one, and views Marxism-Leninism as little more than an ideological mask for insanity, criminality, and power-lust. Obviously, this perspective precludes even a reasoned polemic against the Left. Instead, we are informed that Lenin was brain-damaged and emitted "thought waves of hatred," (pp. 31–32, 161 *et seq.*), that Stalin exiled and killed Trotsky for purely "personal" reasons (p. 184), that the Nazis learned the techniques of terror and genocide "mostly from Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin" (p. 203), and so forth. The author's lumping together of small-group terrorism, mass revolutionary violence, and totalitarian state terror makes it impossible for him to ask, much less answer, significant questions about the relationship of political violence to political change. *Is* "heroic" small-group terror "revolutionary"? *Does* revolution necessarily lead to state terror? These are questions worth exploring, but Professor Parry evidently believes the answers to be self-evident. His obsession with "left-wing" violence leads him to slight or ignore other sources of terror (in particular, the tradition of nationalist terrorism). Eighteen pages, in a book of 624 pages, are devoted to "right-wing terror" (pp. 488–515), and of state terror by respectable Western nations there is hardly a word. The American terror in Indochina is accorded three pages of

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discussion (pp. 417–420), principally a defense of United States actions in Southeast Asia, while Israeli violence against the Palestinians is dismissed in one page as "determined counterterror" (p. 466). Indeed, so intent is the author on identifying terrorism with socialism that, in his view, the Irish Republican Army Provisional Wing consists of "left-Socialists" rather than religious or cultural nationalists (p. 380).

Not surprisingly, the book ends on a sour, almost despairing note: since elimination of the causes of terrorism is impossible, Western nations must attempt to "control" it by dealing harshly with terrorists and their allies. Professor Parry is no friend of right-wing dictatorships, but to him the terrorist is public enemy number one. Why has there been so little terrorism, relatively speaking, in the United States? Is a new wave of small-group violence predictable here? One will *not* find the answers to such questions in this book which, like so many others on the same subject, substitutes denunciation for analysis.

RICHARD LIBMAN-RUBENSTEIN
Roosevelt University

The Totalitarian Temptation *by Jean-François Revel. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday and Co., 1977. 311 pp. $8.95.*

Revel states his general argument as follows: "The world today is evolving toward socialism. The main obstacle to socialism is not capitalism but communism. The socialist society of the future can only be worldwide and it can only be brought about at the cost, if not of the abolition of nation-states, at least of their subordination to a global political order" (p. 15).

Although he says that "no definition is needed," he terms socialist a system which "subordinates the economy to the needs of the greatest number, but *without ceasing to improve the economy*" (p. 18). Communism he identifies with both Stalinism and totalitarianism, hence as antisocialism. The problem then becomes to explain the appeal of communism.

Some people, Revel claims, are simply in "ignorance of Communist regimes," and so see communism "as the opposite of the faults of the society in which they are living" (p. 29). Likewise the "underdeveloped economies, hatred of foreign domination, and the lack of any experience of democratic pluralism" helps to explain the totalitarian tendencies of the third world (p. 30). But "it is far harder to understand why the case of Stalinism should find favor in developed, well-informed civilizations, and particularly among the most prosperous and informed classes of those civilizations" (p. 31). A number of partial understandings are then advanced, two of which are of critical significance. On the one hand, social democratic reform has "lost faith in itself as the only true leftist movement," and therefore "fails to articulate a creative criticism of the Communists" (p. 37). On the other, "the totalitarian temptation is really driven by a hatred on principle of industrial, commercial civilization . . ." (p. 263). It blinds itself equally to the vices of communism and virtues of capitalism because it presupposes that "money is sinful, the root of all evil; and if freedom was born of economic development, then it too suffers from that original sin" (p. 263). It is not, however, money which is the capitalist sin, but

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rather the political organization of capitalism in nation-state form. "Capitalism has produced an obsession . . . with being the most or least 'advanced' nation" (p. 266). The subordination of a national population to the goal of becoming an advanced nation, as well as the imperialist tendency of capitalism, derive from the "egotistical" or invidious quality of the nation-state (p. 251). Consequently, social democratic reform which avoids the Scylla of communism and the Charybdis of statism is the only possible passage to socialism. Not surprisingly, therefore, Revel thought of giving his book the "didactic" title: "Of the Inevitable Advance of Stalinism in the World and the Sure Failure of the Efforts That Will Be Made to Oppose It" (p. 285). So much for a future "without Marx or Jesus."

In other words, this is trivial, pop-journalistic reformism, a thinly disguised defense of capitalism. It takes serious issues and reduces them to their most banal forms. The relation of reform to revolution is a serious issue, as is the relation of the nation-state to an increasingly transnational, world economic system. The psychology of totalitarian adherency is likewise an important subject. Moreover, it is possible to write intelligently on these and the other topics which appear in this book from differing political perspectives. One learns a great deal, after all, from a discerning political opponent. But Revel has learned only the elementary lessons taught by his friends and foes, and therefore has little to teach us.

EUGENE VICTOR WOLFENSTEIN
University of California, Los Angeles

Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition *by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 273 pp. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $5.95.*

Since Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's initial work on transnational relations in 1971, their analysis has developed from a *description* of the elements of an interdependent political system, one in which nonstate actors and government bureaucracies were increasingly important in international affairs, to a *theoretical* treatment of the consequences of complex interdependence for political leadership and regime maintenance and change.

In *Power and Interdependence* they develop four models to explain "regimes," that is, the rules of the game governing decision making and operations in international relations on particular problems, like money, or between specified countries, like Canada and the United States. Each model has different predictions about regime stability, the likely instruments of state power, agenda formation, and issue linkage. In the "economic process" model regimes reflect efforts to maximize economic gains, and states shift policies to match economic dynamics. The "structural" model argues that the international distribution of power (and thus the dominant powers) shapes the regime's workings and contents. This approach is modified in the "issue structural" model which suggests that the fit between the power balance specific to a given issue and the overall global power configu-

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ration determines regimes. In the "international organization" model transnational networks and particular bargaining tactics dominate regime operations.

Using the histories of monetary and ocean regimes and American relations with Canada and Australia, Keohane and Nye conclude that, as complex interdependence increases, the saliency of issue structural and international organizational models rises. And complex interdependence occurs when the use of force is a negligible factor; there is no clear hierarchy among state goals; and states have very numerous channels of contact. While warning that no unilinear trend toward complex interdependence exists, they argue that its increase means that the United States must seek more collective leadership arrangements to cope with world problems and emphasize positive-sum strategies for coordinating all major actors.

This brief synopsis omits many important hypotheses developed in the book. But it does suggest the book's importance, richness, ingenuity, and care in presenting competing explanations. It is also well written. In short, it is a major contribution to the literature. Nonetheless, I have three reservations about the work.

First, the study's tests of rival models are sometimes unsatisfactory. For example, it argues that a structural model that predicts influence within regimes should conform to the international structure. I doubt this. A structural prediction would argue that influence within regimes should conform to structure *if* the issue is highly salient to the top powers. And issues are salient *only* if they appear to threaten fundamental security or prosperity. Thus most ocean space issues may not be vital to the United States while international monetary anarchy may be, thereby explaining the latter's closer conformity to a structural model.

Second, one can challenge the authors' idea of regime by examining their conceptualization of a "non-regime." (The concept of "quasi-regime" is treated too briefly to be useful.) Keohane and Nye argue that abandonment of substantial compliance with existing rules without major agreement on new rules, like resort to *de facto* floating rates from 1971 to 1975, constitutes a "non-regime." This implicitly suggests that stable, cooperative positive-sum games exhaust the regime category. But this fails to capture a large set of cases, including the monetary situation just mentioned, involving games with limited cooperation in the form of consultation and commitment to avoid serious crisis. Put differently, the regime concept covers only strong cooperation and thus does not illuminate limited ordering arrangements so common to international politics. And this limit leads to a third difficulty.

The ultimate question confronting grand theory's necessary simplification of reality is "why is the theory needed?" The initial justification here seems compelling, the need to clarify the consequences of complex interdependence. But then one wonders whether "regime" is a useful organizing concept for this purpose. Knowing that a regime exists tells little *theoretically* about the consequences for the actual management of a given economic or technological problem. Knowing it exists under complex interdependence helps only if one has confidence in predictions about the effects of interdependence on agenda setting or issue linkage or leadership. Unfortunately, this may be the weakest part of the case because the particular rules and mechanics of regimes make the general predictions very fragile guides.

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Correction of these problems will require considerable reworking of the theory. Few books are intellectually powerful enough to enrich a field by serving as a target for criticism and correction. This is one of them.

PETER F. COWHEY
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Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment *by Irving Janis and Leon Mann. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 488 pp. $15.95.*

This is a disappointing yet worthwhile book. Disappointing because it is wordy, is difficult to apply to political decision making, and because it fails to address many important questions; worthwhile (especially the first four chapters) because it is one of the few books to pull together much of the research in this area, to present a thought-provoking model, and to focus on the question of the conditions under which various thinking processes (for example, defensive avoidance) occur rather than to take the less satisfactory approach of seeking unconditional and unbounded generalizations.

The authors isolate four defective patterns of coping with information that is discrepant with prevailing belief and policies—unconflicted inertia, unconflicted change to a new course of action, defensive avoidance of the implications of the information, hypervigilance (panic)—and one effective coping pattern—vigilance (thorough search for information, careful consideration of relevant factors, and thoughtful weighing of alternatives). It is quite probable that these patterns are distinct, but there remains a disturbing element of subjectivity in determining how any given decision should be classified. I also suspect that many cases may fall on the borderlines.

In what is probably their most important contribution, Janis and Mann argue that the five patterns are associated with different answers that the person gives to a series of questions. If he feels there are no serious risks from his current policy, he will respond by unconflicted inertia. If he feels there are risks in continuing, but none in adopting a new policy, he will change without experiencing conflict. If he feels the current policy is failing, but no alternative is available, he will cope by defensive avoidance. If he thinks there may be a good alternative but lacks time to search for it, he will be hypervigilant. Only if he sees risks in both his present policy and the obvious alternative to it, believes there is a superior course of action, and has sufficient time to think, will he be properly vigilant. This conflict model, as the authors call it, incorporates the first two stages of a five stage model of decision making, the last stages being the weighing of the alternatives, deliberating about commitment, and adhering to the decision in the face of setbacks.

Although these models can help us understand some decisions, there are several problems. First, the authors do not present convincing evidence that most decisions follow the stages they set forth. They acknowledge that the sequence is not "an ironclad law," but rather "a useful framework," (p. 178) yet little of their later analysis depends on it. Most important is their argument that the impact of discrepant information varies as the decision maker progresses through the decision-making process (pp. 180–1, 212–15), but

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the authors offer little evidence in support of this argument. Second, the conflict model treats as objective the answers to the crucial questions of whether the policy is failing, whether there are serious risks in the alternative policy contemplated, whether it is realistic to hope for a better solution, and whether there is time available to search and deliberate. It is the answers to these questions that determine the coping pattern followed, but the authors tell us little about how people answer them. Sometimes the answers may be self-evident. But often they will not be. One person may see a risk in maintaining current policies where another does not. One statesman may think there is nothing he can do to make a situation better where another will think an effective policy can be discovered, adopted, and implemented. Unless we can specify how and why people answer the questions as they do, the dependent and independent variables will be too close to each other. In such circumstances we cannot predict the coping mode people will adopt, or move beyond fairly obvious claims (for example, that a person who sees no risk in continuing his policy will respond with unconflicted inertia), or verify the theory (the correlations between the two variables may be spurious). The authors note that the "knowledge about various antecedent conditions" that influence the answers to the questions "is still very primitive" (p. 72), but they do not seem to see how much this problem weakens their arguments.

The authors conclude with suggestions for improving the quality of decisions. Some, especially the "awareness or rationalizations" and the "emotional role playing" techniques, are designed for aiding a person who knows what he should do (for example, stop smoking, lose weight) but cannot muster the will power to act. Of more relevance in most political situations are the ideas that decision makers should employ systematic balance sheets of the pros and cons of alternative actions and develop procedures to discourage collusive defensive avoidance in group decision making. But one can doubt whether these would be the most effective ways to improve the process and indeed whether anything could be done that would be highly beneficial.

ROBERT L. JERVIS
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The Superpowers and Their Spheres of Influence: The United States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America *by Edy Kaufman. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1977. 208 pp. $16.95.*

This is a study of comparative dependency. Latin America and Eastern Europe are here analyzed in terms of their penetration by the dominant powers in their respective regions, the United States and the Soviet Union. The author is searching for "general principles of behavior" common to the two dependent subsystems. What are the rules of the game the two superpowers play? How different—or similar—are these rules? What is the difference—and similarity—between, say, the two dominant doctrines, Monroe's and Brezhnev's?

The first part of the book attempts to explain why penetrated states behave the way

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they do. What makes them different from nonpenetrated states on international, regional, and individual levels? The second part focuses on the superpowers' behavior within their regional groupings, vis-à-vis each other, as well as toward the other's region. The author's broad preliminary conclusions (he treats them as working hypotheses) stipulate that penetrated countries display more restricted behavior in the international system than nonpenetrated countries; that multipolarity there is less effective than elsewhere; that external variables explain more than internal variables; that superpowers tend to be more rigid toward their own region (and the region of the other superpower) than toward the rest of the world; that the superpowers' behavior in their regions is directly related to their political structures and ideologies; and that they both wish to maintain their monopoly of control. While the Soviet Union insists on "discipline and docility" in Eastern Europe, Washington's effective control is more "subtly expressed to permit profit and earnings for U.S. investors." Deviant cases—Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania, Cuba and Peru—do not show a direct relationship: while the penetrated countries do not necessarily face a prisoner's dilemma, as the deviant cases show, chances of others following their example are limited. They are the exceptions, not the rule. Costs are still high.

This is a novel undertaking, and all the frustrated dependency theories wish the author well. Unfortunately, their frustration is relieved by *Superpowers and Their Spheres of Influence* only in part. As the author himself points out, much remains to be done. What are the indicators of dependency? Which are the significant regularities of dependency beyond those broad, intuitive ones introduced and examined in the book? What factors increase or diminish dependency? What are the actual constraints on national autonomy of the penetrated states at any given time? And what is the dependency a primary function of? Economy? Security? Both? Other issues?

There are many useful tables in the volume and the bibliography is adequate.

JAN TRISKA
Stanford University

President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics *by Douglas Kinnard. Lexington, Ky., The University Press of Kentucky, 1977. 169 pp. $13.75.*

This brief book will appeal to historians of the Eisenhower presidency and to scholars interested in the formulation of national strategic policy. Douglas Kinnard, a political scientist by training, has made effective use of historical sources. He has read widely in the primary and secondary literature and in the public documents of the Eisenhower period, and has utilized numerous oral history transcripts and manuscript collections. Kinnard has also enjoyed special access to internal memoranda of conferences at which the president and leading Defense Department and military officials shaped American strategic policy. The result is a solid, straightforward account of the evolution of New Look strategic policy from 1953 through 1959. The author stops at 1960 because thereafter "defense issues . . . merged with the rhetoric of the 1960 election campaign, and that is another story" (p. xi).

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Kinnard disagrees with certain of the stereotyped views of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and joins the growing group of scholars who emphasize the strength and purposefulness of his presidential leadership. In this study Eisenhower emerges as a president who dominated the generals and Pentagon officials with whom he dealt; indeed, among military and Defense Department figures, only Admiral Arthur Radford is credited with having much influence over Eisenhower's security policy. In the cabinet, Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles appear to have had the president's ear, but Dulles's influence was limited. Refuting the "mythology" that Dulles controlled foreign policy in the 1950s, Kinnard cites the secretary of state's lack of involvement in military matters, which so strongly affected foreign policy. Kinnard's evidence also suggests that Eisenhower made decisions in a personal and political way and did not depend on staff or formal groups. Contrary to the myth of Eisenhower's "staff presidency," the author asserts that at least in national security affairs administration decisions grew out of "sessions in the president's office with ad hoc groups" (p. 65). The National Security Council, for example, was used "as a coordinating device and as a forum to announce decisions, rather than to make them" (p. 17). Also interesting is the implication that Eisenhower may not have been so sanguine as he is usually portrayed as being—or so dovish—about the possibility of using nuclear weapons; Kinnard cites one private meeting wherein the chief executive remarked that it was "fatuous" to believe the United States would not use "atomics" in the next war (p. 54).

Less surprising are the author's emphasis on Eisenhower's consistent adherence to the principle of a balanced budget, and his contention that budget considerations determined the New Look policy. "This differs," says Kinnard, "from the accepted textbook notion that the defense budget was developed to support a strategic policy developed in the National Security Council" (p. 56). To support this thesis, he carefully describes the annual congressional-executive confrontations over the budget and their connection to strategic policy.

For all the light he sheds on Eisenhower's methods, perhaps Kinnard should not have concentrated quite so exclusively on the president's personal role. Larger political forces that helped to shape policy go virtually unexamined. While it is probably correct to imply that Congress played little part in the formulation of strategic policy during the 1950s, the author might have followed the example of Huntington and others and paid more attention to the nexus of competing interests within the executive bureaucracy and the armed services.

On balance, this informative book succeeds in describing the important connection between budgetary and strategic considerations and offers useful insights into the Eisenhower presidency. If the broad outline of Kinnard's story is familiar, nevertheless it is told well and grounded in careful and thorough research.

GARY W. REICHARD
The Ohio State University

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The War Managers *by Douglas Kinnard. Hanover, N.H., The University Press of New England, 1977. 216 pp. $14.00.*

Authors are always unhappy when reviewers suggest that they should have written different books, but surely Douglas Kinnard, a retired Army brigadier general with two tours of duty in Vietnam and a Ph.D. in politics from Princeton, currently on the faculty of the University of Vermont, could have produced a more ambitious work.

For the most part, *The War Managers* consists of a report on the results of a survey sent out by Kinnard in September 1974 to all 173 Army generals who had commanded U.S. forces during the course of the war in Vietnam. Kinnard writes clearly and economically, and his analysis of the survey seems unexceptionable. Some of his findings, however, are quite predictable and uninteresting; for example, there is the tiresomely familiar litany of complaints from the generals about the "handcuffing" of the military, the "civilian interference" from Washington (p. 31), the "distortion" of the war and the efforts of the armed forces by the news media (p. 124–35), etc. Even when the generals are disposed to consider where the *military* went wrong, much of their criticisms are by now well-known: excessive careerism, false reporting, the ticket-punching syndrome. Moreover, much of the survey deals with matters that may be important to the professional military, but are of limited general interest: the pros and cons of various military tactics, the kind of training given the South Vietnamese Army, the quality of interservice cooperation, and the like.

However, some of the author's findings are interesting and perhaps unexpected: over half of the generals thought that U.S. military involvement in Vietnam should not have gone beyond an advisory effort, and a majority were critical of the overall military strategy of the U.S. army, especially the large-scale "search and destroy" operations; in particular, 55 percent thought that the "kill ratio" or "body count" emphasis were poor measures of military progress, both for practical (the enemy could control his rate of losses and had sufficient manpower reserves to go on indefinitely) and for moral reasons. A few were even vehement on the matter: "a great crime and cancer in the Army," "a blot on the honor of the Army," "gruesome—a ticket-punching item" (p. 75).

Kinnard's views on the war are muted, though some of them do emerge, more by tone, choice of words, and passing remarks than by direct analysis. Though he considers the war to have been "a disaster" (p. vii), his disagreement with U.S. policies and actions in Vietnam does not seem fundamental, for he is not disposed to question the premises that underlay U.S. intervention or to give serious consideration to the moral—as opposed simply to the practical—consequences of the war. Some apparently unconscious giveaways illustrate his general stance. For example, he describes the anticommunist forces in Vietnam —including the troops of Thailand and South Korea—as the "Free World" forces (p. 38); he characterizes criticism of the excessive use of firepower in South Vietnam as "loudly-voiced" (p. 46); and he objects to "false" body count reports as "corrosive of professional standards" (p. 111) without commenting on how he would feel about *accurate* body-counting. Most revealing of all, he asks the generals whether the use of massive firepower was "useful" and whether the B-52 bombings were "worth the effort" (p. 46–48); it is instructive that at least one of the respondents was able to transcend the narrowness of the question, answering that "it was not worth the effort when considered in light of what it did to the people and territory of South Vietnam" (p. 48).

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In a brief concluding section Kinnard does directly state some of his own views on the conduct of the war, but they are mostly concerned with what he considers to be failures in professionalism on the part of the military: the careerism, the false reporting, the naive "can do" ethos, the unwillingness to speak up when there was genuine disagreement, and the like.

In sum, *The War Managers* is a competently done but narrowly conceived book. Let us hope that some time soon Professor/General Kinnard will forget about surveys and the problems of the U.S. army and address himself directly to the full range of political, philosophical, and moral controversies engendered by the Vietnam War.

JEROME SLATER
State University of New York at Buffalo

Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941–45 *by Michael S. Sherry. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. 260 pp. $12.50.*

The armed forces of the United States emerged triumphant from World War II only to find that traditional defenses would no longer suffice to preserve American security. Technology had wiped out the time advantage for mobilization that Americans had previously enjoyed and threatened to make the nation vulnerable to direct attack should hostilities again break out. Equally significant, the world balance of power had shifted, leaving the United States and the Soviet Union in predominant positions. The question of how the American military establishment prepared itself, if at all, to meet these new developments has received only passing attention from historians and political scientists. Partial descriptions of the mood and content of service postwar planning were provided by Vincent Davis's *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946* (1966) and Perry McCoy Smith's *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945* (1970). These works were limited, however, by the fact that crucial documents were not yet declassified; each focussed on the problems of one particular service and neglected the larger scope of postwar planning.

Michael Sherry's *Preparing for the Next War* satisfactorily remedies these shortcomings. Utilizing recently declassified files of the War Department, the Army General Staff, the Army Air Forces, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Archives, appropriate Navy records and collections of personal papers, and such untapped resources as the National Academy of Sciences archives, he has produced a well-written, tightly organized, and comprehensive portrait of the evolution of the thinking of cabinet officers, generals, admirals, and scientists about the postwar world and the place of American armed forces in it.

Sherry begins his volume with a description of military thinking about the shape of the postwar military establishment which had begun to emerge as early as 1942. While concentrating on the Army, and the ideas of Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in particular, he nevertheless outlines both the administrative and political environment in which all the services worked out their initial plans. He then traces the development of these plans and the ensuing debates over the size and composition of the peacetime military establishment, placing in perspective the opposition of the Army Air Forces to War Department plans. Three subjects receive noteworthy treatment. The first is the history of the Army's

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campaign for Universal Military Training as a potential solution to the problem of mobilizing trained troops in the event of war. A major concern of General Marshall's, U.M.T. has usually been ignored by students of military affairs, despite the fact that it became a pet project of President Harry Truman and was debated into the 1950s. Second, Sherry presents a detailed analysis of the military-scientist alliance which was welded in World War II in response to the increasing impact of technology on the course of the war. This mutually beneficial partnership proved extremely long lasting and became a fundamental part of postwar military planning.

Finally, Sherry has made a useful contribution to understanding the evolution of American military perceptions of the Soviet Union. He demonstrates convincingly that while American policy makers were becoming suspicious of the U.S.S.R. by early 1945 as a result of Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, most military officers remained committed to the Grand Alliance through August. Although military planners were concerned about a possible postwar confrontation with the Russians and began to investigate the problem, Sherry concludes that the resulting initial studies were cautious and uncertain.

The only major weakness in Sherry's work lies in his final two chapters in which he describes the emergence of a consensus about the nature of American postwar strategy. He argues that there was a general agreement among the armed services by the fall of 1945 that the Soviet Union was the primary threat confronting the United States, and that the only possible response to the threat was to adopt a strategy of deterrence based on strategic air power since the advent of the atomic bomb had made general warfare appear intolerable. The difficulty with this analysis is that it greatly underestimates the struggle over postwar strategy that occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It suggests that the process was virtually complete at a time when it was only beginning. Whatever policies and strategies were arrived at in the fall of 1945 were tested, modified, and refined by cold war confrontations and, even more important, by domestic developments like President Truman's budget ceilings of 1948, 1949, and 1950, and fierce interservice rivalry over scarce defense resources. Sherry may be forgiven for underestimating the complexity and impact of these developments since he did not have access to the war plans, strategic concepts, and budgetary statements of 1947–1953 which have been declassified since his research was completed. His sweeping conclusions, however, tend to obscure important conflicts and choices of the postwar world and must be viewed with caution.

Despite this difficulty, Sherry's work is a major contribution to understanding American politico-military affairs in the early cold war. It is valuable reading for all those interested in the evolution of American national security strategy and military thinking.

DAVID A. ROSENBERG
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Unionizing the Armed Forces *edited by Ezra A. Krendel and Bernard L. Samoff. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977. 198 pp. $10.00.*

This compendium is the first of three recent books on the subject of military unions in the United States armed forces. It also constitutes the first scholarly treatment of the subject

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in a relatively comprehensive context. The analytical approach is generally confined to management perspectives, whereas one of the other two books provides broad interdisciplinary analysis.

Many writers treat the subject of military unions solely as a phenomenon of the U.S. All Volunteer Force of the 1970s. Ezra Krendel and his colleagues insist that the issues involved can be understood properly only in historical and contemporary social context. Accordingly, they address the history of the trade union movement and the philosophical underpinnings of the federal labor relations systems of the United States. They find relevant analogies for the structure and functioning of military unions in the systems for due process, appeals, and bargaining found in the American police and firefighter services, in public education, and in nonuniformed federal employee structures. Their analysis in these respects is both cogent and persuasive; the problems and progress of other unionized sectors may be instructive in assessing the development and impact of U.S. military unions.

Following the lead of the sociologist, Charles Moskos, Professor Krendel posits a trend in the U.S. armed forces away from a "profession" or "calling," under which motivation is based primarily on a sense of self-sacrifice in the national interest, toward an "occupation" where the incentives for service are founded principally upon monetary compensation. The co-authors list these other bases of a recent trend toward military unions: inadequacies of grievance devices in the military; inadequacies in military management techniques; and lack of congressional support for military compensation of various types. One does not have to agree with these conclusions in order to find the analysis informative.

Professor Krendel provides an excellent precis of the development of European military unions, a subject he has researched carefully in Western Europe. He was the first to make a most significant point which few understand even today—that the armed forces of the Netherlands are *not* unionized. It is significant that almost all writers (and government officials) who address the issue of military unions refer constantly to the Dutch experience. Although he doubts the extent to which the European experience with military unions is applicable to the United States, Krendel concludes that "the European unionized armed forces might well induce a productive examination of the priorities for discipline, training, and personal appearance in the United States Armed Forces."

This assertion is questionable. The societal contexts in which discipline, training, and personal appearance are perceived are not the same. Although legitimately debatable, I have argued the point elsewhere that the trade union movements in Western Europe and in the United States have developed in fundamentally different ways. The history, traditions, and, most important, the contemporary national security missions of the most highly unionized Western European military establishments are quite different from those of the United States. Finally, the state of readiness of the unionized military establishments to perform their missions has not been definitively assessed. In fact, standard criteria for evaluation have not even been institutionalized. For these reasons, sound analogies cannot be drawn from the European experience. Current debates that compare American with unionized European armed forces are thus supported by little evidence on either side and are largely irrelevant to understanding trends toward military unionization in the United States.

With this major substantive exception, *Unionizing the Armed Forces* is an excellent book. It leaves the reader with a clearer picture of the threat of military unions to the security

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interests of the United States, and it offers some insights into the management of large public service organizations which should prove valuable, especially to those charged with leading and managing the armed forces of the United States.

The editors of this book and their contributors deserve great credit for a pioneering effort which will enhance the quality of public debate on an important national security issue.

WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR.
United States Military Academy

Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy *by Arnold J. Meltsner. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976. 310 pp. $10.00.*

A great deal has been written about policy analysis in recent years but very little about the people who engage in this activity. Arnold J. Meltsner seeks to repair this omission. In this book he tries to understand what policy analysis is by studying what policy analysts actually do. Along the way he also adds substantially to our knowledge of a variety of other subjects, including the internal play of forces within bureaucracy, the advisory process within government agencies, and the methods by which an individual working for an executive organization can exert influence over its decisions.

Meltsner acknowledges that the occupational group about which he is writing still lacks a certain amount of career status. "Policy analysis is not an established profession," he writes (p. 12), and the evidence presented in this book certainly supports that assessment. Many of the analysts studied by Meltsner have professional credentials in other fields—economics or engineering, for example. It is from this other training that the advice analysts give office-holders ordinarily derives its legitimacy and persuasiveness, and such advice lies at the heart of the policy analyst's role. As Meltsner puts it: "The policy analyst is an advisor, and policy analysis is advice" (p. 50).

But while they may not yet have attained full professional standing, policy analysts certainly engage in activities as important as those undertaken by most professions. For as the goals of government in modern society expand, the task of devising programs for achieving these goals becomes increasingly difficult, principally because the resources and technology available for this purpose are insufficient. And it is policy analysts who have emerged as the major group charged with inventing new techniques to attain governmental objectives, as well as to evaluate established programs according to their success in achieving the ends for which they were originally intended.

As Meltsner shows, a major dilemma all analysts face is that of reconciling their commitment to professional standards of inquiry with the political imperatives and constraints of the governmental environment in which they work. One group of analysts, whom Meltsner labels "technicians," try to keep their work as free as possible of political considerations. Another set of analysts, whom he calls "politicians," are primarily political in orientation. Their chief aim is to please their governmental clients, and their commitment to research is tenuous.

The ideal stance, Meltsner feels, is that of a third category of analysts, whom he calls

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"entrepreneurs." Members of this group have a balanced perspective. While preserving a strong commitment to high-quality research, they are at the same time keenly sensitive to the nuances of their political environment and very skilled at manipulating other actors and organizations so as to enhance the likelihood that their research will have a significant impact on policy decisions within government.

Like most such studies, the book leaves unanswered the question of how much beneficial influence analysts actually exert on the quality of the policy product turned out by the agencies by which they are employed. At one point, Meltsner somewhat ruefully confesses to the suspicion "that policy analysis creates more problems than it solves" (p. 265). While the findings presented in this book do not directly support so pessimistic a conclusion, they do not altogether rule it out.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
The Johns Hopkins University

The Participatory Bureaucracy *by Harry Kranz. Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath and Co., 1976. 244 pp. $17.50.*

Dr. Kranz presents a simple and provocative thesis. He argues that it is desirable that the "ratios of each racial-ethnic minority group and women at all levels in a particular bureaucracy equal that group's percentage in the population in the geographic area serviced by that agency" (p. 67). By "racial-ethnic minorities" Kranz means "politically relevant minorities" (p. 82), specifically Blacks, American Indians, Spanish-speaking Americans and Asian Americans, although he recognizes that groups may have to be added to this list over time.

Clearly, such a thesis requires a forceful defense because it is open to attack on various fronts and from numerous perspectives. Unfortunately no such defense is offered. No single consistent argument is pursued: instead, several partial and individually inconclusive points are made. For example, the author points out that such a bureaucracy would greatly increase the employment opportunities of minority members and women but this alone is a barely credible rationale for so major an organizational, legal and social change. He then buttresses the case by reference to the advantages of the change for those who receive benefits from the bureaucracies, especially minority members. Yet, after pursuing this reasoning he admits that "the case for a participatory public service does not rest on the debatable contention that it would necessarily be more efficient or provide better services for all" (p. 105). At this point an additional rationale is adduced and another after that, etc. Some are powerful supports for his propositions, some are weak, all are well documented. But they do not evolve from a single developmental scheme and so appear indiscriminately mixed regardless of importance or priority.

The remainder of the book does not suffer as much from these shortcomings. The "data" chapter which shows that we do not now have a representative bureaucracy, and the "policy" chapter, in which suggestions are made for change, both make their points well. But as the work must stand or fall on the demonstration of the desirability of participatory bureaucracy these chapters are anticlimatic.

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Dr. Kranz's mode of presentation is seconded by the structure of the work as a whole. The first three chapters are concerned with history, the bureaucracy-democracy debate, and a definition of the concept of representative bureaucracy. These chapters contain 294 footnotes. Indeed, the core of the argument—the desirability of participatory bureaucracy—isn't even addressed until a third of the way through the book.

In structure and style of argument this is clearly a dissertation. It contains all the obligatory dissertation chapters: literature review, data, etc. And, in the academic manner, it marshals every argument, central and peripheral. The result illustrates the author's knowledge of the field and his capacity for analytical thought. It is not Dr. Kranz's fault that, as a form, dissertations obscure rather than enhance a scholar's thought. Nor is it his fault that the hand of an experienced publisher is not more obviously in evidence.

Periodically Dr. Kranz's basic belief does come through—that "ethical, moral and democratic values . . . support the belief that a more representative bureaucracy will be a better one" (p. 105). It is a pity that we never receive a consistent development of that thesis.

JEFFREY MANDITCH PROTTAS
Harvard University

Revenue Sharing: The Second Round *by Richard P. Nathan, Charles F. Adams, Jr., and Associates. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1977. 177 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

The Brookings Institution has monitored the federal revenue sharing program since its inception in 1972 and published in 1975 a report on the subject—*Monitoring Revenue Sharing*. The current volume, the second of three planned, describes changes in the program made by Congress in 1976 and focuses on the purposes for which revenue sharing funds are spent by state and local governments and the decision-making process employed to determine how the funds will be spent.

Major conclusions include: "the problems of most troubled central cities are not in any major way ameliorated by general revenue sharing" (p. 107); revenue sharing has not produced a dramatic change in state and local political systems as had been anticipated by some; and uncertainty as to whether the program would be continued chiefly was responsible for the failure of "small governments to expand the scope and level of their activities" (p. 142).

To a large extent, the findings confirm earlier observations and one questions the need for reporting that ". . . revenue sharing plays a much more critical role for those jurisdictions currently faced with extreme fiscal pressure" (p. 40).

The authors deal with several methodological problems, particularly those involving the fungibility of funds, yet must be faulted for deficiencies in their research design including the admittedly small sample of state and local governments. The major deficiency is the failure to explain the rationale employed to select state and local governments for monitoring. No explanation is provided of why three of the eight state governments monitored are in the Northeast or why two of the three "genuine towns" are in

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New York State. A reader intimately familiar with local governments is apt to conclude that the units were selected by individuals inadequately informed on the variety of local governments in the United States.

One assumes that geographical location and population size were selection criteria and it appears that local units were grouped together if the names were similar. Placing two Wisconsin townships, which are little more than highway districts, in the same class as Massachusetts and New York State towns, which possess powers similar to those of a city, greatly distorts the findings relative to the use of shared funds by what are labelled as "townships."

Placing the Town of Irondequot, New York, in the "legislative dominance" class in terms of "who appeared to play dominant roles in deciding the use of shared revenue" (p. 115) is misleading since the chairman of the Town Board is also the town supervisor, that is, the chief executive of the town. One can also question why only six "townships" were selected and whether a small sample, reduced to four by the omission of the Wisconsin townships, permits the development of national generalizations of use to policy makers.

A similar distortion results when Los Angeles County and Monroe County are classified with most of the other counties. The former is a unique county government because of the large number of services provided by the county under contract with "Lakewood Plan" cities; Monroe County jointly provides eleven services with the City of Rochester and has assumed responsibility for five other municipal services transferred by the city.

Classifying data relative to local governments by population size is of some value. However, population size is only one of numerous variables that may influence the process of deciding how to utilize shared revenue. Whether a local government is a "reformed" government and whether it has "professional" or "amateur" management obviously have a bearing on the decision-making process employed.

The study also employs suppositions that are questionable, including the statement that the analysis of central cities "is based on the assumption that shared revenue paid to county governments benefits cities within the county proportionate to their population . . ." (p. 83).

The authors apparently do not understand the governmental nature of New York City to judge from the statement that the "City's fiscal problems stem in large measure from the fact that the city is responsible for many services—especially social programs—that in other urban areas are the responsibility of overlying governments, either the county or state" (p. 105). The city is a consolidated "city-county."

In conclusion, this book will be of interest to readers concerned with fiscal federalism and may stimulate the development of a research design to overcome the methodological problems associated with this study.

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN
State University of New York at Albany

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Urban Politics and the Criminal Courts *by Martin A. Levin. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977. 332 pp. $19.00.*

This is not one book but three. The first is a comparative analysis of political culture, criminal courts, and judicial behavior in two cities. The second book is an analysis of the causes and impact of delay in the criminal courts in five courts, and the third book is a normative analysis which explores the implications of various sentencing practices on the competing goals of crime reduction, deterrence, and justice.

The first and primary book attempts to explain sentencing behavior in two quite different cities: Minneapolis, a middle class "good government" city and Pittsburgh, a city of ethnic machine politics. Few of the Minneapolis judges have had an active background in electoral politics; most of the Pittsburgh judges received their appointments as rewards for past party service. These differences affect the ways the judges think about their jobs and perform their primary function of sentencing. Levin argues that in comparison with Pittsburgh judges, Minneapolis judges are more "legalistic," more oriented to society's interests, and harsher in their sentencing. Although it is disappointing that Levin did not probe his data more fully with more sophisticated techniques, he nevertheless builds a convincing case for his conclusions.

There is, however, one perplexing finding that Levin does not adequately deal with. Minneapolis judges are not only harsher sentencers than their Pittsburgh counterparts, they also appear to be more consistently racist. According to Levin they regularly sentence blacks more severely than whites, a pattern which does not disappear with controls. Presumably the hallmark of a rational-legal system is that decisions are based on universalistic principles that transcend status, personal characteristics, and particularistic appeals. Yet here we find the more rational and legalistic of the two systems biasing its decisions on the most invidious of factors. Given this finding, it is questionable whether Minneapolis can in fact be termed rational-legal. In characterizing the Minneapolis judges as "legalistic" it is unclear whether Levin is referring to a superficial stance, a type of behavior, and a style of decision making, or whether he simply means that the judges are more "conscious of society" when they sentence. If it is the first, he should have proved the "myth of legality notion." If it is the second, he should have probed more deeply into the paradox presented by his findings. If he means the third, it is questionable whether, in the circumstances, he has an adequate understanding of the term *legalistic*.

His second book deals with delay in five courts (in Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and three elsewhere). He challenges conventional wisdom which holds that delay is a simple function of case overload, and shows instead that it is more often the result of voluntary behavior pursued for strategic reasons. This is an important finding, but it is one that he has dealt with much more fully elsewhere. Contrasted to the themes of the first book, the analysis of the five courts is distracting.

The same point can be made about his third book. This theme considers the crime reduction and deterrence functions of sentencing and discusses the problems of incomplete and imperfect information that face policy researchers and policy makers. Had the author expanded his analysis of Minneapolis and Pittsburgh to show how sentencing policies affect crime reduction and deterrence in these two cities and how these policies were arrived at, he would have added a valuable concluding section to the book. Unfortunately

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the author's analysis relies on still a third data base, studies of California courts which he and others have reported on at greater length elsewhere. While I sympathize with the author's attempt to integrate a discussion of crime reduction and deterrence in his analysis of the Minneapolis and Pittsburgh sentencing practices, the problematic nature of the California findings, makes his efforts confusing. Furthermore, he has already convinced me at least that local political culture is so important that it is not evident what lessons could be learned from California—provided there are any—which are applicable to places as different as Minneapolis and Pittsburgh.

Though Levin would have been better advised to concentrate on his first book and to develop it more fully, it is already a fine piece of work. But it could have been much better.

MALCOLM M. FEELEY
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Bail Reform in America *by Wayne H. Thomas, Jr. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977. 272 pp. $10.00.*

Wayne Thomas's stated objective in writing *Bail Reform in America* is to present the ". . . major national efforts in the past 15 years to reduce the impact of money, and the lack of it, in determining whether a criminal defendant obtains freedom prior to trial." His actual contributions far exceed this goal.

Bail Reform in America presents a detailed, logical account of many efforts, both national and local, to improve the bail system from the points of view of fairness to the defendant, administration and cost of the system, and protection of the general public. It also discusses the design and results of the National Bail Study conducted by the Center on Administration of Criminal Justice at the School of Law, University of California at Davis, an analysis of the findings, and a critical examination of the basic issues involved in the bail process. Finally, a comprehensive pretrial release plan encompassing the best aspects of the many current individual programs is recommended.

In Part I, the history of the bail reform movement is traced through the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project in 1961, the Illinois Ten-Percent Deposit Plan of 1963, the National Bail Conference in 1964, the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, and federal funding through LEAA in the early 1970s. An excellent description of the American bail system including its underlying concepts, structure, and modus operandi is presented with a critique of its effectiveness. This material is then used in Part II in interpreting and rationalizing the findings of the National Bail Study.

The purposes of the bail study were to determine what changes might have occurred between 1962 and 1971 in the percentage of defendants obtaining pretrial release, the impact of various types of bail reform, such as OR, deposit bail, how well the alternative pretrial release methods were ensuring defendants' presence at court, the effects of pretrial release on court delay, and the accomplishments of the bail reform movement and insights to guide future modification. The study was extremely well designed from a dynamic system's point of view, successfully integrating the effects of time, jurisdiction,

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types of crime, defendant characteristics, and pretrial-release alternatives. The presentation of results is professionally and perceptively done, with complete disclosure of all the attendant research problems involving the economic restrictions on sample sizes, the availability of the data sought, and the quality of that obtained. Measures investigated include felony and misdemeanor detention rates, days to release, failures to appear, days to case disposition, and interactions between various pretrial release programs and nonfinancial releases. In every case, the level and precision of the analyses match the estimated accuracy and completeness of the data. No formal statistical tests are included; and, with the sample sizes used, none are warranted. Extenuating circumstances affecting the results are fully explained, such as increases in FTA's in some cities being traced to judges granting OR's without the benefit of the guidance of the release agency. Where conflicting evidence or opposing points of view exist, all are presented.

Part III discusses the pertinent issues of bail reform including conditional release to issuance of citations, bail schedules, night courts, pretrial services, diversion programs, crime on bail, and preventive detention. A suggested format for pretrial release programs based heavily on the Manhattan Bail Project supplemented by a deposit bail system of the type of the Illinois Ten-Percent Plan is offered as a general guide for future programs.

In conclusion, anyone involved in any way with the bail system should read this book. It is broadly inclusive, factual, and well written. All the issues, philosophical and procedural, are laid out for all to examine. Although very few absolutes are stated (an exception being the exclusion of surety bail in systems of the future), *Bail Reform in America* provides a comprehensive list of hypotheses concerning how a bail system should operate, which must be tested by individual researchers, court officials, and program developers in the context of their own environment and constraints.

ALBERT B. BISHOP
The Ohio State University

The Courts and Social Policy *by Donald L. Horowitz. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1977. Cloth, $11.95; paper, $4.95.*

Donald L. Horowitz offers a critical review of social policy making through adjudication in his well-written and cogently reasoned book, *The Courts and Social Policy*. His purpose is to assess the impact of process on outcome. He argues that courts may be especially ill-equipped to deal with the myriad social issues that today beckon them, and that will likely beckon them in the future.

Horowitz elaborates on the uniqueness of the adjudicative process and then matches those features of the process with its imprint on policy outcomes in four case studies. He recognizes the limits of the case study approach; and he makes no broad claims for the generalizability of his findings. His decision to err on the side of inclusiveness (in selecting the case study approach) has netted him much information. At times, there is so much information in these case studies that the net he casts captures much that could obscure his theoretical points. He is careful, however, to sort out the findings and demonstrate the relevance of his catch.

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The four case studies, drawn from federal court decisions, highlight the capacities and incapacities of courts as social policy makers. The cases cover: citizen participation in the Model Cities program, distribution of educational resources, procedural alteration of juvenile courts, and control over illegal police enforcement practices through the exclusion of illegally seized evidence of state criminal trials.

One clear finding from these studies is that untoward consequences often accompany court-created policies. Horowitz's study certainly confirms a view best articulated by Felix Frankfurter: "reforms have a way of not turning out according to the expectations of their architects." Unfortunately, the errors made by courts are not as easily corrected as those made by legislative or administrative processes.

Horowitz concludes his study with a dilemma. "The danger," he says, "is that courts, in developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may become altogether too much like them" (p. 298). If the judicial process is altered to make it more responsive to the problems it addresses, then the likelihood increases that the unique and treasured features of the courts will be undone. Horowitz's work forces a consideration of ideas that would reform courts to enhance their capacity to make policy. The current movement to increase staff assistance to judges may hold the promise of providing the expertise needed to evaluate social facts. But this reform threatens to undermine individual responsibility in which the person vested with the authority to decide actually makes the decision. Another idea that has received much attention in the court reform movement is the application of pretrial procedures in appellate courts to encourage informal resolution of disputes. If effective, this reform would overcome some of the inadequacies that Horowitz's case studies highlight.

Horowitz has done yeoman service in gathering and sifting the social evidence bearing on the policies enunciated in the case studies. That evidence is marshalled to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the reforms or on the premises on which they are based. But social research is rarely conclusive; the results often require a certain Delphic ability to translate the findings into terms relevant to policy. The weight of the evidence supports Horowitz's view; but the policies enunciated by courts are not completely and unequivocally eroded by the glimpses of social reality that social research offers.

The Courts and Social Policy is essential reading. It provides balance to a popular view that courts are appropriate—indeed, desirable—institutions for making social policy. Horowitz's work will stimulate other systematic studies of judicial capacity. The payoff in terms of theoretical refinement and understanding will be a testament to Horowitz's initial research.

JERRY GOLDMAN
Northwestern University

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The Insoluble Problems of Crime *by Robert P. Rhodes. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1977. 269 pp. $7.95.*

A mood of caution and skepticism pervades this book and the author warns that reformers may find it "excessively pessimistic." His main argument is that "the problems of crime are, as presently understood, susceptible to approximate solutions of very limited potency," largely because "much of our crime results from social and historical forces that cannot be altered by police and courts" (pp. 3–4).

Robert Rhodes captures the prevailing tone of criminal justice policy analysis in the mid-1970s. It is a period of sober and chastened reassessment. We have recently experienced not one but two "wars on crime:" first the Johnsonian promise to eliminate the causes of crime through Great Society social reforms, then the Nixon pledge to restore "law and order" through stronger law enforcement. Both wars failed and, by raising false hopes, probably did more harm than good.

The prevailing mood cuts across political lines with liberals and conservatives saying many of the same things. Both sides agree that there are severe limits to our ability to reduce crime. Rhodes is a member of the so-called neoconservative school of policy analysis and his book is a more detailed elaboration of the argument in James Q. Wilson's *Thinking About Crime*. Both Wilson and Rhodes present themselves as hard boiled realists, seeking practical solutions to immediate problems. Both criticize the liberal concern with the "root causes" of crime, arguing that there is little we can do to affect those causes.

The Insoluble Problems of Crime illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of the neoconservative perspective on crime. As a review of the literature it is an excellent introduction to criminal justice policy analysis from which both specialists, nonspecialists, and students will profit. Rhodes presents a lucid analysis of current research and thought on the police, prosecution, sentencing, crime statistics, the systemic nature of the criminal justice system, and other topics. The critique of various reform proposals is especially strong.

When Rhodes shifts from critic to advocate, however, he runs into serious difficulty. Like Wilson, he is insufficiently critical of his own prescription. Rhodes proposes a "victim-oriented crime policy." Instead of focusing on the offender, as academic criminology has traditionally done, he suggests that "the victim's suffering, as an output to measure the success of an anticrime policy, might be the key to comprehensive planning and evaluation . . ." (p. 151). Yet he does not indicate how we might translate victimology into practical reforms.

In the end Rhodes advances the traditional deterrence theory, one that is enjoying renewed popularity of late and which is the essence of the neoconservative position on crime. Swiftness and certainty of punishment are the major goals. Rhodes argues that sentencing reform could help to deter and isolate chronic recidivists. Swiftness of punishment could be enhanced by reducing delays in the criminal process (p. 197). Yet the deterrence argument is asserted but not proved. These are not completely new ideas and the available literature on attempted reforms yields mixed results. It is particularly unfortunate that Rhodes does not take up the question of determinate sentencing, since it has acquired much popularity recently as a means of ensuring certainty of punishment.

Rhodes's proposal is undercut by his own best points. His main thesis is that the problems

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of crime are "insoluble" because of the lack of consensus on the nature of the problem in a pluralistic democracy. Not only are there many "publics" (p. 18), but the very complexity of the criminal process inhibits an accurate understanding of precisely how the system works. It is not clear how a "victim-oriented" policy would surmount these problems.

SAMUEL WALKER
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Black Odyssey: The Afro-American Ordeal in Slavery *by Nathan Irvin Huggins. New York, Pantheon Books, 1977. 250 pp. $8.95.*

Nathan Huggins has written another very fine book. Only a historian of demonstrated ability and reputation could get away with writing a book on such an important topic without a single footnote. It is, nevertheless, a scholarly treatise and one which sheds new light on the important topic of the survival of black people through the period of American slavery.

"The slave's true story," Huggins tells us in the introduction, "lies in his humane triumph over tyranny" (p. xi). He thus sets the major theme of his book. The treatment of slavery as tyranny is somewhat novel, yet provides a new perspective on the subject. "Rather than the onus of slavery falling on those who were oppressed by it, we must find out how the liberty of some Americans rested on the unfreedom of others" (p. xiv).

A second major contribution of this work is its focus on ordinary black men and women rather than on heroes or villains. "Slaves, despite obstacles, managed to build family structures and honor them wherever conditions made it possible. They maintained a strong sense of bond to kinfolk, even those distanced by death or by sale to other parts of the country" (p. 163).

Moreover, Huggins analyzed the essential character of the slave situation. The relationship between master and slave, he points out, was essentially an economic one.

Perhaps the most meaningful aspect of this book for students of political science is the author's concern with the state and government under slavery. "Here was a model totalitarian society supported directly or indirectly by the entire nation" (p. 113). Moreover, it was power and force and almost absolute determination, and especially, the arbitration of the power relationship which caused him to characterize slavery as tyranny. "What made whites the masters and superiors of blacks was power—not individual power, but a social and collective power that had little to do with their worth as people" (p. 121). "Initially, it was a superior technology in weapons and ships. In America, it was the owner's ability to inflict pain and death with the entire coercive power of the state behind him."

Yet it was not only the slaveholding white but all whites who benefited from this relationship. And all blacks were victimized by it.

Huggins points out that despite the system of tyranny, blacks made important contributions to American culture based in part on their own African heritage, faculties, and ability to adapt to new ways and to the new conditions they found in this country. Europeans and Africans made different contributions, he observed, but European and

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African immigrants put their experiences together creating an American culture and an American character.

And finally, what about the ordinary African slaves who neither overcame the system of slavery nor succumbed to it? "The slaves' tendency to adapt to their condition rather than to defy it attests to their realism rather than their contentment or inertia" (p. 237). He continues: "What prevented their liberty were circumstances, not character. Thus, when the circumstances began to change, slaves were ready to assert what they had always felt: that their rightful place was as a free people" (p. 237).

Huggins has written a highly readable book. And because of its readability and insight, it may very well be the best single volume book on slavery available today.

ANDREW BILLINGSLEY
Morgan State College

Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare, 1960–1970 *by Kirsten A. Grønbjerg. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977. 266 pp. $16.00.*

This study is another attempt to explain the rapid increase in the number of welfare recipients and the amount spent on welfare during the past decade, despite a general rise in the national standard of living. Grønbjerg explains the welfare crisis as "a glacial and uneven shift toward the democratization of social rights . . . a vaguely defined right to share in the collective product of national achievement" (p. 2). Thus, during the 1960s she maintains that broader conceptions of citizenship were being employed, "extending the primary rights of national citizenship to include the secondary rights of economic citizenship" (p. 3). Consequently, a wider range of people became eligible for welfare.

The work begins with a review of the literature in the familiar manner favored by dissertation committees, and the writing style has the dry quality best associated with doctoral work. Unfortunately, it has several serious methodological weaknesses which lead to significant distortions of the data and to spurious relationships. For example, the author relies too much on correlation analysis, not enough on the relationship of regression coefficients to explain variance. Her work is subject to confounding by multicollinearity. For her purposes path analysis would be more appropriate.

Furthermore, much of the material she deals with involves spurious associations. Population size explains more than her whole set of variables together. For a vastly better handling of most of the same methodological problems see Robert B. Albritton, *Welfare Spending In The American States: An Approach to Analysis of Public Policy*, doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1975.

By focussing on state policies the author does not look at the effect of the 1965 federal Social Security amendments which enlarged the pool of eligibles who were quickly absorbed into the caseload. She does not pay much attention to grants levels which differ from caseloads. Caseloads are more responsive to state factors whereas grants levels are more responsive to federal factors.

The author's reliance on the mass society concept is not particularly productive for her analysis because in application it is vague and diffuse. More economical explanations

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would be preferable. For example, her argument about social citizenship (which is linked to the mass society concept) never clearly resolves an important point. Is the author postulating an expansion of social citizenship as a consequence of expanded welfare rolls? They are the primary data available. Or does her argument involve a claim about change in the attitudes of elite groups and/or the general citizenry, for which little data is provided? The author never clarifies the nature of the claim she makes and therefore never establishes the usefulness of the theoretical constructs she invokes. In short, strip away the theory and hers is a modest piece of work, but in that form it would be more valuable.

DOROTHY B. JAMES
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Social Security: Promise and Reality *by Rita Ricardo Campbell. Stanford, The Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 351 pp. $14.95.*

One of the most important problems confronting the Social Security system today is the widespread lack of understanding of the program. Therefore, a book designed "to inform the public of the issues . . . that need public debate and resolution" should be welcomed by all those interested in public policy. Unfortunately, Rita Ricardo Campbell's offering contributes little toward clarifying the various issues in the Social Security debate. The analysis is replete with errors, the book is poorly organized, and the style is awkward.

One of the author's major analytical errors lies in her explanation of the origin of the financial crises that confront the Social Security system. She fails to distinguish between the short-run deficits, which result from the 1974–75 recession and a rapid increase in disability claims, and the long-run deficit, which is a result of anticipated demographic shifts and a benefit formula that overcorrects for inflation. Instead, she attributes the short-run deficit to overindexing. "Because of an error in the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act, the revenues in some months have been less than the benefits payable, and this draws down the contingency trust fund" (p. 7). In describing the long-run deficit, the author decides that the progressivity of the benefit formula which "creates a 'kink' in the benefit amount" (p. 7) is in some way responsible for the increase in long-run costs. Actually, the progressive benefit formula serves partially to offset the double indexing introduced in the 1972 amendments since workers will have a smaller percentage of wages replaced by Social Security benefits as they find themselves in higher brackets of the benefit formula.

In addition, many numerical errors serve to undermine the reader's confidence in the author's mastery of the complex Social Security system. The most glaring mistake occurs in Table 8.1 (p. 229) where the tax rates in the table pertain to OASDI while the heading indicates that they refer to OASDHI which includes the levy for medicare.

The organization of the volume is haphazard and issues of varying importance are awarded roughly equal attention. For instance, Chapter 5 which discusses financing, a topic of major concern, is preceded by an almost equally long chapter on the "Treatment of Men and Women" and is followed by a chapter on "Statements Dissenting from Advisory Council's Reports." These two chapters stem from the author's participation on

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the 1974 Advisory Council and on the Subcommittee of that Council which focused on the treatment of men and women. However, the discussion in both chapters simply repeats the material in the Advisory Council *Report* and interested readers would benefit more by reading the original document.

The method of Campbell's book is perhaps its most significant weakness. Of the 287 pages of text, 159 pages or 55 percent of the volume represent verbatim excerpts from previous studies. If a chapter on the effect of Social Security on saving prepared by Gerald Musgrave and the conclusion are excluded, the percentage of pages derived from other documents rises to 70 percent. This extensive use of previously published material, interspersed by text and asides in the form of "author's notes," makes the book disjointed and confusing.

In short, while Rita Ricardo Campbell has compiled a detailed bibliography of the literature on Social Security, her compilation fails to fulfill its stated objective—to provide a useful analysis of the program for the public.

ALICIA H. MUNNELL
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

The Case for the Welfare State: From Social Security to Social Equality *by Norman Furniss and Timothy Tilton. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1977. 249 pp. $14.00.*

This book sets forth a theory of the "social welfare state" and then defends that political model as the one which best promotes the authors' central values of equality, freedom, democracy, solidarity, security, and economic efficiency. The authors attempt to demonstrate its superiority by comparing it to the two other principal models of government operating in the industrial democracies: the "positive state" and the "social security state." Government intervention in the former is aimed primarily at protecting the interests of property holders from the vagaries of an unstable market, and social programs are limited to measures which spread a worker's income evenly over his own life cycle, spread the risk of unemployment and disability over the working population, and provide minimum assistance to certain categories of deserving poor. The authors' primary example of the "positive state" is, of course, the United States. The "social security state," exemplified by Britain, constitutes significant advance over the positive state, in that it seeks, through full employment and social benefits, to guarantee to every citizen the right to a decent minimum standard of living. Yet it falls short of the "social welfare state" (most closely approximated in Sweden), because it produces only a guaranteed minimum for its citizens, rather than the *equality* of living conditions sought by the social welfare state. This last model, outspokenly favored by the authors, replaces social insurance tied to workers' contributions, with a wide array of universal public services and assistance programs.

In the first half of the book, the authors provide a systematic inventory of the major arguments against the social welfare state. They identify, classify, explain, and then try to answer the main objections that have been raised by critics of the welfare state. The

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clarity they have achieved in these first four chapters makes this book extremely useful for advanced undergraduates in comparative politics, political theory, and social policy.

The authors' surveys of the three real-world approximations of their prototypical welfare states (Britain, Sweden and the United States) are not without problems. Their discussion of Britain highlights the National Health Service as the centerpiece of the "social security state." But as a universal free service to all Britons, the NHS fits better into the social welfare state model than into the social security state model, which Britain supposedly represents. The authors' portrayal of Sweden's social achievements is in places overly enthusiastic. For example, I question their assertion that housing problems have been eliminated in Sweden: "By the mid-1970s a couple needing housing in Stockholm could move within hours" (p. 140).

The final section, which explores the possibility of moving the United States toward the social welfare state, skims too lightly over several crucial problems. First, the authors dismiss too casually ideological debate over private vs. public ownership as both "outdated and irrevelant" (p. 195). Second, they label as a "red herring" the widespread anxiety that welfare diminishes the incentive to work, but the research they cite to refute this idea is by no means conclusive. This issue merits more than a perfunctory paragraph, if only because it is probably the most common objection to expanding American welfare programs. Third, they do not convincingly defend their assertion that in the social welfare state, citizen participation would increase rather than decrease. American observers of both the Swedish and British citizenry have remarked upon their willingness to "let the government govern." The question of whether this willingness reflects high citizen satisfaction or a disturbing level of apathy, deserves closer scrutiny than the authors give it.

Despite these objections, I would recommend this clearly organized and well-written volume to anyone interested in the normative dimension of policy analysis—a dimension which I hope will receive more of precisely this kind of thoughtful treatment.

CAROLYN TEICH ADAMS
Temple University

Economic Regulation and the Public Interest: The Federal Trade Commission in Theory and Practice *by Alan Stone. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1977. 314 pp. $15.00.*

In this study of the failure of a regulatory agency to protect the public interest, Dr. Stone penetrates beyond the simplifications of the Naderites and others who contend that the incompetence of individuals created the crisis of the regulatory commission. He also challenges those who maintain that the lack of a set of clear standards for regulation has led to regulatory failure. Stone argues instead that the political system has failed to come to grips with a basic contradiction in capitalism—the drive for increased sales and profits and the desire for a stable economy.

This contradiction between competition and stability shaped the ambiguous mandate for commission organization and regulatory style in the original 1914 Federal Trade Com-

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mission and Clayton Acts as well as in the subsequent amendments through the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975. Stone's analysis deftly borrows from the traditional historical view that popular clamor forced passage of the legislation and from the revisionist view that business interests directed the drafting of regulatory guidelines. He establishes the significant point that the Clayton Act (with its admonition that unfair methods of competition were unlawful) marked a move away from the promotion of competition found in the Sherman Act toward "a bias in favor of stability" in the economy (p. 51). Once the commission was established, it did not follow the life-cycle theory of regulation, but rather actively, albeit irregularly, prosecuted small and large firms alike. The commission's action against exclusionary, collusive and deceptive practices and its support of standards and labeling guidelines have tended to prevent entry of new firms into the marketplace, thus ironically inhibiting the very competition some believed it was supposed to promote.

From Stone's analysis of F.T.C. organization and regulatory style emerge several reasons for the commission's failure to promote the public interest: the vast jurisdiction of the agency (all interstate firms not regulated by another commission), lack of "effective tools for discovering violations" (p. 72), the time consuming case-by-case approach to violations, and the ineffectiveness of the cease-and-desist order. Stone underemphasizes the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the commission's decisions and regulatory style. He presents a controversial thesis in the chapter on the commission and economic structure when he maintains that mergers tend to foster competition. His argument that the case-by-case approach is inadequate ignores not only the myriad factors in national, regional and local market situations but also the American tradition of equity through legal recourse. Notwithstanding minor problems, the study presents solid research and thought, supported by practical experience—Dr. Stone served as an F.T.C. lawyer in the 1960s.

The author concludes that "on balance, the kind of business regulation we now have is not and cannot be an effective instrument for the promotion of public values" (p. 263). Individual firms undermine regulation in the public interest through persuasive advertising, by passing regulatory costs on to the consumer and by simply cutting back on research that might produce an improved product and lower prices. Stone identifies a list of values that constitute the public interest goals of regulation—promotion of safety and health, protection from deception, maintenance of a wide range of quality products, continued innovation and protection of the environment—and suggests that some form of government ownership is the only effective way to balance these contending values. By Stone's own admission, this final suggestion is detached from the careful consideration given the rest of the book.

WILLIAM R. CHILDS
The University of Texas at Austin

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Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900–1941 *by William E. Akin. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977. 227 pp. $9.50.*

Depression America was offered many panaceas, especially during the grim winter of 1932–33 when the economic and social life of the United States seemed about to grind to a halt. Among those many panaceas, which ranged from right-wing barter and self-help groups to Communist organizations of the unemployed, Technocracy had a brief but brilliant moment of glory.

What was Technocracy? According to one 1930s Congressman it was a "scientific snake dance"; according to Will Rogers, most Americans didn't know whether it was "a disease or thing." Akin, benefiting from prodigious research as well as from a perspective unavailable to 1930s commentators, is much more precise. For him Technocracy—whatever its shortcomings as a movement—"dealt with one of the central themes of the twentieth century, the effect of technology on modern society" (p. xii). And Akin maintains that the technocrats were among "the few" between the Progressive Era and the 1960s who dealt with the questions raised by technology's influence on American society.

Akin has gone to considerable length to give Technocracy its due—even though he understands, and more important makes clear, that the movement had "little direct influence" on either American politics of the 1930s or on "subsequent American thought." But for all that Technocracy is only an interesting footnote to the history of the United States in the 1930s, there is no gainsaying Akin's argument that the movement deserves study because "history should be informed by an awareness of rejected alternatives, as well as the main path" (p. xii).

Akin has intelligently chronicled the story of Technocracy from its intellectual origins in the Progressive period (for example, in the ideas of Thorstein Veblen) to its lingering death throes in the later 1930s as just another fad which found a home in Southern California. He has perceptively detailed its impact on the American public from December 1932 to January 1933, and has dealt capably with the split which rent the movement in January 1933 and led to its precipitous decline. Akin has also dealt capably with the movement's chief figures such as Howard Scott (Technocracy's flamboyant spokesman during its heyday) and Walter Rautenstrauch (the noted Columbia University professor of industrial engineering who before the split gave Scott's views "respectability").

Indeed, in my opinion this book is the last word on Technocracy as an intellectual movement. Moreover, the book's concluding chapter is a very well-reasoned exposition of complex arguments about the meaning of Technocracy for American life, then and now. But if Akin's work lacks nothing in dealing with Technocracy as an intellectual movement, there is still something important missing from this book. And that is the excitement aroused by the movement, which however briefly did have an enormous influence. For a few months during the winter of 1932–33, thanks to the mass media and to the American public's desire for a cure for the ills of the Depression, Technocracy was a colorful and immediate part of everyday life in the United States. This aspect of Technocracy is barely touched on by Akin.

Just about a decade ago, while I was still a graduate student at Columbia University, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. spoke to a group of us about the writing of history and asserted

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that if historians continued to write only for their peers and their graduate students, the discipline would suffer. And it has. Akin's book is a good example of what Schlesinger meant. *Technocracy and the American Dream* is in many ways a model monograph: well researched, carefully thought out, intelligently argued. But notwithstanding all these virtues it is a dull book, one which encapsulates all the necessary details, yet does not bring to life what was obviously an exciting if extremely minor part of American history.

DANIEL J. LEAB
Seton Hall University

The Behavior of State Legislative Parties in the Jacksonian Era: New Jersey, 1829–1844 *by Peter D. Levine. Rutherford, N.J., Farleigh-Dickinson University Press, 1977. 285 pp. $14.50.*

Whether the Jacksonian era may be better understood as a time of consensus or of conflict in American life is a question which continues to generate more conflict than consensus among historians. Scholarly inquiries into the nature of the second party system have been central to this debate: Were Democrats and Whigs committed ideologues, opportunistic political brokers, both, or neither?

Peter D. Levine offers his interpretation of political parties in the Jacksonian era through a systematic analysis of the voting behavior of the 561 partisans who served in the New Jersey legislature over the years from 1829 to 1844. The study, which grew out of a graduate seminar at Rutgers University under the guidance of Richard P. McCormick, concludes that, on balance, the legislative parties of New Jersey were primarily "electoral mechanisms," committed, above all, to perpetuating themselves in office. In Levine's judgment, party interests, not conflicting ideologies, serve to account for the evident differences in the voting records of Democrats and Whigs.

The first three chapters lay the background for comparing the records of the legislative parties in action. The author describes the balanced, competitive two-party system within the state, the internal structure of the legislature, and attempts to identify and compare the members of the legislature. He finds that Democratic and Whig legislators were more alike than unlike in their social, economic, and career patterns. However, too many factors remain unknown for Levine's conclusion of sameness to be entirely persuasive. Religious, ethnic and educational backgrounds were left out because of insufficient information and the analysis of occupational categories is hampered by the limits of the census data.

The heart of the study is Levine's analysis, assisted by a computer, of virtually every roll call vote taken from 1829 to 1844 to determine the degree of party cohesion on all issues before the legislature. This comprehensive approach is essential to a truer understanding of the role of parties, the author contends. Earlier studies, notably Herbert Ershkowitz and William G. Shade, "Consensus or Conflict? Political Behavior in the State Legislatures during the Jacksonian Era," *Journal of American History*, 58 (Dec. 1971): 591–621, have been methodologically in error, he believes, in relying upon selected roll calls, dealing with substantive issues only. This selective approach, he argues, has tended to distort

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our understanding of parties in the Jacksonian era by exaggerating the differences between Democrats and Whigs. Given that statement of purpose, the most striking result of Levine's study is the extent to which its findings confirm, rather than contradict, the findings of Ershkowitz and Shade.

Not surprisingly, Levine finds the strongest evidence of party discipline in matters such as appointments which directly involved "party as interest group" (p. 202). He finds, too, that legislators of both parties were equally indifferent to broad social reform legislation such as the construction of schools and asylums. So, for New Jersey at least, the Whigs' reputation as the party of positive social reform (first noted by Lee Benson) is not borne out. But Whigs and Democrats could be readily distinguished on economic issues. Legislative voting on all banking and currency issues and on incorporation of manufacturing companies showed a clear party split, which grew stronger over the years after 1832 and especially after the Panic of 1837. The partisan voting pattern in the legislature upheld the party image of Democrats as antibank and anticorporate privilege and of Whigs as the defenders of banks and corporations.

What motivated the parties to oppose each other on economic issues? Levine fairly points out that we should not assume, from voting records alone, that the parties differed in essential ideology. He himself finds it more likely that the state parties voted as they did because they needed to identify themselves with their national parties through agreement on national party issues, and they calculated their stands on substantive issues to serve their interests in the "struggle for political power in New Jersey" (p. 177). Perhaps so, but support for this interpretation is hazy at best. The question of party motives necessarily remains unanswered by this study, for knowing how legislators voted cannot tell us, with assurance, why they voted as they did. The methodology, which focuses solely upon voting patterns, excludes consideration of these broader questions. Hence, Levine's hypothesis remains tentative and not compelling. As it stands, the evidence is likely to have an effect not intended by the author, for, if anything, it tends to bolster the case for the existence of important differences in the thinking and actions of the two parties in the Jacksonian era.

KIM T. PHILLIPS
University of Connecticut

Japan: The Paradox of Progress *edited by Lewis Austin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1976. 338 pp. $20.00.*

What will Japan be like in the 1980s? This symposium is an ambitious interdisciplinary endeavor by thirteen social scientists to answer the hazardous but vital question. Examining Japan of the mid-1970s from political, economic, and sociocultural angles, they have attempted to identify the domestic forces that will shape the nation in the coming decades. The first three chapters analyze the political variables. Conjecturing upon future national electoral patterns and intra- as well as interparty manueverings, Nathaniel B. Thayer predicts the continuing but modified dominance of the Liberal Democratic party over national politics. Terry E. MacDougall emphasizes the growing policy demands and ensuing

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opportunities for the opposition parties in local politics, and evaluates their repercussions upon national politics. William K. Cummings searches for a future orientation of Japan's higher education in the current policy controversies over the ideas and the administration of universities.

The next four chapters discuss the economic variables. Using the oil supply issue as a case study, Hugh Patrick expounds choices for Japan's economic policy within future international settings. T. Dixon Long surveys Japan's technological development, and assesses its military options and inclinations. Robert E. Cole foresees an adverse impact of economic growth and the increasing shortage of youthful labor upon the quality of the Japanese work force. Koya Azumi and Charles J. McMillan investigate correlations between workers' morale and their organizational surroundings. The last four chapters deal with the socio-cultural variables. Lewis Austin tests the value convergence theory of political development with a comparative analysis of the opinion polls that he had conducted among the Japanese and the American elites. Robert Frager and Thomas P. Rohlen explore the patterns and the continuing functions of the traditional Japanese spirit in the changing society. Christie W. Kiefer describes the minds of the urbanized Japanese through an investigation of the *danchi* residents. Based on her personal interviews, Susan J. Pharr depicts three types of today's young Japanese women, and discusses the continuous growth of "new women" and accompanying problems.

This symposium has many strong points. Each of the eleven articles is insightful, original, and clearly written. In dealing with the future, the authors are properly cautious, but they do not hesitate to venture reasoned conjectures. The editor's thematic introduction and succinct chapter notes unify the volume, and yet avoid an undue conformity. On the contrary, it is one of the strong points of this volume that the separate articles supplement each other well. To cite just one example, Patrick finds in a domestic factor rather than external conditions a bottleneck for the future Japanese economy. The reader then learns from Cole, Azumi and McMillan, and Pharr about the multifaceted explorations into the domestic factor, the quality of the future Japanese work force. In fact, the volume reveals a number of mutually conflicting speculations and conclusions as the authors apply differing analytical methods to their respective subjects. For instance, seen under the broad dichotomy between "spiritualism" and "materialism," Austin, Frager and Rohlen, Cummings, Long and Kiefer disagree with each other to varying degrees. Similarly, on politics, Thayer's view from the center is not squarely supported by MacDougall's view from the province. These disagreements only strengthen the value of the volume. They together show the complexity of changing Japanese society and are a powerful antidote to various stereotypes of Japan.

Perhaps because the volume is so successful in pointing to the multitudinous forces that will shape the Japan of the 1980s that one may particularly miss the pointed discussion of the qualities and capabilities of Japan's policy making in face of these forces. For example, Patrick's cautious optimism for Japan's future economic position can be fully convincing only when one can expect that the Japanese decision makers will be as cool-headed and warm-hearted as the author. The general avoidance of the discussion of quality is similarly observed when Thayer's straightforward political forecast deals only with the "style" of leadership. This may be a matter, to borrow Austin's words used in a slightly different context, for "philosophers and theologians." One cannot, however, help feeling

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that the issue of leadership will have a direct bearing upon the future course of Japan and that it may turn "progress," itself a value-laden term, into disorder, and "paradox" into crisis. One must nevertheless conclude that this volume is one of the most successful works in explicating the contemporary Japan that has been undergoing kaleidoscopic changes.

SHUMPEI OKAMOTO
Temple University

Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931–1941 *by Gordon Mark Berger. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 413 pp. $20.00.*

This is a study, written by one of our able younger historians, of an important aspect of that fateful decade in Japan's recent past, the 1930s, which culminated in war. The title suggests that the subject matter is about political parties, and in the preface Gordon Berger states that his purpose "is to examine the political party as a vehicle for the acquisition, allocation, and exercise of political power in late imperial Japan" (p. ix). Although the book takes up parties, it perhaps would be more accurate to describe it as a political history of Japan during the 1930s, with particular reference to Prince Konoe Fumimaro, a high ranking court noble, and his abortive attempt to create a "new political order" built around the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. I believe this is the best account that has been published, at least in English, about Konoe's political endeavors.

Of course, the political parties were involved in the changes that occurred during this period. From about 1924 to 1932 party leaders were appointed prime ministers by virtue of the fact that the parties they led held majorities in the House of Representatives. But it is worth noting that party governments became possible because party leaders accommodated themselves to other elite groups and, as Berger puts it, acted as power brokers and conflict managers. But after 1932 party government ceased to exist, and the government came to be dominated by a military-bureaucratic coalition. Still, party politicians managed to retain control of the House of Representatives, and some of them were appointed to positions in the government. Moreover, according to the author, "on several occasions, the parties fought vigorously and successfully against military attempts to limit their institutional prerogatives, and the prerogatives of their principal backers" (p. 355).

Party leaders may have fought to save their prerogatives, but they certainly did not fight to change the drift toward war. Why they did not becomes obvious when we begin to understand the nature of Japanese political parties as described by Berger. Party leaders recognized the need to accommodate themselves to other elite groups. They accepted, moreover, the institutional framework of the Meiji constitution with its principle of imperial rule. Parties were *not* committed to strengthening the legal position of the House of Representatives, and they were "not organized around policy positions, ideologies, or class interests, but rather by personal loyalties to the men who led them" (p. 16). Nor were parties linked to liberalism or democracy. Finally, notes Berger, "despite individual exceptions, party men as a group were never principled pacifists, and during much of the 1930s, they were among the most jingoistic elements of the ruling elite" (p. 354). In short,

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it seems clear that parties did not articulate an alternative national policy to the one pursued by the military-bureaucratic coalition that was pushing the nation toward war, so there was no need to remove them completely from politics.

In fact, party politicians were in a position to contribute to the mobilization of the population in behalf of the war effort. Parties had little in the way of local organization, but politicians did have personal ties with local notables *(meiboka)*, who mobilized support for party politicians in return for tangible material rewards such as pork barrel projects.

This raises an interesting question as to whether being in or out of power made any difference to political parties in their ability to reward their supporters. Questions of this kind that would be of interest to political scientists are not raised by Berger, and from this point of view his analysis leaves something to be desired; but those who want to find out about Konoe and his new political order will find Berger's book well worth reading.

NOBUTAKA IKE
Stanford University

Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution: Dynamics of Policy Processes *by Byung-joon Ahn. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1977. 392 pp. $15.00.*

Professor Ahn has written a good book on the origins of China's Cultural Revolution. No more concise, succinct, and comprehensive work is available. Ahn shows how policy disputes throughout the decade preceding the Cultural Revolution reached a crescendo, with debate over economic, military, educational, medical, cultural, and rectification policy becoming increasingly strident. For the author, ideology and power assume meaning primarily within the context of specific *and* interlocking policy issues. Ahn argues that the Great Leap Forward and the period of retrenchment that followed were the wellsprings from which the Cultural Revolution flowed. More than half the volume deals with specific pre-1966 policy debates in the areas mentioned. The remainder of the book briefly describes the course and aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. The author's major argument is that Mao Tse-tung became progressively more alienated from the Party apparatus in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Consequently, the Chairman increasingly came to rely upon specific central military leaders, particular radical intellectuals, and identifiable social sectors for support. Though this thesis is by no means novel, Ahn weaves previously disparate threads into a readable and useful book.

Although the author admirably explains why Mao became increasingly alienated from the ever more institutionalized Party apparatus, he offers no adequate explanation of why specific social sectors responded to the Chairman's calls to mobilization. Similarly, while the author mentions the factionalism that ultimately necessitated ending the Cultural Revolution, the reader does not find a systematic explanation for these deep divisions. In brief, the reader gains little sense of the patterns of social cleavage that Mao and his political competitors faced.

The portion of the volume which deals with post-Cultural Revolution events is weakest. The author's treatment illustrates the dangers of attempting to immediately interpret the

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meaning, direction, and permanence of specific political events in China. Several debatable propositions were advanced as Ahn reacted to the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao in 1976, the purge of Teng Hsiao-p'ing that same year, and the political liquidation of "the Gang of Four." For example, the author says that ". . . the legacies of the Cultural Revolution were basically different from and more enduring than those of the GLF [Great Leap Forward]" (p. 244). In 1977, as changes in Cultural Revolution policies gush from Peking, the durability of that movement's legacy is in doubt. Similarly, Ahn cites a now repudiated leftist tabloid *(Study and Criticism)* to document his contention that "We now know that Mao did not approve of the way Teng [Hsiao-p'ing] conducted his post" (p. 255) and that the Chairman was the motive force behind Teng's fall in 1976 (p. 256). However, Peking now asserts that "the Gang of Four" distorted Mao's intent by carrying criticism of Teng outside the Party. This discrepancy reminds us that one must be circumspect in accepting assertions made during political campaigns, anywhere.

Finally, the author does not always specify where his interpretations differ from those of other scholars. For instance, Ahn's belief that Lo Jui-ch'ing was purged, in substantial part, because of his desire to improve Sino-Soviet relations is somewhat at variance with the analysis of Harding and Gurtov. Similarly, the author's assertion that Mao decided to purge Liu Shao-ch'i in January 1965 (p. 113) over issues arising from the Socialist Education Movement diverges from Baum's conclusion that Liu's performance only became an issue later. Indeed, Baum and Ahn differ in their interpretations of the entire Socialist Education Campaign.

In sum, Professor Ahn has written a useful book that will be basic reading for students of China for years to come.

DAVID M. LAMPTON
The Ohio State University

Comrade Chiang Ch'ing *by Roxane Witke. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 526 pp. $15.00.*

In first agreeing to write and later doggedly persisting in revealing the political biography of Chiang Ch'ing, Roxane Witke assumed a burden far weightier than biographers of more orthodox figures have traditionally agreed to carry. In a revolutionary society where little remains that is not political, the sixty hours of interviews Madame Mao granted to Witke in the summer of 1972 carry a meaning the significance of which was always assumed, the implications of which can better be understood in light of the hindsight afforded by purge.

In proposing, however disingenuously, to "dissect" herself before Witke (p. 5), Chiang Ch'ing was not only breaking the fundamental tenet of Chinese Marxism that only the masses, not individuals, make history, but she was putting herself on the same historical plane as the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and her husband, Mao Tse-tung. Not since Edgar Snow had spent long hours with Mao in the caves of Shensi, well over a decade before the Communists took control of the mainland and long before their ultimate fate had been assured, had so high-ranking a member of the Party permitted such an

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intimate portrait of personal involvement in the country's continuing revolution. In light of recent accusations against her, it is entirely conceivable that Chiang's interviews with Witke were part of a larger plan if not actually to replace her husband, at least to assure her continuing political prominence after his death. Witke, it can be argued, was to perform the same function for her that Snow had played for Mao.

In her quest for acceptance by the West, however, Chiang Ch'ing may unwittingly have contributed to preparations for her own political funeral. For however genuinely tragic her life, however real her commitment to China's revolution, however difficult it has always been and may still be for even the most intelligent, persistent, and ambitious Chinese woman to rise to power in a society traditionally dominated by men, Chiang Ch'ing's political acumen, her depth of understanding of China's history and its future and her insight into her own personal political motives bear scant comparison to the skills and insights of Mao. In exposing herself to this sophisticated and knowledgeable American scholar of modern Chinese history, Chiang revealed her weaknesses as well as her strengths, her sometimes immobilizing neuroses as well as her political stamina, her personal vendettas as well as her political credo, and her ultimate and utter vulnerability in the face of a hostile political elite without the protection of her husband.

I either do not share much of Witke's interpretative analysis of Chiang Ch'ing, or wish that more of such analysis had been included in the book—possibly both. While there is little doubt that the obstacles to Chiang's quest for political power can be at least partially attributed to the antifeminism of those who blocked her path, the limitations of this particular female aspirant to the historical stage were nonetheless both discernible and real. Nor is it possible for me to be quite so sanguine about the effects of Chiang Ch'ing on China's literature and arts. If the recapitulation of Chiang's visit to Hainan Island to perfect *The Red Detachment of Women* has a ring of poignant truth that some other recounted episodes lack, it is nonetheless with relief that one reads recent reports that Chinese audiences now break into hearty and heartfelt laughter when the heroine dismisses the death of her lover as necessary in the cause of revolution. Finally, Chiang Ch'ing's concern with her place in history is less difficult for me to resolve. Chiang will be viewed as a woman whose power was derivative and who, when granted a place in the highest ranks of China's power elite, woefully abused her position. The beauty of Witke's book is that its thorough and painstaking research and reportage permit scholars who may well disagree with the author's analysis to debate the role of Chiang Ch'ing for many years to come.

ANNE F. THURSTON
Fordham University

Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Peasants in Mexico: A Case Study in Public Policy *by Merilee Serrill Grindle. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977. 220 pp. $12.50.*

This study of CONASUPO (Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares, S. A. de C. V. —National Staple Products Company), a Mexican government "decentralized agency,"

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offers informative insights into the politics of public administration in Mexico. It does not pretend to offer a historical review of the unit's overall functions or even a complete description of its activities during the six years of the last presidential term. Instead, the work concentrates on one facet of CONASUPO's operations under President Echeverría—the creation and implementation of a policy for rural development from late 1970 to mid-1975. The materials presented here do not cover the serious agrarian unrest and land seizures which marked the final year of Echeverria's administration or the shifts in both agrarian policy and agricultural administration which occurred during the early part of President López Portillo's term beginning in December, 1976.

The book clearly is a reworked dissertation, with many of the strengths and a few of the weaknesses of the genre. It offers a useful recapitulation of standard works on Mexican politics and administration, and advances several theoretical concepts within which the investigation is couched. As a case study, it is limited in scope and time to a particular set of facts and conditions, with emphasis less on the substance of CONASUPO's rural development policy than on the political considerations which shaped that policy and its implementation.

The major weakness of this work is the unfulfilled—perhaps unfulfillable—promise of its subtitle. It really is not a case study in public policy, for it limits itself to one aspect of a broader policy as carried on by a single agency among many. For all the present vogue of public policy studies, I am not convinced that a monograph of this sort, written by a relatively inexperienced investigator, can succeed in defining and describing a continuing public policy. A given policy is apt to apply beyond the research period available to most students, and any study of it depends upon the cooperation and assistance of individuals staffing the agencies involved in initiating and implementing the policy under consideration. Almost inevitably their discussion of the process is partisan or self-justifying. Professor Grindle has avoided this trap partly because of her maturity as a researcher but also because she really does not offer a public policy case study. Instead, she concentrates more on political and bureaucratic concerns and the more general Mexican political environment in which they are manifest. The book benefits as a result.

This administrative politics approach is realistic and constructive, for any sort of descriptive review of a specific attack on Mexico's very difficult agricultural problems is certain to be time bound and particularistic, given the country's marked pattern of six year cycles of highly personal presidential government. Professor Grindle's more analytical presentation offers a basis for understanding the material and political constraints upon policy planners and administrators which limit their real options. One might not have been able to forecast the specific sorts of agrarian conflict which broke out in Mexico during 1976 from reading this book, but it does help one to understand why President Echeverría and his CONASUPO collaborators adopted their particular tactics of rural reform and why President López Portillo shifted his approach when he came to power.

ROBERT E. SCOTT
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress: An Account of the Belaúnde Administration, 1963–1968 *by Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 308 pp. $16.50.*

The demise of constitutionally elected government in the Third World has been a major concern of social scientists in recent years. Increasingly, economic factors have been considered critical to this demise. Thus Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski's *Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress,* which deals with the government of Fernando Belaúnde that was toppled by a leftist military group in 1968, purports to address important issues in the political economy of development. The promise of the volume is especially great because of the author's intimate involvement with economic policy making, as a director of the Central Reserve Bank. By and large, however, the book fails to fulfill its promise.

Most of the book is devoted to accounts of the major economic decisions of the Belaúnde government. Kuczynski describes the increase in government expenditure and the ensuing budget deficit; the 1967 balance of payments crisis and the subsequent devaluation; and the Central Bank's battle for greater taxation. However, the significance of these economic policies for the fate of the Belaúnde government is not made clear. Indeed, the author emphasizes the positive effects of these policies: Peru's solid economic growth, increasing benefits for top income groups, the smooth adjustment to the devaluation, and the apparent success of the tax reform package in contributing to economic recovery just before the coup (pp. 50, 71, 174, 259, 283–284).

Given the author's positive assessment of economic policies during the Belaúnde era, he must turn to other factors as key determinants of the military coup. Belaúnde's problems in negotiating a new agreement for the control of the International Petroleum Company (IPC, a Standard Oil subsidiary) are emphasized (pp. 259–276). Kuczynski suggests that the government's difficulties with IPC were blown out of proportion through newspaper campaigns and politicians' personal ambitions (pp. 262, 272, 284). Kuczynski also stresses that the Peruvian constitution excessively fragmented power between the executive and the Congress (pp. 278–279).

Kuczynski's account of the Belaúnde era neglects various important issues. Although numerous social scientists have emphasized the nature of economic growth in the Third World as critical to the difficulties confronted by democratic governments, especially limitations in the import substitution process and the capital-intensive character of imported technology, these problems are not discussed by Kuczynski. Although Kuczynski refers to the work of Richard Webb on income distribution in Peru, work which shows that redistribution occurred primarily among the top deciles in the income profile during the Belaúnde era, Kuczynski does not elaborate the causes or results of this fact. Peasant discontent with the Belaúnde government was great, in part because Belaúnde had promised a land reform which he then could not deliver, but this issue is glossed over by Kuczynski.

Various shortcomings of the political system are also neglected by Kuczynski. The author criticizes the Peruvian Congress as a manifestation of the cumbersome workings of "traditional political machinery," but does not analyze its character thoroughly. The socioeconomic position of most members was high; a literacy clause severely restricted electoral participation and rural areas traditionally electing hacendados were overrepre-

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sented. The conservative role of the Congress thus had to be expected. The divisions within Belaúnde's party reflected not only political ambitions, as Kuczynski emphasizes, but also frustrations that the government had not been able to carry out promised reforms.

As an insider in the Belaúnde administration, Kuczynski does present considerable interesting detail on important political personalities and bureaucratic conflicts. But also perhaps because of his position as an insider in the administration, Kuczynski seems to neglect many of the larger problems that contributed to the demise of the elected government.

CYNTHIA MCCLINTOCK
George Washington University

The Military Coup D'État as a Political Process, Ecuador, 1948–1966 *by John Samuel Fitch. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 243 pp. $15.00.*

This is a book with much to recommend it. To begin with, it is one of only a handful of studies of coups d'état which are grounded in a systematic study of the attitudes and orientations of military officers themselves. The primary data source for the volume is a survey of seventy-two military officers who were active in a succession of coups and attempted coups in Ecuador between 1954 and 1966. Second, by focusing on a Latin American country, Ecuador, which has received relatively little scholarly attention from political scientists, the book helps to broaden the empirical base of a regional literature which is heavily skewed toward the study of a few large countries—Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile. Relatedly, this is a case study undertaken with a comparative perspective. The volume contains a large number of interesting additions to, or qualifications of, earlier works on the political behavior of the military by authors such as Huntington, Stepan, and Needler.

Fitch's analytical point of departure is a list of "decision criteria," inductively derived, by which Ecuadorian military officers monitored the performance of incumbent governments. Decisions to support a coup evidently depended in the first instance on officers' perceptions of a government's constitutionality, public opinion, on the extent of public disorders, personal ties to the government, "communist threat," or the military's institutional interests. The relative salience of these criteria in turn varied with changing military role perceptions. Officers identifying with an "arbiter" role, for example, were most likely to emphasize public opinion. "Developmentalist" officers attached relatively little importance to constitutionality and a great deal to the "communist threat" and institutional interests. While taking socioeconomic factors into account, Fitch also has some interesting observations about the influence of military organization and class composition on the political role of the armed forces. Finally, these patterns are related to the larger domestic and international sociopolitical environment. Fitch suggests that both decision criteria and role perceptions are influenced by fluctuations in Ecuador's

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dependent, export-oriented economy, and that, at the level of macropolitics, the coup d'état serves as an adjustment mechanism which helps to preserve the status quo.

As implied, this book ranges over a very large number of issues: causes and consequences of military "intervention," individual and institutional behavior, and domestic and international social and economic forces. In some respects, this is a weakness since the comprehensiveness of the coverage creates a degree of diffuseness in the analysis and presentation, and perhaps some imbalances as well. While extensive attention is devoted to the perceptions and role orientations of individual officers, for example, discussions of "environmental," socioeconomic, and political structures receive less scrutiny, sometimes in the context of overly detailed historical accounts of the maneuverings of high government officials and military officers involved in particular coups. The thesis about the "safety valve" effects of Ecuador's coups receives less attention still. Such weaknesses, however, are substantially outweighed by the strengths of the volume. It reflects careful, serious, and highly difficult field research. It breaks important new empirical ground and adds a variety of rich comparative insights into the literature on the military.

ROBERT R. KAUFMAN
Douglass College, Rutgers University

Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments by Eric A. Nordlinger. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1977. 224 pp. $8.95.

This is probably the best general work on the Third World military in a decade. Eric Nordlinger has provided a truly impressive summary of the rapidly growing body of empirical data on military officers, coups, and military governments, along with a clear and straightforward synthesis of the current theoretical literature. It is one of those rare books that is simple and direct enough to be used successfully as an undergraduate text and also sophisticated enough to serve as a reference work for professional political scientists. It includes, for example, a wealth of statistical findings from other studies, but these citations are almost always accompanied by carefully drawn examples from a variety of countries which illustrate the particular point in question for the nonprofessional.

Beginning with a discussion of various methods for civilian control of the military, Nordlinger explains why these seldom work in Third World societies. In his chapter on military coups, after a careful review of various hypotheses about the military decision to overthrow the government, he concludes that most often coups occur when corporate grievances of the military coincide with a loss of legitimacy produced by poor government performance. There is also a nice section on *how* coups occur and the often uncertain process by which individuals and cliques maneuver to influence the final outcome.

The second half of the book discusses the attitudes, policy preferences, and governing style of the military in power. Here Nordlinger builds upon his earlier work on the comparative performance of military regimes. In the economic field, he finds the military record ambiguous and not easily distinguishable from that of the civilians. Despite the claims made for the military as an agent of change, he finds that most

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military regimes tend to accept or protect the status quo, with military governments much more uniformly conservative than their civilian counterparts. Moreover, even the more radical military regimes usually turn out to be ineffective in promoting reform. In the more directly political areas—national integration and legitimacy—the military's record is even worse, leading Nordlinger to conclude that the aftermath of military intervention will normally include further crises, exacerbated in many cases by the specific deficiencies of military officers as political leaders.

A book as wide-ranging as this one exhibits, not surprisingly, some weak points. There is a perhaps unavoidable tendency to overgeneralize, to focus on the "typical" case and to underplay the range of variations, neglecting therefore the explanation of these variations. The major exception is a section on the Latin American military which unfortunately endorses, albeit with qualifications, José Nun's thesis on the ties of the military to the middle class and Huntington's corollary proposition that the military generally plays a progressive role in traditional societies, then switches to a moderating role, and finally becomes the guardian of the status quo as mass mobilization threatens middle class interests. The logic of the argument is overly simple. There is, in addition, little evidence of strong class identifications among the Latin American military or of such a neat progression in military roles. In part, the difficulty here stems from the sometimes uncritical reliance on statistical studies, particularly cross-national correlational analyses which are methodologically very suspect.

A more serious flaw is the neglect of external influences in Third World coups which Nordlinger treats as inconsequential, even in the overthrow of Allende in Chile. Without disputing the argument that most coups result from essentially domestic problems, one can nevertheless cite various cases of major and minor intervention by external actors. Likewise there is almost no discussion of foreign military assistance programs, foreign advisers, foreign military aid, or foreign training, even as these relate to the increased professionalization of the military and hence to the growth of the sense of corporate identity which Nordlinger quite properly stresses as a key determinant of military behavior. In its tendency to view Third World nations as encapsulated, self-contained entities, abstracted from the complex patterns of dependency which tie them to the centers of world power, *Soldiers in Politics* seems curiously dated.

Finally, I personally object to the use of the term *praetorians* throughout the book to refer to officers who use military force for political purposes. This unfortunately reinforces the subconscious assumption of most undergraduates that military officers come in two neat and distinct varieties—those who intervene in politics (theirs) and those who don't (ours). It therefore encourages them to see military intervention as merely a Third World problem which is for us a matter of intellectual curiousity, rather than prompting them to wonder what conditions might lead normally nonpolitical, "professional" officers to become politicized, as in the fall of the French Fourth Republic.

Nevertheless, given the merits of the book, these are minor quibbles. Even at $8.95 *Soldiers in Politics* deserves to be used extensively as an undergraduate text and to be read carefully by anyone interested in Third World politics.

JOHN SAMUEL FITCH
University of Colorado

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Latin America in the International Political System *by G. Pope Atkins. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 448 pp. $11.95.*

This book is designed to provide "a topically complete, factually current, introductory level general survey using political science concepts" (p. xiii). That is more or less what it is. It appears to have been inspired by a volume edited by Harold Davis and Larman Wilson, *Latin American Foreign Policies,* which contains a number of competent articles on the foreign affairs of individual Latin American states.

One of Atkins's main purposes is to determine to what extent the Latin American region may be considered "a significant unit" in international affairs (p. 1). In pursuit of this goal, he adopts a "systems" approach, using William Thompson's criteria for the valid designation of a regional subsystem: proximity, internal and external recognition, and intense and regular interaction. His conclusion is that the region *is* a proper subsystem and that it occupies "a unique place in political analysis" (p. 382). However, the author arrives at that conclusion by using a method which probably allows for no other conclusion. This method is the extraction of modal regional experiences by generalizing from the variance in national experiences. Thus, if most nations in Latin America demonstrate forms of nationalism in their foreign affairs, then the author concludes that the "force of nationalism is strong everywhere" (p. 42). In the same vein, the author asserts that political parties "rarely pursue strong or consistent policies on international issues" (p. 44), and that Latin American diplomats tend "to share upper class interests and goals" except in nations with large middle classes (p. 46). This method, which obscures both the variance and the forces behind the variance in national experiences, guarantees the conclusion.

Another major failing is the use of concepts such as "conflict," "cooperation," and "nonstate actors" as convenient devices for organizing chapters rather than as elements in a set of interrelated theoretical propositions.

Nevertheless, the book contains a number of redeeming features. Chapter three is a good survey of the relations between Latin America and the nonhemispheric great powers since the colonial era. Chapter four summarizes the conclusions from the major historical works on the foreign policy of the United States toward Latin America, starting with the Monroe Doctrine. Chapter five is dedicated to a survey of nonstate actors and contains a wealth of information on the role of the Roman Catholic Church and on guerrilla movements in Latin America. The discussion of multinational corporations and labor movements leaves a lot to be desired, however.

The author either omits, or cites but then fails to discuss, some of the more important studies: for example, the works of Ted Moran on Chilean copper, of Franklin Tugwell on Venezuelan petroleum, of Constantine Vaitsos on multinational pricing practices in Colombia. He also omits any reference to the charges by Philip Agee in *Inside the Company* that the CIA had helped to finance and had infiltrated many of the international and national labor organizations in Latin America.

I do not understand why economic investment, trade, aid, the training of military personnel, arms transfers, diplomatic exchanges and cultural relations are all lumped together under the heading of "cooperation" in the sixth chapter, while chapter nine is devoted to regional integration. Regional integration certainly fits the author's definition of coopera-

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tion ("the conscious behavior of the differentiated units designed to produce results of value to all of them" p. 156) better than arms transfers.

Chapter eight, on the effects of the global and regional balances of power on Latin American affairs, is well done and concludes with some interesting statements: "While some individual regional actors have substantially increased their national capabilities (notably Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru), the region's generally increased freedom of action and the loosening of the balance of power system in their favor rests not so much on the power of individual states as on their ability to unify with each other and present a common front to the rest of the world. If external influence continues to decline relatively, then struggles for leadership within the region will become more important to international politics" (pp. 268–9).

Finally, the book provides a very complete bibliography and each chapter concludes with a short bibliographic essay. To summarize, this book provides few new insights into the subject of Latin American international affairs, mainly because of its lack of sophistication. Nevertheless it contains a great deal of useful information which has never before been assembled in one place. For that reason it would make good reading for advanced undergraduates or beginning graduate students if supplemented with works of greater theoretical sophistication.

JEFFREY HART
Princeton University

The Politics of South Africa: Democracy and Racial Diversity *by Howard Brotz. New York, Oxford University Press, 1977. 164 pp. $11.95.*

The publishers of this book claim that Professor Brotz has "undone the ideological straightjacket" surrounding South African politics and discovered, or rather rediscovered, a politically feasible path toward peaceful change in the republic. No one could be better qualified than Brotz, an outsider with expert knowledge of North American race relations who has closely followed South African politics for some thirteen years, to undertake this daunting task. However, after reading *The Politics of South Africa*, I remain unconvinced.

Brotz argues that the development of Afrikaner nationalism in the direction of doctrinaire *apartheid* was by no means inevitable. It arose because Smuts failed to sever his connections with the liberal wing of his party led by Hofmeyr and to unite instead with Havenga to form a new "center" coalition (Brotz's term) before the fateful 1948 elections. Consequently, moderate Afrikaners were alienated from the United Party and the eminently "realistic and practical" guidelines set out by Chief Justice Fagan's commission could not be implemented. The essence of Fagan's report rested on two proposals: that Africans, Coloreds, and Indians should be granted the greatest measure of self-administration compatible "with the general safety and welfare of the State," and that in all other matters there should be *effective* and *genuine* consultation. Most of the book consists of a discussion of the political, economic, and social bases of apartheid, interspersed with comments on the

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way in which Fagan's principles might have been applied in South Africa. A final chapter considers the broad issue of liberal democracy and racial diversity, and suggests that Fagan's model has relevance not only for South Africa but for all multiethnic and multiracial societies.

A number of fundamental objections immediately come to mind. To equate the "true center" of South African politics with a *verligte* Afrikaner Nationalist position might have been arguable in 1948 when Fagan was writing his report, but thirty years later it seems totally unrealistic. Such an analysis virtually ignores the urban Africans' growing economic and civil power, as shown in the Durban strikes and the Soweto riots, and totally ignores the international dimension of the power struggle in Southern Africa.

Further objections arise to the "practical" solution the author proposes. Although he recognizes the problem, Brotz never shows how consultation, with all its benign, paternalistic connotations, can be effective and meaningful in a situation of very unequal political representation. What is to prevent "consultation" from degenerating into a one-way monologue between government officials and a few black stooges? And who are the "legitimate Black spokesmen" (p. 51) that Brotz simply identifies with the Bantustan leadership? If Chief Matanzima has greater "legitimacy" in African eyes than Nelson Mandela, where is the evidence? (Throughout the book, such new evidence that is cited tends to be anecdotal rather than systematic.) This is a vital question since Africans are unlikely to *consent* to a system of "consultation" in the present political climate in South Africa. What might have been acceptable to an earlier generation of Africans, Fagan's contemporaries, is unlikely to satisfy the "children of Soweto," still less their ex-classmates in Maputo, Moscow, Lusaka and London.

The only chance for liberal democracy in South Africa is a rapid move toward meaningful power sharing with urban Africans, but the chances that this would be acceptable to the present generation of Nationalist politicians, or their white electorate, seem remote. Recent Nationalist proposals to create "ethnic parliaments" for Coloreds and Indians significantly ignore the urban African and have been dismissed by the leader of Soweto's Committee of Ten, Nthato Motlana, as "exercises in futility." Not even a "toy telephone" this time for the urban African.

For a book that claims to transcend narrow politics, there are a remarkable number of rhetorical and unsubstantiated assertions: undefined references to "decent politics"; and the use of the emotive term "ethnic suicide," resisted by "all thoughtful people" except "morons and hypocrites" (p. 136). No references are made to such standard sociological and political works as those of Pierre van den Berghe, Lee Kuper and Heribert Adam. Are they, perhaps, also classified as "coffee-house intellectuals"? It is a pity that a book that raises such a genuine question as the reconciliation of majority rule with minority ethnic rights should not supply a more convincing answer. In South Africa the Fagan problem remains; the Fagan "solution" belongs to a bygone era.

JOHN STONE
St. Anthony's College, Oxford

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Technology, World Politics and American Policy *by Victor Basiuk. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. 409 pp. $17.50.*

Technology is hitting us like a bombshell—global electrical power transmission grids, test-tube fertilizations, cloning of organisms, exploitation of oil and gas on the seabed, and direct broadcasting from satellites, to name but a few novelties. We had better be prepared for the consequences. In elaborating this theme, Basiuk focuses on advanced technologies and their influence on developed countries. He devotes separate chapters to the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Japan in which his projections run to the year 2000. In subsequent projections carried to the year 2050 he foresees either a postindustrial society, as defined by Bell or alternatively by Kahn, or a semi-stationary society, in which growth is limited. Technology will offer postindustrial countries the means to shape desirable societies, but at the cost of making them so complex and pluralistic that they will be unable to deal effectively with their problems (p. 267). Technology will likewise be the means to economic growth in advanced semi-stationary societies, but such means will be limited in their effect (p. 283).

The author has attempted the nearly impossible in this book—to examine all technologies and the ways in which they will impinge on the world until 2050. The reader has to be impressed by the time and effort the author has put into this undertaking and by the scope of his knowledge. But whatever the merits of a comprehensive approach, it entails several inevitable shortcomings as well. Perhaps the most noticeable is that it is already dated. Even within a time span as short as five years, the way in which we view things changes dramatically. We used to speak of a bipolar world primarily concerned with relations among the developed countries. But now Third World demands are important, and our focus is increasingly on North-South problems. We now recognize that availability of resources affects our options. Population growth is levelling off, cars are smaller, laws controlling pollution are common; but it was only a short while ago that Rachel Carson's book on pollution was an avant garde work which ushered in a new era of awareness. The rapid rate of change in society fosters skepticism toward projections of the global effect of technology on a future as distant as 2050.

The sheer magnitude of the author's undertaking frequently results in overly facile statements on important, controversial issues. For example, "The energy crisis, on balance, favors the development of the LDCs, although some will suffer". . . . "Since nitrogen fertilizers are based on oil, and the price of oil has increased significantly in recent years, the trend toward lower costs in fertilizers seems to be at least partially reversed" (p. 143). But the price of nitrogen fertilizers, for example, at least partially reflects the accordian investment cycle in fertilizers. Many of the author's statements, which may or may not be true, merit several pages of analysis, if not more.

In the first chapters of his book Basiuk sets forth a framework for the analysis that follows. Because it mainly consists of disjointed classifications and categories, the reader is never sure how the framework supports the analysis. From Chapter 5 onward, however, Basiuk provides a far-reaching description of the global influence of technology and of the factors that may affect it. He displays his analytical skill most forcefully in Part IV where he examines U.S. policy. He offers useful insights and ideas in his discussion of the position of science and technology in the U. S. government—for example,

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that the Office of Science and Technology be modeled on the Council of Economic Advisors (p. 211–12). This proposal deserves consideration. This book should be a useful addition to the literature on technology and political systems.

EDITH BROWN WEISS
Princeton University

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third *by Edward Luttwak. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 255 pp. $12.95.*

Luttwak divides his book into three main chapters, each of which analyzes one of three Roman imperial systems of grand strategy. Chapter One ("The Julio-Claudian System") discusses and praises the early empire's reliance on mobile Roman armies and frontier client-states to protect the borders. Chapter Two ("From the Flavians to the Severi") describes the second system—defense of the border by small, dispersed Roman units. Chapter Three ("Defense in Depth") considers the Roman armies' reconcentration in order to deal with barbarians who had already penetrated the empire. Luttwak describes at length the organization, equipment, tactics, and deployment of the Roman armies and speculates intelligently on the political and psychological devices used by the emperors to alternately expand or defend their realm.

The book displays its origins as a doctoral dissertation in its lavish footnotes and occasionally indigestible detail. Nonetheless, Luttwak writes well and has structured the three main chapters with care and precision. His book has the virtue of being amply supplied with well-executed maps, diagrams, and tables. A minor complaint is that the author sometimes indulges in the "scientistic language" that he condemns in others (p. xi). For example: "At the same time, the particular capabilities of the legionary forces gave them 'escalation dominance' over both enemies and unreliable allies—for in the last analysis they could always prevail over the auxiliaries in high-intensity warfare" (p. 41).

It is strange that in the preface and throughout the book Luttwak denounces " 'Clausewitzian' notions" (pp. xi, xii) which, he believes, consist mainly of a "prejudice against defensive strategies" (p. 61). Clausewitz, in fact, took the entirely opposite view, namely, that defense is inherently much stronger than offense [see Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 357–9]. A serious defect is Luttwak's failure to provide adequate historical links between the three systems, that is, to explain how and why these systems were adopted and then discarded.

The curious thing about this book, however, is that it seems to have attracted as much or more attention and praise from political scientists as from students of ancient history. In part this is so because Luttwak is a well-known writer on current strategic issues, and few "strategic analysts" study any pre-1945 military history, let alone Roman grand strategy. As one who does, Luttwak is indeed to be congratulated.

But Luttwak also makes claims for his book's relevance to current strategic problems, and thereby runs into trouble. He asserts that the "fundamentals of Roman strategy in

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the imperial age were rooted not in a technology now obsolete, but in a predicament that we share" (p. 1). He fails to support this startling assertion with adequate—or indeed with any—serious argument.

Luttwak adopts the extreme "lessons of history" position to defend his study of military history. That is unnecessary and unfortunate. By suggesting that his reader should see similarities between the strategic problems of Jimmy Carter and those of Marcus Aurelius, he turns this interesting—if flawed—history into an enigmatic allegory.

ELIOT COHEN
Harvard University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

America Votes 12: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics *edited by Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivray. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977. 415 pp. $35.00.*

American Constitutional Development *compiled by Alpheus Thomas Mason and D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. Arlington Heights, Ill., AHM Publishing Corporation, 1977. 166 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $6.95.*

Biographical Directory of the United States Executive Branch, 1774–1977, 2nd ed., rev. *edited by Robert Sobel. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1977. 503 pp. $29.95.*

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City Government Finances in 1975–76 *prepared by Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 116 pp. $2.30.*

Congress and the Nation: Vol. IV, 1973–1976 *edited by Patricia Ann O'Connor. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1977. 1217 pp. $49.50.*

County Government Finances in 1975–76 *prepared by Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 74 pp. $1.75.*

A Dictionary of Social Sciences *by Hugo F. Reading. Boston, Mass., Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 231 pp. Cloth, $7.95; paper, $3.50.*

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Evolution of the Modern Presidency: A Biliographical Survey *by Fred I. Greenstein, Larry Berman, and Alvin S. Felzenberg. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $4.75.*

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Governmental Finances in 1975–76 *prepared by Governments Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 73 pp. $1.35.*

Local Government Finances in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties: 1975–1976 *prepared by Governments Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census. Washington, D.C., 1977. 147 pp. $2.55.*

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

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

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